Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

THOMAS MACKLIN, JR.

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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Q: Today is September 27, 2000. This is an interview with Thomas Macklin, Jr. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy. Tom and I are old friends.

When and where were you born?

MACKLIN: I was born in Fort Worth, Texas, October 6, 1935.

Q: Tell me a bit about your parents, where they came from, their education and background, what they were doing.

MACKLIN: My parents were both born in Texas. My father was born in Fort Worth. My mother was born in Dallas. They were married during the Depression. My father was working his way through Texas Christian University. He lost his job after he was married and they moved to California. Basically, I grew up in California.

Q: Your parents were Texan for some time?

MACKLIN: Yes. The whole family had come out of Texas, although my grandfather on my father's side was British and had fought in the World War and been in the Royal Navy and had immigrated to the States before World War I.

Q: Didn't your parents go to college or university?

MACKLIN: My father started at Texas Christian, but wasn't able to finish because of the Depression and because he got married. Then later on, he went back to college and studied. He was never able to complete a bachelor's degree, but he completed maybe 45 credit hours.

Q: What was your father doing? Was your mother pretty much a housewife?

MACKLIN: It was the housewife era. Women didn't work. They always told me during the Depression that they would generally not hire women because everyone felt that only one person per family should work so that every family could have as much income as possible. So, she worked until she was married. She worked as a secretary and then she didn't work again for about 12 years.

Q: When you moved to California, what was your father doing?

MACKLIN: In those days, he was working with Jewelty Company, which was a regional grocery store chain. He worked with them for a long time and then he decided he needed to move on in the world of business and he made a lot of ill-considered moves and wound up unemployed for two years during the '40s, which was a psychological strain on him and the family. I guess when he was about 42, he took a job at San Diego State working in the bookstore as an accountant. He then worked his way up to be bookstore manager and then became president of the National College Bookstore Association and achieved a certain amount of prominence, but it was late in life.

Q: How old were you when you moved to California?

MACKLIN: A year and a half.

Q: So there is not much Texas memory there.

MACKLIN: Well, we'd go back and forth, but no, not really. I really grew up in San Diego and Long Beach.

Q: You just missed the earthquake in Long Beach, didn't you?

MACKLIN: I don't remember an earthquake in Long Beach.

Q: If you were there, you would remember it. I was in Beverley Hills at the time and I slept in the car that night because everything was shaking so much. It was quite something.

What was life like in Long Beach growing up?

MACKLIN: That was during the war and it was all very quiet and peaceful. Nobody locked the door to the house. Crime was either unreported or non-existent. There was a lot of emphasis on the war. I remember war posters everyplace and propaganda. There was a lot of concern about the Japanese. There were blackouts all the time. We had blackout curtains in the house. There were rumors that the Japanese had shelled parts of California. There was concern that the Japanese might land in California. So, people were very nervous and consequently there was a lot of anti-Japanese feeling. In the process, the Japanese were portrayed as subhuman monkeys who didn't value human life and were treacherous and duplicitous like the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. But life was good for a kid.

Q: You went to school where?

MACKLIN: In Long Beach and San Diego.

Q: How did you find the California school system at that time?

MACKLIN: I guess it's hard to generalize. I was dyslexic as a kid and so I wasn't a great student. I didn't work my way out of high school. It wasn't a great school experience. Comparing it to what my kids go through now, I had it a lot easier.

Q: You were 12 when the war ended. Were you following the war news?

MACKLIN: I was actually 10 when the war ended. My understanding of it was that we were so much better than the other side and so I couldn't figure out why it lasted so long. But in the last couple of years, there was an inevitability about the end of the war. Everybody expected it to end. I can remember VJ Day in San Diego. We went downtown to the Orpheum Theater to see the Marx Brothers on stage. There was a parade and ticker tape and stuff like that. We watched that for a while and watched the Marx Brothers for two or three hours clown around and went home.

Q: You went to high school in San Diego.

MACKLIN: We were in Long Beach during most of the war and then came back to San Diego and stayed there.

Q: San Diego was very much a Navy town, wasn't it?

MACKLIN: It was. Navy Day was a big celebration.

Q: Did you get out and watch the ships?

MACKLIN: No, but the harbor was always chockablock with ships. I can remember one time as a kid, we had family friends who lived down at the far end of San Diego Bay and the parents took us to the beach one time and we wandered across to the bayside, where there were a whole bunch of destroyers and things lined up. We wanted to go look at the ships. The Navy guys yelled at us and we yelled back at them, so they shot at us. Didn't come close, but kicked up sand maybe 20 feet away and scared us and we ran away.

Q: That was rather stupid.

MACKLIN: Yes.

Q: I can't imagine that anybody in their right mind? Who knows.

MACKLIN: I think that the military had a little bit more latitude in those days than they do now.

Q: Yes. It sounds like some pretty odd characters on the ships at that point.

You graduated from high school when?

MACKLIN: 1954.

Q: The Korean War was essentially over by this time.

MACKLIN: That's correct, although the draft was very serious and so people were concerned about the draft. There was still an active draft program. They figured they would get you by about the time you turned 21. I went to San Diego State right out of high school. Most young boys joined the Air Force ROTC program because that kept you out of the draft for two years and then at the end of your sophomore year you were sometimes offered a contract to continue ROTC for your junior/senior years and then you would be commissioned as a second lieutenant and have a four year commitment. So, I went the first two years and then I refused to sign on.

Q: How does one work one's way out of dyslexia?

MACKLIN: I sort of seemed to grow out of it. A neurologist might be able to explain it. If you read and write enough, eventually you create neuron grooves in your head which make it natural, but I've always found it difficult to learn foreign languages.

Q: What were you majoring in in college?

MACKLIN: I got a bachelor's in political science and eventually got a master's in history.

Q: Was there any particular area of concentration in political science?

MACKLIN: I always wanted to join the Foreign Service. I decided in my first year of college that I really liked foreign affairs and if you're interested in foreign affairs, there weren't really very many professions where you could apply that. So, I was interested in the Foreign Service. Generally at that time when you turned 29, you couldn't take the written test, so it was a young man's game. Generally, everybody said, "Well, the exam is so difficult, you can't depend on it. So, figure out something else to do." So, I thought I'd become a history teacher, but it never worked out.

Q: In history, were you looking at any particular area?

MACKLIN: I liked Roman and European history. I never cared much for Asian or Latin American. I was always more interested in Europe. That was in part a reflection of the professors we had. Later on, I became fascinated with the Middle East, but we didn't have anybody that taught Middle Eastern history. Only one teacher did Mexico and Latin America and he was no good. I think nobody did Asia. So, if you studied history, it was history of Europe.

Q: What was the spirit of San Diego State at the time? Were they looking towards places outside of California or was this pretty much self-contained? Was it a pretty international looking time on the campus?

MACKLIN: In retrospect, it was a terrible school. I have always regretted having gone there. When I grew up in San Diego, if you went to college, you went to San Diego State. When I graduated from high school, if you got a scholarship, it was usually $50 to help defray expenses. So, that meant that you went to San Diego State. There were no dorms at San Diego State, so anybody who came from out of town had to find a family to live with. So, consequently, 98% of the people who went to San Diego State were from San Diego. I remember, I had a good friend from high school who was president of the senior class, president of the student body, captain of the basketball team, might have been valedictorian (he was a straight A student) and he was the only one who got a full scholarship anyplace. That was to Pepperdine, a four year scholarship that paid his tuition but none of his room and board, so he went for a year and then dropped out. Basically, everybody who went to San Diego State studied business and education. Those were the two big curriculum. People who studied history and political science, unless it was pre-law, it wasn't good for anything. So, they tended to drift off and teach high school. It wasn't a great academic experience.

Q: How did you hear about the Foreign Service?

MACKLIN: My professors talked about it and then I started reading about it. Then everybody knows who the Secretary of State is. You know there's a State Department. So, the more I read about it, the more I thought, well, that would be kind of fun.

Q: Did Mexico loom large? You're right on the border there.

MACKLIN: Mexico was Tijuana. Tijuana was cheap liquor, liquor without an i.d. card, and the bullfights. So, people would drive down to Tijuana. At the time, the border was pretty easy to get across. No waiting in line. You could go down there and get drunk, go to the bullfights. It was a place to go raise hell. Everybody was aware that there was a place called Mexico City, but that was a long ways away. Mexico was just Tijuana to us. Pretty enlightened.

Q: I have to admit, I went there at one point when I was a kid. I kept that in mind and never wanted to serve in Latin America.

MACKLIN: Yes. It really turned me off.

Q: Did you start doing anything about the Foreign Service while you were getting your master's?

MACKLIN: I took the exam twice. The first time, I got a 68 or something like that. I didn't quite pass. The second time, I did. I improved my score substantially and passed the written. By then, I had started graduate school. Generally, I had figured I would never get in the Foreign Service because basically nobody from San Diego State ever had. We figured it was mostly an Ivy League institution. I thought, well, I'd like to be a history professor. I had started doing graduate work in history. I was working my way through. It took me five years to get my bachelor's.

Q: What type of work were you doing?

MACKLIN: I worked about 35 hours a week. I drove a school bus, sold shoes, was a student teacher's aide, did instruction in the summer, stuff like that. I was extremely active in the fraternity, which took up a lot of time, too. So, it took me a long time. I also meandered around a little bit academically.

Q: You took the oral exam.

MACKLIN: Yes. In 1962, my best friend in the fraternity, Boyd Malloy, and I had absolutely had it with San Diego State. We had gotten to the point where we had to get out of town. I was interested in going to Berkeley, but I needed somebody to sponsor me up there. There was a problem at Berkeley. At the time, there was a division in the history faculty at Berkeley. It had gotten so bad it had separated into cliques. We were told professors were flunking each other's students. There was such open bad feeling.

Q: Was it personality or viewpoints?

MACKLIN: It was entirely personality. So, the professor helping me at San Diego State was in the wrong group at Berkeley. He was trying to get me into Berkeley and it hadn't worked yet. This fraternity brother of mine and I said, "We've got to get the hell out of San Diego. We're going nuts." This was early fall. I had taken the written exam in September. We found out that there was a fraternity scholarship. The scholarship would pay tuition and room and board to go to a chapter that was trying to rebuild or had just been founded and needed somebody. We had both been presidents of the fraternity and held a lot of offices. So, we contacted the national office in Memphis.

Q: Which fraternity was this?

MACKLIN: It was Pi Kappa Alpha, a strong southern fraternity. So, we contacted national headquarters in Memphis and said, "We want to do this." They said, "Great, you're on. We'll give you a choice of seven campuses." We said, "We don't care what the school is like. We want to go as far from San Diego as possible." The farthest place from San Diego was the University of Maryland. So, we went to the University of Maryland for a semester. I was going to Maryland when I took the oral exam. I found a professor there who had some experience in the Foreign Service exam process. So, I went to him and he gave me some tips. I had an old station wagon that I had driven from San Diego and so I drove down, parked the car by the Lincoln Memorial in the circle there, and then walked up to the State Department, took the oral exam, passed. They said, "When do you want to come to work?" I said, "Well, I've saved up my money and I want to go to Europe this summer. How about September?" I went to Europe and came back and checked with them. They said, "Well, we should be able to take you in in a couple of months. Why don't you go back to San Diego and get your gear?" That was 1963. Then in November of 1963, there was a change of presidents. The first thing Johnson did when he came in was freeze federal hiring. That freeze stayed in effect for over a year. I finally entered the Foreign Service in January of 1965.

Q: What about the oral exam? Do you recall any of the questions that were asked?

MACKLIN: Yes. I think there were five or six? There was a senior guy named Sidney Mellon who was an economic officer. There was a USIS officer, a consular officer, and two or three others. Mellon started off by saying, "You've been studying European history. Why don't you trace the development of democracy in Germany from 1919 thru 1933 and draw some generalizations?" So, I tried to patch together a short answer. I think he was only marginally pleased with what I said. They said, "Why do you want to enter the Foreign Service?" I said, "Well, it's not a job. It's a way of life." Most people who at that time entered the Foreign Service stayed in over 40 years. Generally, you could work until you were 65. Most people joined in their 20s, so they had worked over 40 years. I said, "It's a way of life and I really like it. I'd like to serve overseas. I'm interested in economic development in the developing world, particularly Africa." I was. I had been reading a lot on economic development.

Q: Africa had a very high profile at that time, during the '60s. It was a coming of age.

MACKLIN: Yes. All of these countries were becoming independenGhana, Tanzania, etc. There were bold new African leaders who were not yet corrupt. It was kind of an exciting place. There were a lot of ideas about how to go with economic development in that area. So, Mellon, who was an economic officer, had been involved in civil air negotiations. We talked about economics for a while. I think that's what got me through, the economic line of questioning.

Q: What did you do in the interim period when the freeze was on?

MACKLIN: I went back to San Diego State and started on my master's again. I worked with that, worked 35 hours a week, and took 12 study hours, and kept chipping away at my master's and tried to figure out what the hell was going on.

Q: You came into the Foreign Service in 1965.

MACKLIN: Yes, January of '65.

One thing I might say about the oral is that it was funny? another question they asked me was "How did you work 35 hours a week and take a full study load?" I explained how I had worked to drive a school bus at hours you don't normally go to class, sold shoes, drove a bus Sunday morning when you normally sleep. They seemed to really like me and there seemed to be a point at which in the oral exam they had decided to pass me. That is when I choked. They asked me, "Since you want to go to Africa, how many capitals can you name in Africa?" It was a throwaway question. I just completely blanked. All I could think of was Cairo. Then they said, "Well, how many countries can you think of in Africa?" Again, all I could think of was Egypt. I thought, "Suddenly I passed and now I'm going to get thrown out of here."

Q: That happens to all of us.

You came in in '65. I take it you went into an A-100 course.

MACKLIN: Right.

Q: Did you have any feel for the composition of the group of people you were coming in with, the outlook, where they were from?

MACKLIN: It was a class of about 28, a relatively small class. None of us ever got to be ambassador. One of my classmates became a DAS [deputy assistant secretary]. That was the highest anybody got. There were some good people in it, but about half of them dropped out within five years for personal reasons. There were five ladies in the class and only one of them stayed in for full career. Frankly, she kind of became an alcoholic. But it was a good group. In those days, everybody was thrilled to have gotten in the Foreign Service, took it very seriously, tried to measure up. There were FSOs running the A-100 course. At the time, the entire FSI establishment was located in the basement of one of the buildings at Arlington Towers. The language school, the A-100 course, everything. The air down there was dank and putrid. It was hard to stay awake sometimes.

Q: It was really a garage, multistory and underground. Every once in a while, the carbon dioxide level was too high and so we all had to get out.

MACKLIN: Yes. That happened once. But we were working for the Foreign Service, for the State Department, so this was nothing. We were so thrilled to be there we didn't realize what a pit it was that they used for the facility.

The head of the A-100 course was a man named Garrett Solen, who had been DCM in Reykjavik and in Colombo. His deputy was a guy named Bob Barrett. Garrett Solen had been a major in the war and before the war had been an instructor at a CCC [Civilian Conservation Corps] camp. He was very much by the numbers, stand tall? He made it very clear the first day of class that we would have speakers and that we were supposed to be attentive to speakers and we were supposed to ask thoughtful questions during the question and answer period, that we would be graded on the quality of the questions and that if we didn't ask thoughtful questions, our careers might start off with a black mark. So, at the end of every lecture, there was a force of hands that went up. Later on, years and years later when I was at the National War College, the Air Force guys used to keep a list of the dumbest questions and the longest questions and the windiest questions and we should have done the same thing in the A-100 course, but we were too intimidated. There was a guy in a class following ours who had a beard. I remember Garrett Solen got up the second day and said to him, "That's not done in the Foreign Service." So, the next day, the beard was off. In fact, we had a chat about halfway through the program. He was terribly concerned over my posture. He felt I didn't sit up straight and this would be a reflection on the Service and I needed to improve my posture. So, I tried to sit up straight.

Q: That shows you how things were run by idiosyncrasies because those things just weren't? I didn't pick up any of that before. It shows one person putting his mark on a special class. I notice you're not sitting up very straight right now.

MACKLIN: That's right. I'm slouching right now.

Let me tell you about the deputy in the class. He was an interesting guy, Bob Barnard. He was called a "mystery man." Garrett Solen dominated the class. He was the one who talked to us, who introduced speakers, who said what we were doing. Bob Barnard sat in the back and read the "New York Times." There were people who wondered if indeed he worked for State or for somebody else. He almost never spoke. All he did was sit in the back and read the paper. No visible role in the whole process. He was an FS-04 at the time.

Q: That's about a major.

MACKLIN: Yes. He was at the end of his career. He had loved Africa, but somewhere along the way, he had blotted his copy book and he figured his career was over because he hadn't been promoted fast enough. In those days, the Service selected out people who were low ranked. So, he had something like six kids. He told us towards the end of the class that he had one more tour left in the Foreign Service before he would be selected out because he had been in grade too long and that he wanted to pick the post that had the highest differential possible so that he could make some money because he had to put these kids through college. So, the post he picked in '66 or '67 was Enugu in Nigeria. He went off as consul general in Enugu just as it separated from Nigeria and became Biafra. So, he was our man in Biafra and had a bit of a name for himself, got two quick promotions, did another 15 or 20 years in the Foreign Service, and enjoyed a rebirth. Just good luck.

Q: There is nothing like a coup or a war to cut things up. This is what we need. Did you have any idea where you wanted to go?

MACKLIN: Yes. I really wanted to go to Africa. I was really interested, particularly East Africa. I was worried about the language factor. Languages have never been easy for me. I had a capability in German and I thought, "Really, if I could go someplace where they use German, I can get off language probation then." You could be promoted once but not twice without getting off of language probation. I was afraid that if I went off to East Africa, I was an FS-08, I would maybe get promoted once during my first or second tour, but I'd be in an area where they just spoke English or tribal languages. You couldn't be promoted twice unless you got off language probation. I was really concerned. So, I said, "If I could get a German language post, then I could get off language probation. Then I'd really like to go to Africa." So, they assigned me to Frankfurt. They gave us 16 weeks of German language training. Then halfway through the training, they changed my assignment to Holland. The reason they changed my assignment was because one of the female officers from our class had been assigned to the Hague. But she was a Foreign Service brat and she had grown up in the Foreign Service, Betty O'Brian. Her father had been CG in Capetown and a bunch of places. She had had it with Europe. She wanted to go someplace in South Asia. But they said, "No, you're a girl. We don't want to send you off someplace rough." So, they assigned her to the Hague. But then the embassy in the Hague wrote back and said, "We've got too many girls here. There is a girl at the consulate in Rotterdam and a girl at the consulate in Amsterdam and we've got two girls here in the embassy. We don't want another girl. Let's break that assignment." So, they said, "Well, Betty's single and Macklin is single. We'll just switch them." So, halfway through German language training, they switched us. I was assigned to Holland and Betty, who was pretty feisty, stood up to Personnel and said, "Look, if you're going to change me, I don't want to go to Germany." We were all in language training together and she was clearly going to get a 3/3 at the end of her 16 weeks. She said, "I want to go someplace exotic. How about Nepal?" So, they sent her to Nepal. She did extremely well, came back, was made Nepalese desk officer, was slated for a dazzling career in the Foreign Service and was extremely bright, but she met a truck driver, fell in love, and quit the Foreign Service." But because of Betty O'Brian, I wound up in Holland rather than Frankfurt, Germany.

Then they broke the assignment again. They said, "Actually, we want to send you to Amsterdam for a year and do consular work. Then you're going to go to the Hague. You won't have to do consular work. You'll do a year of political and a year of economic. But it wouldn't hurt to take the consular course." So, halfway through the consular course, which I was not applying myself to very well, they said, "No, you're going to spend a year in Amsterdam and then you'll rotate up to the Hague."

Q: This would be from '65 to '67?

MACKLIN: Yes.

Q: How did you find the consular course?

MACKLIN: Alice used to lock us in the classroom.

Q: She poisoned the well for a whole generation.

MACKLIN: There was the other guy who kept saying "Goodnight, nurse." Anytime something wouldn't work, he'd say, "Goodnight, nurse." I didn't get a lot out of it.

When I got to Amsterdam, there was a career consular officer in Rotterdam named Alice Mahoney, who was a great consular officer. She was really sharp and she knew it. She could talk simply and directly. So, in our consulate general, nobody at post knew squat about consular work. Here I was, having dozed through the consular course. So, I used to talk to Alice almost every day. That's how I learned consular work. She was a superb teacher. I think I learned it pretty well from Alice Mahoney at post, but not in the consular course.

Q: How was Amsterdam in '65?

MACKLIN: Can I back up and tell two anecdotes?

Q: Sure.

MACKLIN: One is, because they were moving me around so much, there was a time lag and I had to take the consular course not with my class but with a class two classes later. I didn't actually go to post until September. I had a couple of months to fill there. I found out that there was a vacancy on the Dutch desk. The Dutch desk officer had moved on. So, I went out and talked to David McKillop, who was the country director for Western Europe [WE] and I said, "I'm potentially a free body. If you want me to work on temporary duty [TDY] on the Dutch desk, I've been assigned to Holland. I'd be happy to do it." He said, "Fine," so I was Dutch desk officer for two months. In the process, both the DCM and the political counselor were going off to post. I got to know them. I gave them briefing material and saved telegrams for them. The DCM was Earl Sohm, who was really good. The political counselor was Cleo Noel, who was later assassinated in the Sudan. I got to know both of them extremely well. The hierarchy within WE, part of EUR, was kind of distant and arrogant towards me. We'd have morning staff meetings. I remember Bob Funseth in particular, who would when it became my turn to talk, I would simply say, "We've gotten a telegram in and _____ is pointing out _____," Funseth would turn to the guy next to him and start doing business rather than listen to me. Generally, people were not unfriendly but certainly not warm and not helpful. McKillop was the only one who made an effort to teach me what it was all about. After I had been there for a month, we had an intern who came to work in EUR/WE, a guy named Richard Baker, who later entered the Foreign Service and did quite well. He was from Yale. It turned out about half the guys in EUR/WE then were from Yale. When Baker came in there, it was just like a family reunion. They were constantly chatting him up and showing him things. I really felt like I had the wrong ring on my finger. That was the old Foreign Service.

Q: When you got to Amsterdam, what was it like then?

MACKLIN: Amsterdam is the economic capital of the Netherlands; the seat of government is in the Hague. The Hague is called "the biggest village in Europe" by the Dutch. Amsterdam is a more exciting town, but it was a lot less exciting in those days. The Dutch can be kind of starchy. It was pretty, quaint, and much cleaner than it is now. The Dutch were much more strict and upright. It was a strange mixture of things.

The consulate general was located right on a square called the Museumplain, or Museum Square. It was in a building that the Gestapo had used during WWII. The Germans had seized a lot of property, and then after the war the property was up for grabs so our consulate was located at Gestapo headquarters and the consul general's house was where their commandant for the Gestapo lived during the war. I remember one time? The Dutch are very economical and very careful with money. One time, one of the locals had some stationery and was writing on the back of this piece of stationery. On the stationery it looked like there was a German eagle. I turned it over and there was a big swastika. During the war, the Germans had lots of stationery printed up and the Dutch had it down in the basement and they were using it for scratch paper. So, a lot of visa files contained this old Nazi stationery that they were writing on the back of to save money. Amsterdam was a very conservative society. The Dutch were institutionally quite open minded. They were very liberal institutionally, but personally they tended to be very conservative. For example, the Dutch would talk about being very open about race relations, but in practice were not. That was very typically Dutch. The government tended to be stuffy. There was a junior diplomat's organization in Holland that would throw lunches every couple of months and I would go to them. Aside from me, there was nobody there under 45 or 50.

The consulate general was kind of a ship of fools. I was brand new to the Service and really didn't know what the hell I was doing and needed some guidance. The consul general was Ward Cameron, who was a neat guy. He was a Mormon who had been the deputy, the senior civil servant, in the Legal Division of State. He had had a run-in first with Bobby Kennedy and then later with Bobby Kennedy's successor at Justice. At the same time, we had the Wriston Act. So, Ward Cameron, who had served all of his professional life at State as a civil servant, decided to convert to Foreign Service, wanted one overseas assignment, hand picked the job in Amsterdam as consul general because he had gone there as a Mormon missionary as a kid and still spoke a little Dutch. Ward Cameron wanted nothing else other than four years without any kind of a ripple in the water. No reporting. No disturbance. He just wanted four quiet years in Holland and then he was going to retire under the Foreign Service system rather than the Civil Service system, go back to Utah, and be a good Mormon. He was a nice guy but he didn't know anything about the Foreign Service. He liked to sit around and tell stories about working in the Legal Division. Whenever we had a difficult visa case, he said, "For God's sake, give them the visa. Who cares?"

The number two was an econ officer who had saved Ambassador Reischauer's life in Japan when a fanatic Japanese student attacked Reischauer with a bayonet. This guy intervened, was wounded himself, and disarmed the Japanese. He had been near selection out before that happened. According to rumor, Reischauer had written such a glowing efficiency report and he got an award for valor that it kind of saved his career. So, he was number two. He was the economic/commercial officer. He was a dunderhead. He had done consular work but didn't understand it. He felt his job was to go around Amsterdam and try to find Dutch companies who were trading with Red China so we could blacklist them. That was very popular with the Department of Commerce. So, that was essentially what he did.

The third officer at post, Mary Lois McKinsey, was delightful but a little scatterbrained and very easily excited. Mary Lois McKinsey had started out in the Foreign Service as a secretary in 1939 in Poland. When the Germans came in, we moved her to Paris where she'd be safe. When the Germans came into Paris, we said, "Oh, this poor woman. Let's move her to London. At least she'll be okay in London." So, she went through the blitz in London. She was a secretary in the Foreign Service for about 20 years and they said, "How would you like to Mustang up as an administrative specialist?" So, she agreed to do it. This was the first time she had ever done administrative work and she had problems even doing the duty roster. So, she was constantly excitable, constantly fluttering over this or that minor problem. The number two, it took him a year and a half to find a place to live in Holland. He stayed in the Hilton Hotel for 18 months and spent his time swooping around Dutch companies trying to find people who traded with the Red Chinese. Ward Cameron, who kind of didn't want anything to happen while he was there. So, this is what I was thrown in the middle of. I needed some guidance. This was an extremely conservative Dutch society and the one big event in Holland in those days was a group called the Probos, which is short for Probokotsi, meaning Provocation. The Probos issue was about a 10-15 minute issue.

Dutch society in those days was conservative. When kids went off to university, they became radical and a little bit loony. That was expected, but when you got your degree, which was when you completed what they called the "doctorambus," you were expected to then put on a three piece suit and go to work and be serious and work hard and save money. That's what most of them did. Amsterdam is a city with a certain tradition in the arts, mostly painting, not so much music. Not much Dutch literature. In those days, there was no Dutch movie industry to speak of, although there is now. There is a kind of hippie community in Amsterdam and was even in those days. Once a year, for example, one of the big social events was something called "Movaball," a ball put on by the book publishers in Holland. They would always have it down at one of the big palaces or one of the convention centers. It was hard to get tickets to. There were always 2-3,000 people there. The artists of Amsterdam would create art, usually kinds of sculptures of zany things with bicycle wheels or nuts and bolts, and they'd put it up on the wall in the Bookball, a black tie affair. At midnight, you could take anything you wanted, any of the sculpture art or painting. Anything that was there, you could take. So, people would walk out carrying things. There was this dichotomy in Amsterdam of extremely conservative society with this hippie subculture that went on. The Probos were a hard core group who started demonstrating against the stodginess of Dutch society in a municipal government. They were on the edge of the Vietnam business. This was at a time when in France, in Paris, they would have 10,000 people out on the Place de la Concorde railing about Americans in Vietnam but we didn't get that in Holland. There wasn't a lot of anti-Vietnam element to the Probos. The focus was on the domestic government. But they had a platform which included sealing the center of the city off from automobiles because there was too much exhaust fume, buying 5,000 bicycles, painting them white, and just leaving them around. The bicycles would be anywhere in that sealed off center of the city and they would be free bikes. So, you'd park your car at the edge of this zone, which was easy in Amsterdam because of the way the canals were constructed, you/d park your car and go get one of these free bikes, peddle into town, do what you needed to do, and peddle back out, leave the bike anywhere you wanted for somebody else to use. They felt that industry should be taxed not nearly in accordance with how much money they earned but in accordance with how much pollution they caused. They felt that there should be a speakers corner in Amsterdam where people could go and say anything they wanted to. Well, these things seem pretty mild today and some of them were incorporated later on in Holland, but at the time, the Dutch authorities felt that the way to deal with Probos was to suppress them. There was a small statue in downtown Holland of a little boy. It was on a square not much bigger than this house. So, the Probos tended to go there on Saturday night and demonstrate. The Dutch police would come along and beat up the Probos. That beating became the grievance for the next demonstration. By the time I had gotten there, the Probos attitude had infected two or three student parties in the university system. So, it had become a major concern. They were also concerned that the Probos might do something violent, although they never did. So, the authorities were on edge and always anxious to beat somebody up thinking that was the best way to deal with it.

This was at a time when Bobby Kennedy was still very much a part of American politics and the whole cult of youth. Kennedy was always saying, "You don't pay enough attention to the young people." So, there was an interest by the State Department in what these youth groups were doing, but people at the embassy were forbidden to talk to any of them. There was absolutely no dialogue between the two. So, I came along and asked my consul general, "I've got a good friend here who's here on a Fulbright and he's living with a guy who's active in the labor student group and he knows a lot of these Probos. Why don't I just talk to some of them and maybe do an airgram?" He said, "Oh, no, I don't think we ought to do that. We shouldn't get involved in this stuff." I said, "I'll keep it all unclassified. There seems to be some interest in it." He said, "No, I wouldn't do that. That could be a problem." So, that went along for about two months until something happened that kind of embarrassed the embassy. There was a Probos demonstration and it hit the newspaper and somebody in Washington asked about it. So, since I knew the political counselor and the DCM because I had been briefing them when I was on the desk, they said, "Why don't you have Macklin go? He wants to write something up. It can't hurt." So, the consul said, "Well, alright." So, I started talking to these guys and put together what was ultimately a 20 page paper on the Probos, which was the first thing ever written on any of the Dutch student groups. Then I expanded it to include a lot of the other groups. At about the same time, we had a STAFFDEL from one of Bobby Kennedy's staffers. I can't remember the guy's name, but generally he was young and abrasive-

Q: Like Bobby Kennedy.

MACKLIN: Yes. He had some time to kill and wanted an excuse to visit Amsterdam. So, he asked for a briefing at the Hague on youth movements. So, we had a big meeting up at the Hague. I was invited up and it turned out I was the only onthey brought in three CIA guys, the entire Political Section, Cleo Noel and Earl Sohm, the DCM, sat in, and this brash staffer, and his wife? Somebody said, "Well, what is she doing here?" He said, "She's my wife and she's going to stay." Then the RSO got up and? Anyway, she stayed. It turned out I was the only one who had talked to any of these guys. So, I was really then encouraged to get to know more about what these student groups were like. I wrote up three or four papers on various groups and did a lot of biographic reporting on some of the leaders. It was the only fun I had in the whole process.

Q: Amsterdam later became sort of a mecca for American kids who were on the move, the Summer of Love, because of legalized drugs and also just the atmosphere. Were we getting many young Americans?

MACKLIN: No, there weren't. That was later on. In those days, we got the usual tourists, but again it was? There is an old Tab Hunter movie called "Roman Holiday" or something like that where he's driving around Rome in a little Vespa in a clean cut shirt and sweater. That was the crowd. They were dressed neat as a pin and were well behaved. LSD was a new thing in those days. One of the things that hippies might da very small hard core bunch of druggies - would sometimes drop LSD into somebody else's coffee. Then they'd go nuts. So, there was a great fear of this, but in fact, there was very little.

Q: How about visa work? Were there any problems?

MACKLIN: There was a very low refusal rate. I had two locals who worked on the visa side and one who did passport, welfare, and whereabouts. The chief local was a young French-Dutch dual national named Pascale Klug de Merveil. Her uncle was the foreign minister of France at the time. She had come from a very high class family, had been engaged to marry a Dutchman who was from a very blue blooded family. I guess a month or so before the wedding, they were involved in a terrible automobile accident. He was killed. She was scarred, although it healed up. She decided to stay in Holland and got a job at the consulate. She was very bright and precocious and extremely prejudiced. She would refuse to issue visas to anyone with a complexion darker than cafï¿½ au lait or to any man who had any facial hair. When I first met Pascal, she was about 35 at the time and kind of saucy and so smart she was dangerous. The guy I replaced in Amsterdam was a young, nervous New Yorker with a kind of a rakish Earl Flynn moustache. She hated him because he was kind of pretentious. He would always introduce himself as the vice consul, but in Dutch you've got to be careful. A "vice consul?" "Vice" is the word for "dirty." You have to say "viza" with strong "z" sound. "Vice" means "dirty." So, he would always introduce himself as the "dirty consul." She hated him so much she would never correct it. He had this thin moustache he was very proud of. I had a week's overlap with this guy. The first or second day in there, I was sitting at his desk watching him work and Pascal flounced into his office, threw a passport down on his desk from some guy who had a big, burly moustache and who was a third country national from France with Tunisian background and she said, "Here is a man with a real moustache. If you want to issue a visa to him, that's your business. I'll have nothing to do with it." That was kind of her attitude.

Q: How did you deal with it?

MACKLIN: I just took her out a couple of times and we got along. She was very handy from time to time in dealing with the French consulate. Every now and then, we had some sort of dealings with the French and she was wonderful. It was very handy. She was really smart. We got along fine. She never pulled any tricks with me. It was okay.

Q: At the time, we were going through the civil rights movement. You had quite a few people coming from the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia, etc. Was this a problem?

MACKLIN: The Asians were not a problem, but the Dutch Antilles was. I played on a Dutch baseball team. I was an outfielder for the Haarlem Nickels. In fact, the year I played with them, we won the European championship. It was kind of a big deal. I got to know a lot of the Dutch people really well. It was interesting. You'd talk to the Dutch sometimes and they'd say, "Oh, you Americans are so prejudiced. We're a free society." Then you'd say, "Well, what do you think about Dutch baseball? How is it coming?" They'd say, "You know, it was doing a lot better until people came here from the Antilles and they're just changing the nature of the game." Well, there was some guys from Curacao and Aruba who played on the Rotterdam team who were fantastic. God were they good. That bothered them. There was an Indonesian on the consulate staff who helped with passports and stuff like that. It was fine. There were no problems with the Indonesians as best I could determine.

Q: You spent a year there, 1965-1966. Then you moved up to the Hague.

MACKLIN: Yes.

Q: How about protection and welfare? Any seamen problems?

MACKLIN: No. There were odd cases. There was a series of demonstrations in the spring of '66 that were pretty widespread. The Dutch authorities really didn't know how to deal with it and the embassy was kind of nervous about it, but in fact nothing much ever came of it. One day there was widespread rioting in downtown Amsterdam but the police beat up everybody they could find and it didn't happen again. But it rattled the embassy a lot.

Q: Were these demonstrations against the United States?

MACKLIN: There was an anti-Vietnam element to it, but it was mostly against the Dutch government for just being too stodgy. It was just routine consular work. Didn't refuse many visas. You had the odd bums who would come along. It was pleasant enough. At the end of the year, I moved up, I rotated to the Hague. The idea was, I was to do political work for six months and economic work for six months. I was replaced in Amsterdam by Jack Maresca, who went on to have some moderate success in the Foreign Service. I had problems with Mary Lois McKenzie. There was a black guy who had discharged from the Army in Germany who married a Dutch prostitute and had a couple of kids and who stayed there so long that he couldn't get his repatriation money from the Army. I remember, he was destitute. They had a baby. We had a very modest welfare fund at the consulate, provided by the American Women's Club. I dipped into that fund and gave the guy some money because they didn't have a place to stay and it was winter and they hadn't eaten in a couple of days. I was criticized by Mary Lois McKenzie, who was the admin officer who was supposed to control the fund, and by the consul general, who said, "You shouldn't go giving that money away." I said, "Well, the guy was destitute and in a bad fix." They said, "It doesn't matter." I said, "Well, what's the money for?" They said, "Well, it's to loan Americans money when they need to call home or when there is a short-term financial problem." He stayed around for about six months. Kay Stocker, who was in Rotterdam at the time, and I worked for a long time to try to get him back to the United States. We got him an arrangement to work his way back on a ship and he got to the ship and looked at it and said, "Hey, man, that ship's too dirty. I don't want to work on that ship." He finally just sort of disappeared. But that is the only?

The Dutch girls were often very pretty. There was one girl who came in with her father, who was a Dutch minister, and she wanted to go to the States for three months to kind of help her learn English. The minister came in with her and I ran a visa. It seemed fine to me. We didn't turn down many visas. Then he came back about four months later and said, "I think she's spying over there. She's writing me letters about going to cocktail parties with Werner Von Braun's [a rocket scientist] brother. She has some friends who are from East Germany. I think she's involved in espionage." So, this was at a time when James Bond was hot stuff. So, I wrote it up and sent it in. So, the FBI started investigating it. Indeed, what the truth apparently was that she was young and pretty and she had fallen into a crowd with a group which involved some people working with Verner Von Braun's brother, but the FBI got terribly interested in this and this minister kept coming back and providing me with more letters and more revelations and I passed them along. We found out at the tail end that she was finally asked to come back to Holland. Pretty young thing. The minister was not her real father but a kind of adopted father who was just a dirty old man and he was mostly upset because he had gotten used to her company and she hadn't come back. He wanted her back. But the nature of the security process in those days was that there was a lot of chasing wild rabbits or something, kind of a silly waste of government funds in retrospect.

Q: We'll pick this up next time when you're off to the Hague in '66.

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Today is October 5, 2000. You're off to the Hague. You were there from when to when?

MACKLIN: I went up there in September of '66 and I left in early May of '67.

Q: What were you doing in the Hague?

MACKLIN: It was a rotational tour, so the idea was that I would spend a year in Amsterdam at the consulate, spend a year in the Hague doing political work and economic work. So, when I got there, they moved me into the Political Section.

Q: What were our interests and how did the political officer at this point operate in the Netherlands?

MACKLIN: The interests in the Netherlands were primarily multilateral. We didn't have any bilateral problems, but the Dutch are very active in the UN, in international organizations, in Europeanwide efforts to do a variety of things. We often used the Dutch to communicate with the Red Chinese. The CIA station, for example, had a whole bunch of China watchers. We had people at the embassy who would communicate with people at the Chinese embassy and oft times we would use the Dutch as an intermediary.

Q: Why the Dutch?

MACKLIN: The Dutch had good relations with China.

Q: At that time, we did not recognize China and did recognize Taiwan.

MACKLIN: That's correct. So, our China interests were a major part of the work. But there were also a lot of European Union issues in NATO. The Dutch are very active in a wide range of multilateral organizations.

Q: How did you operate?

MACKLIN: I picked up the scraps. As I think I mentioned before, the consulate in Amsterdam was kind of a ship of fools. Nobody there was any good at their job, including me, and basically the locals kept us out of trouble. The Hague was just the opposite. The ambassador was Bill Tyler, who had been assistant secretary for European Affairs. The DCM, Earl Sohm, was highly regarded and went on to be DCM in London and was expected to be director general of the Foreign Service; however, somebody decided we had to have a female, so Carol Laise got the job. The political counselor was Cleo Noel, who was martyred in Sudan. His first deputy was Don Norland, who went on to be ambassador to Chad. The number two officer in the Political Section was John Clark, who was the best officer I ever worked for in the Foreign Service and who would have gone on to great things, but he ran afoul of Dick Viets and was sort of encouraged to leave the Service. But he was a really solid officer who could write brilliantly and had a very balanced management skill.

So, I was assigned to the Political Section and they handled all the big issues. I did exciting things like biographic reporting. In all fairness, they gave me all the extremist parties. I covered the communists, which were about 3% of the Dutch parliament. The Pacifist Socialist Party [PSP] was an extremist left wing party. While I was there, I worked up an overture to the PSP and the embassy actually had a face-to-face meeting with PSP, something it had never done before. I handled student politics as a follow-on from the Probos. The students had become more and more active. There was a Farmer's Party, which was led by a guy named Bokuku, which was sort of the equivalent of the current French extreme right wing party. So, it was an interesting basket. I did a lot of airgrams and cables and had a lot of fun. Then because I arrived in September, I rotated rather late. They hung on to me in the Political Section until March and I moved into the Economic Section. The head of the economic unit was Emmerson Brown, who was also very good. But after I had been there about a month, in early April, they told me I was going to Vietnam and that I should expect to leave early. Again, because I was a bachelor, they figured they could move me, whereas moving a man with a family is more complicated, which?

Q: Had you made any movement toward Vietnam, saying "Barkas is willing?"

MACKLIN: No, I never used any of those words. I even avoided eating rice. But the DCM wrote a letter on my behalf. I wanted to go back to work in the Department's Operations Center and he wrote a nice letter back, but they said, "Sorry, you're going to Vietnam to be a provincial reporting officer." So, I had been replaced in Amsterdam by Jack Maresca, who went on to achieve some notoriety in the Foreign Service. Absolutely brilliant officer, a bit temperamental. He had a French girlfriend who was secretary to the French ambassador in London. They had been going together for some time. When they told me I was going to Vietnam, they told Jack at the same time. In fact, the letter said, "Macklin and Maresca are going to be direct transferred to Vietnam and they'll be provincial reporting officers." Well, Jack immediately got serious with this French girlfriend and got engaged. In those days, if you married a foreign national, you had to resign and then the Service decided whether or not they would accept your resignation or let you remain in - having married somebody who was suspect. But in Jack's case, he parlayed that into breaking his assignment and managed to stay on for two full years in Holland and then was transferred back to State to work on the French desk. But I went off to Vietnam.

The other two junior officers in Holland at the time were a guy named Clyde Prestowitz, who went on to write several books about Japan (He quit the Foreign Service about five years later, wrote several books about Japan. I see him on TV from time to time.) and Kay Stocker, who was in Rotterdam and went on to be an economic officer of some success.

So, I did political work on the extremist groups for that period of time and then sailed back to the United States.

Q: Before we leave the Netherlands, obviously, extremist groups in Germany were looked upon with great interest and concern even though they might be small, particularly in those years as the Hitler time was still very much in everyone's mind. How did we view them? The communists, I guess, were considered tools of Stalin?

MACKLIN: Yes. There was a very strong left wing movement in Holland who were considered the communist pariahs. They were conservative, petrified intellectually, puppets of the foreign government. So, basically, the only people who were communists were those whose fathers were communists and so they became communists. The left wing youth if they wanted to do something got involved in something like PSP or one of the other left wing groups. The Dutch at least in those days tended to be extremely conservative and stodgy, but institutionally very liberal and so they'll tolerate verbal dissent as long as nobody puts anything into action. There was no real violence. The only violence in Holland at the time was caused by the police, which was extremely conservative.

Q: You went back to the U.S. before going to Vietnam to get some training?

MACKLIN: Yes.

Let me mention two stories on atmospherics in Holland. One is talking about how conservative society was. While I was there, there was an incident at the train station. The hippies tended to hang out at the train station. They had long hair which was anathema to the Dutch and they smoked marijuana. The Dutch frowned on that and there had been an incident at the train station where some long haired punk kid had smiled at, said something to the girl, a Dutch sailor. So, one Sunday out of the clear blue, about 200 servicemen showed up at the train station, surrounded the train station, went inside, got all of these hippie kids (There must have been 70 of them), and shaved their heads. They cut off all this long hair. They didn't beat them up, punch them out, or rob them; they just shaved their heads. Well, the Dutch people liked this so much that no arrests were made, there was no legal action taken against the servicemen at all. That was the nature of society.

Don Norland was the number two in the Political Section. When Cleo Noel left to be ambassador to the Sudan - he may have gone someplace else first, but he was destined for the SudaNorland was made acting head of the Political Section. At the time, Don was only an FSO-4, which is the equivalent today of a 2.

Q: That would be about a major.

MACKLIN: Yes. Well, the Dutch wouldn't receive him at the same level they received Cleo Noel. Cleo Noel was an FSO-1. When he went to the foreign ministry, he saw the deputy foreign minister or someone at that level at the very least. After Don took his place, he was received at a much lower level. This went on for about eight months until the next promotion list came out and Don made FSO-3 and then they received him at a higher level. It was kind of stodgy and old country.

I left in May of '67 and sailed back to the United States on the United States and went to the Vietnam Training Center to take a year of Vietnamese. Promises about being a provincial reporting officer were sort of brushed aside. I was not thrilled about going to Vietnam, but at the time all single officers were going. I fussed a little bit and they said, "If you don't like it, quit." So, I stayed in. I discovered I was kind of tone deaf. I had a lot of trouble with Vietnamese because it has five tones. So, after about three months into the process, I asked for six months leave without pay. I had a master's dissertation that was about 50% done and I was running out of time on the completion of my master's. You have a limited period of time for all the coursework and the dissertation to be completed.

Q: This was where?

MACKLIN: San Diego State. Because the master's was the highest degree they gave at San Diego, they were very fussy about it. So, I asked for leave without pay to finish it. They gave it to me. I said, "I'll just take time off. I'm having a bad time with the Vietnamese and I'll come back in and go off with my class." They said, "Okay," so I did and I finished it off. Then I went off to Vietnam in the summer of '68. I didn't go with my class. I went with the following class.

Q: You got to Saigon when in '68?

MACKLIN: It was late July. Because I was in training with a guy named Lionel Rosenblatt in the Vietnamese language training and we were both having trouble with Vietnamese and Ted Kennedy had gone off to Vietnam and discovered there was a refugee problem there and had criticized the State Department and the State Department said, "No, there is no refugee problem" or did something to deflect Kennedy and said, "In fact, we have several trained officers going out now to deal with the refugee problem," they came to the Vietnam Training Center and said, "Anybody want to go early?" So, Lionel said, "Yes, I'll go. I want to go over there and get it over with." So, he went to Vietnam. I thought about going then, but I didn't. There were four or five guys from my Vietnam Training Center class who went. Instead, I went off and did this master's thesis and then went off in summer. But the guys who were there were there for Tet and mini Tet and had some really hair raising stories. One of the guys who was killed was captured by the Viet. Cong in Hue, a guy named Bob Little, who was really a nice kid, a Harvard graduate, smart, and really liked the Foreign Service. He was captured by the Viet. Cong and was murdered in an extremely brutal way. Lionel was trapped in a building in Saigon during the last Tet. So, I went out over the summer with a group of CORDS IV. I didn't know any of them very well, but they took us to Taiwan first for two weeks to work with rural communes to see what it was like in a rural atmosphere where there was no security problem or insurgency. It was pretty interesting. Then we flew individually into Saigon.

Q: When you were in Taiwan, what were you expected to learn?

MACKLIN: They took us around to rural communes and they had us speak to village chiefs. They had some agricultural organizations for purposes of marketing or just channeling agricultural produce back to the city. Farmers didn't do it individually. It's kind of like a dairy association with rice and ducks and other things. So, we talked to those people and just got a feel for it.

Q: You arrived. How were you received and where did you go?

MACKLIN: That was actually kind of interesting. Normally when you go to a diplomatic post, there is somebody at the airport to meet you and say, "Here is where you're going to live," etc. There was a hurricane or a typhoon in the area at that time. We had gone from Taiwan to Hong Kong and then from Hong Kong into Saigon. I noticed all the other guys were staying in Hong Kong two or three days longer than I was. I figured, "Well, if I get there sooner, maybe I'll get a better job or a better something." So, we wound up flying through a hurricane, which was awful. The plane dropped 2,000 feet and went up 2,000 feet. There was food all over the inside of the fuselage. It was pretty messy. So, I arrived in Saigon a little bit rattled. Hong Kong had been a little bit mild and Saigon was typically about 105 and sweaty and the airport was just kind of a mess with a not very effective loudspeaker system and there was nobody there to meet me. So, I got off the plane. I had a bag. I got my other bag. I looked around and there was nobody there. I wandered all over and asked some people. I asked some military people and they didn't know what CORDS was and they didn't know what the embassy was. It was a holy mess. So, I didn't know what to do. So, I finally found a military phone, which was basically a phone that you pick up and then you ask a Vietnamese operator to put you through to someone, kind of like rural America in the old days. Terrible connection. I said, "Give me CORDS headquarters. They'll know what to do." So, there was a lot of squeaking and squawking and somebody picked up the phone at that end. I said, "Hi, my name is Tom Macklin. I'm in the new CORDS group and I've just arrived and there is nobody here at the airport. I'm happy to grab a taxi and go on into town, but I don't know where to go. If you guys could let me know which hotel to check into, I would be grateful. I'll just head on in on my own." He said, "Buddy, you did the right thing. Just sit tight and I'll come get you." I said, "I don't mind taking a taxi. You tell me where to go." He said, "No, sit tight, old pal." So, I sat down and about 10 minutes later I hear a string of names being announced over the loudspeaker, including mine. So, I go over and there is this young babe about 20 with a clipboard with some names on it. I said, "I'm Tom Macklin. Did you just call my name?" She said, "Yes." I said, "That was quick." She said, "What do you mean, that was quick?" I said, "I just called you guys and you're here already." She said, "What do you mean, you called us?" I said, "Well, there was nobody here, so I called CORDS headquarters and asked what to do and somebody said, 'Sit tight. Somebody will be there to get you in a minute.'" So, we hung around there for about half an hour looking for people and nobody else showed up, so she said, "Come on" and we got on a jeep and drove back into town and went to one of the USAID/CORDS personnel offices. So, I'm sitting there with this babe in this hot, steamy office filling out forms and some guy walks past me with a big cigar with kind of a New Jersey accent and barks out a couple of orders to this babe and says to her, "Has anybody seen that asshole, Macklin?" I said, "I'm Tom Macklin." He comes up to me with his cigar, starts poking me in the chest, and says, "Look, listen to me, you son of a bitch, the next time you call up General Coors and ask him for a lift, you damn well better stay at the airport until he shows up!" I said, "What are you talking about?" He said, "You called up General Coors, the head of the whole aid program and asked him for a lift and he went out there to get you and you weren't there." I said, "I didn't know who I talked to. There was nobody there to meet me." He handed me one of those, "We'll fix you, son of a bitch" look on his face and walked off. So, eventually, the other CORDS guy showed up. We were parked in a hotel. It was a smelly, rundown hotel with no air conditioning. The lights were constantly blinking on and off. They had Vietnamese staff in the hotel who pretended they didn't speak English most of the time. The other guy spoke Vietnamese. I hardly knew a few words. For about a week, we were kept there. They took us to various places to eat and started processing us through. It was still, you'd go up on the roof of a hotel and look at the city at night and there was shelling off in the distance. In fact, we got shot at on the roof the second or third night. A handful of us were up there. This was over by USAID I someplace. Just a seedy little small place. We heard a bullet ricochet off the concrete wall behind us. So, we ran like hell and got to the exit and there were two more shots. We ran downstairs and told the people in the hotel and they said, "Ah." They couldn't have cared less. We assumed it was a sniper. I'm sure it was just some drunken serviceman saying, "Let's scare those assholes over there." But you don't know at the time. It was kind of nutty like that. About the fourth night there, George Tuttle, with whom I had roomed in Washington, who was working at a district just outside Saigon, came out to get me and said, "Come on, spend the night with me out in the country. You'll like it." So, we went out there. He lived in a trailer about 20-30 miles from Saigon next to a small army unit which was next to a large complex of gasoline tanks. It was kind of a small refinery and storage area. Of course, if they ever mortared that, the whole area would go up, but that's where they parkehim and that is where he lived and he never complained. It was kind of interesting. The trailer was supposed to be air conditioned but really wasn't. it was kind of hot and steamy. At night, you could hear and feel the B-52 raids off in the distance. It was like an earthquake.

Q: These were searchlight strikes.

MACKLIN: It was off in the distance and you could hear a distant rumble, but the ground would constantly shake. It was a lot like being in an earthquake in California. Then in the middle of the night, George when he went to bed said, "If there is an attack, this is where we go. That is our bomb shelter." The far end of this trailer had a bunch of holes in it that had been plastered over and it was kind of like somebody had taken a shotgun and went bam, bam. There must have been 200 little holes. He said, "That's where a mortar landed outside the trailer." So, in the middle of the night, wham, there were three or four right outside the trailer. I jumped up, ran to the little bomb shelter, and the noise kept up. You could see the flashes. I saw George standing in the door of the trailer. He said, "Tom, you asshole, come on back." I said, "George?" He said, "Tom, those are outgoing. That is not incoming. There is a difference between outgoing and incoming." I said, "Well, you could fool me." He was next to a mortar unit and three times a night every night they would fire off a few rounds just to keep anybody around there ill at ease. I don't know how he slept through it.

Anyways, I went back the next day and they started dividing up jobs. They wanted to send me off to one of the border provinces. The guy was still kind of peeved. They wanted to send me off to Kunminh or something. But at the same time, there were three jobs in USAID Youth Affairs working out of Saigon. So, I went over and interviewed for one of these jobs, which kind of peeved the guy with the cigar because he wanted me to go off to Kunminh or someplace. So, I agreed to accept this job. In retrospect, I would have probably been better off in Kunminh, but I accepted a job working in Youth Affairs with an organization called CPS. It's a long Vietnamese term. CPS was an organization that AID funded to organize high school teachers in the provinces in new committees and then those committees of teachers were to organize their students into civic action projects. The educational system in Vietnam was based on the French system. The upper classes went to an elite school and the lower classes learned a trade. So, these upper classes who went to these elite schools tended not to identify with the guy in the provinces or the farmer or the urban worker. So, the effort was to get these high school students to identify with the problems in the countryside and to organize civic action programs. There was resistance to it from the Vietnamese side but then they simply saw it as a source of money. We'll do what you want us to superficially on an organizational level, but we don't believe in this, so we're not going to really follow through with it. I spent the next year and a half trying to make some sense out of it. I traveled a lot. We had committees all over Vietnam. So, I traveled around the country on Air America. I had a couple of Vietnamese working for me. I just couldn't speak Vietnamese well enough to communicate with anybody. So, I had big problems with my boss and my boss' boss and I had problems with the Vietnamese. The end result was, I really didn't do very much.

Q: What were the problems with your boss and your boss' boss?

MACKLIN: It was more bad luck than anything else. There had been a collection of fairly dynamic young guys working on Youth Affairs a couple of years before I got there. There tended to be a lot of people in Vietnam who went out there and fell in love with the place and stayed on for a long time. There were three or four guys who had gotten involved initially in Youth Affairs and saw this as a great opportunity, kind of the Bobby Kennedy approach to things. Half the population is under 18. The Viet Cong are mobilizing these guys; why can't we? So, they had gotten involved in Youth Affairs programs and achieved some limited success and then decided that the Vietnamese bureaucracy was so stodgy and had such an emphasis on age that they were not really going to support any real effort in Youth Affairs. So, they said, "The hell with it." I found this out about a year later, too late. So, they didn't close down the program. They just withdrew and went off and did something else. The two USAID directors whose directorate included Youth Affairs felt Youth Affairs was a waste of time and money and the only reason they maintained the office was because there was pressure from Washington to do something with Youth Affairs. My direct boss was a guy named Charlie Reed who was a nice fellow. He was stupid. He had been a superintendent of public education from Oceanside, California. Charlie had gone through a terribly ugly divorce in the late-mid-'60s. In those days, if there was any scandal connected with your person, you could lose your job in the public school system in Southern California. In fact, he had been encouraged to move on. So, he had gotten a job somehow with USAID. But his background was in education administration. That is the paradigm he used for everything. You had to have extensive lesson plans before you could do anything. My view was, we were dealing with an alien culture who didn't want to do what we wanted them to do and we were going to have to wing it. He said, "No, you can't waste government money by traveling on these Air America flights with everybody else and their goats and chickens unless I see an outline of what you're going to do." I said, "Well, Charlie, it's hard to give you an outline if I don't know what the situation is there. I can give you an outline that says we will set up a committee, this is what the committee will do, this is how many people are going to be on the committee. I can do all of that, but it doesn't mean anything." He just looked at me like I was lazy or naive. So, I eventually won him over. I didn't get poor efficiency reports, but the frustration was monumental. There were a lot of people within the USAID structure who felt that the real answer to the youth problem was organizing Little League baseball. The Vietnamese weren't interested. There were constant problems. I traveled a lot with my Vietnamese assistant and we did organize a lot of committees. Occasionally, they would do something worthwhile. My counterpart at the Ministry of Education was sacked after I had been there for about a year because his family fell out of favor with the family who sort of controlled the ministry at that time. We were sort of awash in excess resources. Everybody was going off in a different direction. There was no cohesiveness. It was just kind of stupid. We would get together and whine about it.

Q: Did you find that you were up against the cultural situation where no matter what youth said, youth was something to keep quiet about and do the bidding of elders?

MACKLIN: The Vietnamese are very good at external emotions. They are very good at putting on the right face, but it's a very hierarchical society. Kids are supposed to go with their parents. Administrators are supposed to obey their seniors. Their seniors were always people who were older. The higher you went, the older they tended to be with the exception of some of the army. So, student were expected to obey these teachers. Again, the teachers tended to be cynical about this. There were some NGO groups that I dealt with a bit and tried to get them involved in this and they said, no, this was tainted, that these were kind of tainted because "you have money from the U.S. government. If you can do this without money from the U.S. government, we'll support you."

Q: Where were the NGOs getting their money?

MACKLIN: I don't know. I think they were being paid salaries by their NGO organization but they were operating without a budget or with some sort of a local budget or maybe from scrounging stuff up. But I found them impossible to deal with. The people at the Ministry of Education were supportive and they'd smile and didn't do anything. My boss kept wanting more and more lesson plans. His bosses kept trying to figure out a basis for abolishing our office. My direct boss kind of went through what several older divorced men and some not divorced men went through in Saigon. They discovered young chicks. So, he'd go off trying to pick up chicks. It was kind of embarrassing. There were all of these people from organizations like PANE and the other big contractors who were there making millions of dollars and guys would volunteer to come over and work for them and they'd love it. They were fighting the communists, making tons of money, and the Vietnamese girls were very willing. It was a great opportunity for these aged warriors.

Q: You and I met quite often while we were there. I was there from '69 to '70, about 18 months. What were you getting from your fellow officers as they'd come into your place?

MACKLIN: We had an apartment in Saigon, Lionel Rosenblatt and I. Then eventually Lionel left and went back to the Ops Center. His place was taken by a guy named Stan Jorgenson. Then Stan left after about three months and a guy named Jan De Wilden moved in. Because we had a big apartment in Saigon, there were a lot of people who would come to Saigon who would camp out at our place. Mostly young officers like to complain and there was a lot to complain about. They'd complain about excesses and about corruption. One of the really big issues that people would complain about was the suppression of any negative reporting by the embassy. The embassy leadership in the Political Section and in the front office didn't want to see reporting that was negative. People would come in with documented proof of corrupt officials in the provinces and it was just suppressed. You were supposed to get out there and support the policy. Martin Hertz was the worst [chief of the Political Section], but he was by no means alone. That was the biggest complaint I heard, that there was corruption, there was a lot that was wrong, and the embassy wouldn't report it. There were complaints over the military but very few complaints over local military units. Most of the guys that I know who worked in the provinces found the U.S. military reps out there as very concerned and very sensitive to the problems of the peasants and not inclined to go up in a gunship and blast anything that moved. Although that went on, it was something that both the military and the FSOs tried to discourage.

Q: What was your feeling while you were there and by the time you left about how the war was going?

MACKLIN: Almost uniformly, I found the USAID people expected this to follow the World War II model, that we would win militarily and that we would then go in with an even larger assistance program and rebuild. We kept saying, "I don't know. The Vietnamese are divided and as bad as the government is from the North, they don't seem to like their own government either. We've got to figure out a way to disengage. It's kind of frustrating." It was a nice place to serve. It was a pretty country. It is green. The architecture, French provincial, is lovely. There were places like the 614th and some of the avenues that were very pretty architecturally. The food was absolutely wonderful and was cheap. The girls were beautiful and compliant. The politics were Byzantine. You could constantly find Vietnamese who would say anything. We used to make fun of people in the Political Section who spent inordinate amounts of time cultivating people, Vietnamese leaders in parliament as if these parliamentary coalitions actually meant something, and spending lots of representational funds trying to get to know somebody from the Chamber of Deputies or something. The younger people there spent a lot of time having fun and a lot of time whining and complaining.

Q: By the time you left, did you see the light at the end of the tunnel?

MACKLIN: No, it looked like more and more of a morass. You left after I did.

Q: I left in July of 1970.

MACKLIN: About a month after I did. Security had improved a lot at that time. By the time I left, you could drive a bullcow without running into a roadblock. Charlie Salmon and a couple of other guys drove from Saigon up to Dalat and back. Those kinds of things were unheard of. There was a feeling that maybe it was getting better militarily, that somehow security was really improving. I'm out of my element. I had a feeling in retrospect that it was just a function of the number of American troops. With that many American troops, security would improve a bit. But when we left, it fell apart again.

Q: Did you have any impression of Ambassador Bunker?

MACKLIN: Very nice guy, a real gentleman. A lot of people had dealings with him. I never did. I never went on any of the support flights to Nepal with him. Some of the guys did. Wonderful guy. Very gracious. Didn't have a terrier like personality that all of his deputies haSam Berger, deputy ambassador [later National Security Advisor to President Clinton]; Martin Hertz; and the rest of them. He was a nice guy and I think he had a pretty good appreciation of this, but that is only intuitive. I have no real idea what his own private thoughts were.

Q: You left there in early 1970?

MACKLIN: Yes.

I did a lot of traveling and saw a lot of the countryside.

Q: With these youth groups, who was running them?

MACKLIN: They were run by teachers. The ones that I felt were really making a contribution were run by, particularly up in Second Corps, we had two or three committees that were pretty good. They were organized by high school teachers who seemed to have dynamic personalities. One time in Kue Young, we went up there and they had organized a group of students to go out over the weekend and help clean up a refugee camp. They went down where the latrines were and dug new ditches for the water to flow away and tried to help clean the place up a little bit and probably didn't make any difference in the long run in terms of the camp, but it certainly exposed the students to what life was like for refugees. Whether or not that had some long term impact, I don't know, but things like that can't hurt, for the rich class to see what the poor class is doing and for the poor class to see somebody from the rich class come out and do something for them.

The worst trip I ever had was the one to Dalat. Dalat is a pretty little town almost 4,000 feet high with a pretty lake. It's a lovely little French resort town. I went in there and there was supposed to be an active committee. They had a committee that did nothing other than spend the money we sent them, had never organized a program. We spent most of the day running around trying to find the people in the committee. Although they were supposed to have known we were coming, there was nothing set up. We didn't get to visit a school. Nothing. At the end of the day, we needed to find a place to spend the night. Then there was a hotel in town, but it was full so we went up a big Army compound there. I was accompanied by three Vietnamese. They looked at me like I was from Mars and said, "You can't say here." It was a huge compound with barbed wire and bunkers and watch towers and stuff like that. I said, "Well, where can I stay? Do you have any idea?" They said, "No, we don't care. Just get out of here." Well, the province senior advisor was a friend of mine from Holland, a guy named Hawk Mills. I knew he lived someplace, so I found out from somebody where he lived. It's kind of like I've always imagined parts of Colorado to be like. Four to five thousand feet with lots of pine trees. Very pretty up there. We found Hawk's house. Hawk was on an R&R out of the country, but he lived in a huge house that must have been 12 bedrooms. He had a guard out front, an old guy who would sleep all night long in front of his house, mostly to ward off thieves. But I said, "Look, Hawk is a personal friend of mine and he said I could stay here if I ever came to town." They said, "We don't care." So, I slept in Hawk's bed and the three Vietnamese people I brought with me slept downstairs. It's funny about Hawk. He was in Key Minh himself for a long time. The first time I saw him in Saigon, having come in to Key Minh, while he was gone from Key Minh, they mortared the compound and they hit his trailer with mortar and basically blew it apart. But he was in Saigon, so they didn't get him. Then the next time I saw him in Saigon, he was always going out on night patrols with a group of rough, tough, Special Forces guys, routinely going out. I learned later that the guy who was standing in Hawk's place in the formation (Hawk was always second or third man back) took a bullet right in the chest, killing him. So, there was this association of "lucky Hawk." Every time there was danger, he had the good sense to leave town. So, I was staying in Hawk's house. About 2:00 am, a firefight erupted outside the house. Hard to tell how close. The way you could always tell, they said, if it was just people firing at shadows or a real fight is if you could see green tracers and whether or not it went on for more than 30 minutes. Well, it went on for about two hours. There were green and red tracers. I'd look out the window and it was impossible to tell. It sounded like they were in the backyard, but they were probably about two miles off. Hawk's house was just? There were rifles and grenades. He had enough stuff there to arm Pancho Villa. What was I supposed to do, supposed to break out a window and start shooting? So, I did nothing, which was really the right thing to do. But frankly, I was uneasy. The next morning, it finally died away. It was a beautiful day. The sky was blue. I went downstairs, not having slept much, and there were my three Vietnamese all red eyed and kind of shaky. I figured, well, "If they were scared, let's not stay a second time. Let's get the hell out of here." So, we went on and got a flight back to Saigon.

Q: I think the story of the American Foreign Service in Vietnam is slowly being told through these oral histories. This was not a picnic. People were really out there shooting at people and a number got killed.

MACKLIN: Right. A lot of guys got hurt. They ran over land mines and still have scars.

Q: I'm sure while you were there you were told by both the director general of the Foreign Service and others who came out to visit that, my god, you people have been in Vietnam are being given special treatment when you get out and all that. What happened?

MACKLIN: I was given special treatment, but it was by lot, not direction. What I really wanted to do was go back to Washington. I loved Washington and I wanted to work in the Ops Center. Lionel had worked in the Ops Center and a couple of my friends had gone back and didn't like it. They said, "Don't do that" and I said, "No, that's what I want to do" and that's what I told my career counselor. It became apparent as I got closer to the assignment montthey only take a couple of people a year in the Ops Centeand I wasn't one of the select few. Time dribbled by. There was a guy in my CORDS class named Richard. He was kind of an interesting guy. He was one of the guys who really did shoot himself in the foot. He was working with refugees in II CORPS and one of the things they would do is, people who had come down from the North who were refugees and had some sort of documentation could be paid money. One of the things he'd do sometimes was find a small hamlet where it was set up and make this payment. He'd bring the money and they'd pay these refugee families so they had a little bit of money to get along on. So, they flew into this small village one time. It was late in the day. They knew they had to get out of there before dark. The villagers knew they were going to leave before dark. The villagers knew that some of them wouldn't collect the money because they were trying to pay people off to get out of there. So, this was this press of people around there. So, Richard pulled out his 45. It just got unbearable. He held it in the air and fired it. That made everybody step back and scared them a little bit. Then he put his gun back in its holster and shot himself right in the foot. So, they left sooner than they planned. Anyways, he spoke Spanish fluently and wanted to go to Latin America in a political job. He was being groomed for the highest levels of the Service. Well, at the same time, our embassy in Barbados had been asking for a political officer. From Barbados, they cover all of the small islands in the eastern Caribbean from Grenada up through the Grenadines all the way up to the British Virgin Islands, that whole crescent of little mini states. At the time, they were called Associated States. The ambassador there wanted a single officer who could travel the islands. It was made very clear they wanted a single and so he was assigned. He said, "That job is beneath my dignity. I'm not going to go work in those stupid islands. Nobody gives a shit what they do there. I won't take it." Ultimately, he quit. So, they needed suddenly to find somebody else to take this job. My CDO, not knowing me from Adam, but knowing that I was single, said, "Well, how about this guy?" So, I got the job. It was more luck than qualifications. So, I was in fact direct transferred from Saigon to Barbados, although they gave me about a month to get there. So, off I went to Bridgetown to be the first political officer in Barbados.

Q: You were there from '70 to when?

MACKLIN: '7two and a half years. Eileen Donovan was the ambassador.

Q: She sort of made a career out of the Caribbean, didn't she?

MACKLIN: Yes. She had been consul general there before and then was deputy on the Caribbean desk and then was named ambassador there. She was the second ambassador after Barbados went independent in '66. The first one had been a political appointee.

Q: Let's talk a little bit about the situation on Barbados and up and down the islands. What was happening there?

MACKLIN: This was a time when going back to the '50s Britain had said to itself, "We can't afford all of these stupid colonies. They cost us a lot of money. We've got to let these people go, but groom them for independence" like they did in Ghana and all of the African colonies. So, the British helped patch together something called the Federation of the West Indies. It was a good concept. It would have been much like Indonesia. It was a federation running all the way from Jamaica around to the British Virgin Islands, down the Leeward, the Windward Islands, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago. It would have taken the whole group and made it one federation. They did it. They had their first election. Grantley Adams from Barbados was elected prime minister. The problem was, the political leaders in Trinidad, and Jamaica wanted to run their own countries. They might have accepted federation if they were the prime minister, but they didn't want to do it if somebody else was the prime minister. So, I think Jamaica was the first one to withdraw from the federation. They even had a cabinet. They were starting to function as a federation. Jamaica withdrew and then Eric Williams, the leader in Trinidad, said, "Well, one from ten is zero, so I withdraw, too." So, that left Barbados and Associated States. The British tried to get it back together again, but it didn't work. So, Barbados in 1966 went independent on its own. The guy who had been chief minister, Errol Barrow, became prime minister. I arrived some four and a half years later. He was still prime minister. The smaller islands were made Associated States, states in association with Great Britain. They had elections and a government based on the parliamentary system within their own island. They had a chief minister or a prime ministeit depended on the island. They were in charge of their own domestic affairs but turned to Britain for foreign affairs and defense. There were British representatives on most of the islands. Then within each little island grouping, there were breakaway problems. St. Kitts, Anguilla, the most famous. Anguilla, which is quite a ways away from Nevis and St. Kitts, said, "We don't want to be part of St. Kitts" and they seceded from St. Kitts Nevis Anguilla. Anguilla had something like 2,000-3,000 people, not much of a population, but they eventually succeeded in breaking away from St. Kitts. The prime minister of St. Kitts had been the treasurer of the federation and was held in wide esteem. He tried to keep his three islands together, but wasn't able to. Antigua included an island called Barbuda, which had 1,500 Barbudans on it. The highest point in Barbuda is about five feet above sea level, but there are people living there. There are something like 10,000 Barbudans in the Bronx and 1,500 in Barbuda. They tried to go independent from Antigua, but never quite made it. The ambassador told the leader of the movement in Barbuda, "There are more people in my apartment building in Washington, DC than there are in your island." It stayed part of Antigua. Then there were a couple of colonieMontserrat, the British Virgin Islands. That was kind of the lay of the land.

Q: What were you doing? Just going around and showing the flag or patting heads?

MACKLIN: There has never been much reporting on those islands. Eileen Donovan had been there before and knew a lot of the people, but Eileen was very gracious. She could write well, but she was very catholic and very bossy. She was not an easy person to get to know and she felt that she should keep her distance from the staff. She lived in a very nice house up the island next to the actress Claudette Colbert and I think was kind of awed by Claudette Colbert, who was a Barbadian resident.

Q: She was a famous movie actress.

MACKLIN: Yes. Eileen Donovan was sharp as a tack but was had been out of touch. The prime minister of Barbados, Errol Barrow, really liked to drink and carouse. He was kind of a very social animal. She was very, very correct. There was friction there, which made it harder for her to do her job.

Q: Somebody I talked to said that if you had a dinner party, you never knethe men had wives, but they might bring a second wife or a substitute wife. It was a pretty relaxed society.

MACKLIN: Eileen Donovan had a very well defined sense of propriety. There are certain social things you didn't do. But I was there because she had campaigned to get a political officer. Basically, some of the guys from the embassy traveled, but for the most part they didn't. Nobody knew much about? Bradshaw was the guy in St. Kitts. He was flamboyant. He had a yellow Rolls Royce that he drove around the island. The movie "The Yellow Rolls Royce" was in part based on him. The novel "An Island in the Sun" is a composite of St. Kitts and Barbados and includes Bradshaw as one of the characters, although by another name.

So, I was brought in. I had two DCMs there. Peter Lord was the second one. John Dreyfuss was the first one. The first DCM was one of the fastest drafters I've ever known. In those days, you could type things out on the telegraphic form and then you take them to the communicator, who would punch out a tape and send them in or you'd do an airgram, which is typed on an airgram form. John was one of these guys who never used a secretary. He could type faster than she did. It was kind of like Amadeus. In the movie "Amadeus," Mozart would sit there and compose and he'd never have to review it because he got it right the first time. That is the way John Dreyfuss, the DCM, was. He was a very gifted writer and he could sit down and hammer out a sensible telegram that didn't read like Shakespeare, but it was logical, coherent, and he was very good. John had a drinking problem. He had been a Marine in World War II and had been on Iwo Jima and really never gotten over it. He couldn't talk about it very much without shaking. He liked Latin America and he served in a number of Latin American posts because the way he got to know the guys in the government and the colonels was, you'd go out drinking and whoring. It wasn't that he was unfaithful to his wife. I doubt if John ever did any whoring. But he liked to drink and he liked to go out with the guys, with the colonels. He was DCM in Guatemala. He was head of the Political Section in Guatemala and in Chile and a couple of other places and I think he must have been very good at developing these contacts. But in the West Indies, although the West Indians were great, it wasn't quite the same. He felt that he was going to be selected out of the Foreign Service because he was in a backwater.

Q: One of the things was that that was Latin America and this was all British. I would have thought that people there were completely out of sync in this non-Latin environment.

MACKLIN: Yes, and he was. He liked to speak Spanish. He missed the drinking. There was a USIS officer there, a PAO, who was out of the same mold, a guy named Wes Stuart, who was a nice guy, but also liked to drink. I'd get together at their house. They were very generous in having me over and so forth. But they basically drank and talked about how great it was to work in Latin America and how much they missed the colonels and all that stuff. John Dreyfuss made it very clear to me that the job wasn't going to be important enough and he was going to be selected out of the Foreign Service. He was a 3, which is now the equivalent of a 1.

Q: About a colonel.

MACKLIN: He would never make FSO-2 because he was in Barbados. The only chance he had of ever making the next promotion was if he could be the one who traveled the islands and did all this political reporting. I said, "Well, John, that's up to you guys. I'm new here. You guys tell me what you want to do." He said, "I need to be the one who does this." I said, "Well, it's okay with me." Eileen Donovan said, "No, you stay here. You're grounded. You run the embassy. He goes. You stay." Terribly upsetting to John Dreyfuss. He traveled with me once to Antigua. We went up there and stayed for four or five days. He'd start drinking in the morning. I just can't do that. It was kind of pitiful. The guy was very talented. He eventually died at the age of 60 of complications from drinking. In any event, there I was, in Barbados. The ambassador wanted me to travel around. I had a great time. I traveled to all these islands up and down the chain, introduced myself. A lot of them thought I worked for the CIA. So, I'd take along reams of visa applications, pass out visa applications. I was really the only guy at the embassy who traveled. All of the island governments are different. They all have different personalities. You wouldn't think so. They were all schooled in England. The Dominicans tend to be extremely xenophobic and it's hard to get to know and a quiet place. The island is very different than the other islands. It's volcanic rather than corral. It has 365 rivers. It's just one big rainforest. There is a very large nature conservancy estate there protecting plants and animals. The prime minister would never talk to me. He was a fairly simple man but very suspicious. There was a family there. The leader of the opposition was very well educated and she later became prime minister. One of the two newspapers was run by a couple who had been very much involved in the literary scene in France in the '20s and knew F. Scott Fitzgerald and all those people and had been involved of the Federation of the West Indies. The prime minister of Dominica, whose name was Blank, was suspicious of anybody connected with the Federation. So, he did what he could to limit their political life. Antigua was absolutely totally thoroughly corrupt. The islands were all different.

Q: How about Grenada? In '82 or '83, it got to be?

MACKLIN: The ruler of Grenada was Eric Geary, who was certifiable. Talk about corruption. He was flamboyant. He had his own group of thugs called the Mongoose Gang. The leader of the opposition was a guy who was a real gentleman and Eric Geary just beat the shit out of him politically. Geary was flamboyant and outspoken and traveled and he was crooked as a snake. I talked to a lot of the businessmen down there and they said that Geary was very open and direct. "You want to do business on my island? I get 10%. If you don't want to give me 10% directly, then go find another island." I played tennis with Geary once and it was one of those things where any ball that he hits that's near the line is in and any ball that you hit near the line is out. He was a very good tennis player, so he didn't have to do that. It's kind of like Sukarno had all of these acronyms and slogans. Eric Geary was kind of like that. He had a lot of strange ideas. He believed in aliens from outer space and the roots of Cruthanism. While he was there, a young, very pretty Grenadian girl was elected Miss World. He made a lot of publicity out of that. He was really flamboyant. There was a small Black Power unit in Grenada. He kept a lot of pressure on them. This was a pretty hard core Black Power group. He was kind of rough when he wanted to be. I got to know some of the guys on an outer? A guy named Michael Sullivan, who was not really part of the inner circle for this Black Power group but was sort of on the edge. He cultivated me because he thought he could use me. If he did, I don't know. But I got a lot of information out of him.

Q: Was the New Jewel movement going at the time?

MACKLIN: Not really. It developed later and they were the leaders of the New Jewel movement. It took them a while. They didn't really have a program. The program was really anti-Geary. There was a sense throughout the islands that they had a problem economically. It was demeaning to the people who lived on that island to see all of the young men and women turning into maids and busboys. There has got to be something for us beyond being the lackeys at a resort hotel. There was a lot of resentment. On some of the islands, the people were more disagreeable than on other islands. In Antigua, there were major labor problems because one of the two leading parties worked this issue a lot. So, that was what the New Jewel movement? That was really the only unique thing they had to offer. Basically, they felt they should run the island, not Eric Geary, that it should be more socialist, and that they shouldn't have to depend on foreigners coming in and using their beaches. So, they kind of built on that resentment. As years passed, Geary got crazier and crazier and people began to understand how crazy he was. When he was off the island one time, they sort of held a coup. The Grenadians were lethargic enough they never really did anything about it.

Q: Did you have any professional dealings with him?

MACKLIN: No. I would talk to him when I'd go there. I never got a straight answer. After a while, I just figured it was a waste of time. What I tried to do was to do a lot of biographic reporting. Nobody knew anything about the younger leadership on the island. In those days, we mostly did airgrams. We didn't do very many telegrams. Frankly, it was depressing because I don't think anybody read by airgrams. But at least every six months, I would do a political wrap-up on each island. I remember, once, I was up on home leave or on R&R and I went into State and was talking to Bernie Felmonela, who was desk officer then. As I was talking to him, a couple of my airgrams arrived. They were airgrams that I had spent a lot of time collecting information for and a lot of time writing anhe looked at them and said, "Ah, great, a couple more Macklingrams. St. Vincent. Great." He took them from his in-box to his out-box and wrote "File" on them while I was sitting there. So, I did a lot of reporting on? Sort of like "Letter from Grenada" or "Letter from St. Vincent." What I would do is, every one of those islands had at least two papers. Every political party had its own and every opposition party had its own. There were often weekly papers and they were often just taking things lock, stock, and barrel off the tickertape and printing them up. I subscribed to every damn paper on all the islands. In every given week, I'd get 20 papers and read the damn things. There was biographic stuff there. The CIA loved it. So, I'd go there and talk to the editor of the paper about what was going on. I'd find the opposition leader, who was always anxious to talk. Then I'd find a businessman. I just developed my own circle of contacts. On three of the islands, we had British representatives who were always very sharp and would also give me their perspective. So, I'd get what I thought was some really good reporting.

After I was there six months, John Dreyfuss left. John Dreyfuss got himself reassigned as DCM in Guatemala and he eventually did make FSO-2. In came Peter Lord to be DCM. Peter didn't know anything about the West Indies. He understood I had the outer islands. So, he concentrated on Barbados and spent his time delivering demarches, dealing with the secretary or the foreign minister and he had a wild social lifnot wild in a sexual way, but just a very active social life. Nice guy. Didn't really have much intellectual curiosity about what went on in the outer islands. About the same time, Ambassador Donovan slipped in the shower and broke her back. Over the long-term, the bones never really quite mended, but she went up to the States. She got x-rayed in Barbados and they said, "You're fine." She was in terrible pain. She eventually went up to the States and they said, "No, your back is broken" and put her in a brace. The result was, she would go for weeks without coming down to the embassy. She would stay at her house up on the west coast of Barbados talking to Claudette and she'd never come down to the embassy. She was a wonderful woman, but she felt as ambassador she had to be above it all. So, I can't ever remember any single occasion where she would sit down with me and say, "Tom, what do you think is going on in Antigua?" Never. The only people who had the faintest interest in this were the CIA. The CIA were based in Miami and they had guys who traveled down from Miami and did these islands. They'd come by and see me. They'd spend a day or so. We'd talk about all the islands and the personalities and all that stuff. They were really interested.

Q: I would have thought that you would have been on the visitors search, congressmen wanting to know what was happening on Antigua or something like that.

MACKLIN: While I was there, I can only remember two congressional visits. One was a STAFFDEL who were just down there on a vacation and didn't want to be briefed. Right after I arrived, a congressman named Holburn from Nebraska who later made the Senate, but I think he was a one termer, a Democrat. That was right after I got there. He went out on a little sailing ship called the Jolly Roger. He asked me where I had been and I said, "Vietnam." He said, "Would you give me a run-down on what it was like?" Those were the only two congressional visits I can remember. Strange. We just never had a CODEL.

Q: What about tourism? Now, you have to have traffic cops out in the middle of the Caribbean to direct these huge cruise ships. Was there much during your time?

MACKLIN: No. The only ship that ever came in was the QE II and it came only once or twice. We didn't have big ships. There was a PanAm flight that used to come down from Miami and one from New York and they would go to Antigua and Barbados and go back. I spent a lot of time in Antigua because we had a naval facility and an oil refinery there and there was labor unrest. So, there were a lot of times that PanAm flights would come down in the late afternoon/early evening. A lot of times I just went out to the airport and jumped on it. I couldn't count the number of times that I got on that flight and there was maybe five or 10 people on this big 707 going all the way down to Barbados. I can remember, the stewardesses were always nice. Quite often, rather than having meals, they had sandwiches. I could just pig out. I'd arrive in Barbados at 10:00 or 11:00 and go on home. So, there wasn't a lot of tourism compared with now. We thought there was a lot then and it was an important part of the economy.

Q: What about Cuba? Was Cuba raising hell there?

MACKLIN: There was a belief that these islands were vulnerable to a Cuba-like mentality, that the U.S. had a meager aid program. I spent a lot of time lobbying to try to get more foreign aid. We had no direct bilateral aid program nor any pressure from State to develop one. We did money from the Caribbean Development Bank, which was supposed to loan the money out at concessional rates for islands who could come up with proposals, but the islands had such a shallow pool of talent that they were unable to put together proposals on their own. So, they would get companies from New York and England who would come in and say, "We'll put together a packet proposal for you for a deep water harbor if you will do the following for us." It never went anywhere. The ones that did, it took years and years and the Caribbean governments complained that the money we gave to the Caribbean Development Bank never trickled down. There was a bitterness and there was concern that they had high unemployment rates and these islands were vulnerable to something like propaganda from Cuba, who would come in and say, "We can solve your problem."

Q: By the time you left there, were they going anywhere or was this a pretty static situation?

MACKLIN: They were drifting towards independence, but economically I didn't see a lot of progress. The development was glacial and they tried desperately to develop alternative sectors and had very little success. I remember the Barbadians, one of the things they had was a small factory of about 300 people. American companies would take cotton gloves and cut them out and then would ship them down to Barbados, where they would be sewn together and then shipped back to the United States. That was just barely economic. There was a slight economic advantage to having these gloves sewn together in Barbados. Then one of Nixon's early measures to strengthen the U.S. economy was, he put a tariff on all foreign imports. So, this was impacted. That was considered a foreign import even though the gloves were an American company sent down there by an American company and so forth. So, with the tariff, that factory kind of folded. So, there were a lot of frustrations like that.

I spent a lot of time in Antigua. There are three things that might be worth mentioning. One is, before I left, I made a major lobbying effort to replace myself with a black officer. I wrote people. I phoned people. I made a trip to Washington. I went around and saw people and said, "The Black Power movements down there are getting stronger and they won't talk to me. You have serious Black Power movements in Grenada, St. Vincent, Antigua, and none of them will talk to me. They're all capable of causing trouble. If you send a black officer to replace me, they'll talk to him because he is a brother." Well, the people I talked to said, "No, the West Indians aren't like that. If you can't handle it, maybe the next guy can." But ultimately, I went out and said, "I need this guy who was with me in Vietnam. He would be really good." So, I saw him. George Moose. I said, "George, have I got a job for you." Initially, he said, "No" and then later on he said, "Yes." He came down and replaced me. Talk about a long lost cousin. Those Black Power movements opened up to him. They poured their heart out. It was wonderful. When he was replaced by Bill Moore, the same thing happened. They went around and were able tcrash parities and do all kinds of things that I couldn't begin to do. I found that kind of interesting.

In Antigua, there was a change of government while I was there. The old political leader, Bird, had been prime minister and had been leader of the country for 20 years. He was kind of old and out of touch and there was an aggressive labor movement led by George Walters and Donald Halstead. They were extremely aggressive and they used to go out and intimidate American hotel owners with baseball bats and stuff and tell employees, "You don't have to do what they say. You work for us, not for them." They harangued the oil refinery a lot and were a little bit concerned at the naval facility. So, one of the things I did was go up to Antigua and got to know Halstead and Walters really well. Walters was kind of dumb but likeable. He was kind of a bear-like guy. He didn't have a mean bone in his body. But Halstead was a nasty piece of business, extremely corrupt and willing to be abusive and absolutely devoid of any ethics. I was able to moderate their behavior a little bit. They won the election and went from being very poor to very wealthy in short order. They were about three or four years later voted out of office. They tossed Halstead and Bird's son took over the government. I knew them pretty well, too. They were good guys, a lot of personality. They also proved to be extremely corrupt.

Q: I know you got married because you married one of my vice consuls, Sandy. Did that happen at this point?

MACKLIN: I was kind of going out with Sandy in Vietnam. I was direct transferred to Barbados. I wanted to go directly there. So, I went there. The ambassador kept making a big to-do out of how important it was to her to have a single political officer so you could travel and not worry about the family. She did that over and over and over. [break in tape] I got married in May. I went up and had home leave. We got married and she came back with me. She taught school at St. Stephens, a small private school there. Then we left there a few years later.

One of the interesting aspects of Antigua was the American expatriate population. There was a naval facility in Antigua. Coolidge Field, the airfield, was named for a pilot in the Army Air Corps. The hotel I used to stay at all the time called the Lord Nelson was owned by a guy named Nick Fuller. He was kind of an interesting piece of work and was very typical of the kinds of people you find in the West Indies, which collects all kinds of characters. Nick Fuller had gone to West Point and was in the class of 1945. When he graduated from West Point, the war was over. They found they had more officers than they had billets for. So, they were offered other opportunities in the U.S. government, including in Nick Fuller's case the diplomatic service. So, he entered the diplomatic service in 1946. His first assignment was in Antigua. He stayed there for two or three years. He had a naval group at his command with his own launch and so forth. One of his main functions as vice consul in Antigua was to dispose of U.S. government property in Antigua. They did this with a sealed bid system and got rid of a large BOQ complex and a lot of other properties. Although they kept the territory that the naval facility was on at the time I was in Barbados-

Q: It was one of those bases for destroyers.

MACKLIN: Exactly. That's where we got it. When they opened the bid for that BOQ and a lot of the beach property, who should have been the high bidder but Nick Fuller. Nick Fuller got the bid for that BOQ and for a bunch of that beach property. Really surprising. At the end of his three years in Antigua, he was reassigned to Colombia. He actually went to Colombia, but by then the inspectors had gone to Antigua and sort of checked things out and they caught up with Nick and said, "The way you conducted that closed bid, disposal of government properties was probably inconsistent with government regulation." Nick said, "Well, screw you. I quit." He went back to Barbados, turned the BOQ into a hotel and built another hotel along the beachfront. So, he ran this. The guy was incredibly well connected. Every time I'd stay there, I'd meet a different collection of characters. The mayor of Jersey City, who was later indicted for connections with the Mafia. There were Mafia guys who would come down and stay there. An Australian girl, Jill Something, who was the one who blew the whistle of the sergeants' mafia in Vietnam, stayed there for two or three weeks. She told me some wild stories about what it was like to deal with the sergeants and all these BOQs up and down Vietnam. She had two Australian rock bands and a Korean girls' band. Fascinating stories. There was a former editor of the "New Yorker." It was kind of a wild collection of people. Fuller was flamboyant and sort of had an in-your-face relationship with the government authorities in Antigua. He was a balsy kind of guy. He had a long portrait of Lord Nelson on the wall of the hotel. I asked him one time how he got it and he said he was in New York on other business and he noticed that portrait in a PanAm office in the Rockefeller Center. So, he liked it and went away and came back the next day, coat and tie, and walked in and asked to see the manager. He said, "I am from the home office. I am supposed to pick up that painting and take it over to the president of PanAm. He wants that painting. Give me a couple of your men. I want it now." There was something about Fuller that made people comply. So, they got a couple of workers out and took it down and said, "It's a great painting." He said, "Okay, put it in this taxi cab. Take me to the PanAm building" and left the two workers there. Then, of course, he went out to the airport and shipped it down to Antigua and there it was on his wall. He was that kind of a guy. He had strange connections. There were a lot of novelists who came down there.

Did I go over the CIA problems?

Q: I don't think so.

MACKLIN: About midway through the tour, there was an election in Barbados. The prime minister, Errol Barrow, was running for reelection and Tom Adams, who became the prime minister later on and whose father, Sir Grantley Adams, had been prime minister of the Federation of the West Indies that had fallen apart in the late '50s, ran against him and was leader of the opposition. He was an extremely articulate, very bright guy who was a very pale black and was considered a little bit elitist by some of the working class in Barbados. Although Tom Adams was more articulate and more interesting, Barrow won hands down. Barrow was kind of a rough guy who was smart and very West Indian. He liked to drink and chase women. Our ambassador was a very cultured lady from New England who had a very Catholic sense of propriety and felt that there were certain things you didn't talk about. The two of them, although they knew each other and had for a long time, there was a clash there. At one of the big campaign meetings in downtown Bridgetown, Errol Barrow made an offhand comment about the CIA and he wasn't going to let the CIA come down to Barbados and push anybody around. He would say things like that. One time he said he was a good friend of Frank Sinatra's and he was going to bring Frank Sinatra down to campaign for him. Nobody took it very seriously. The DCM ran back to the embassy that night and reported those comments and then found the ambassador and she got upset about it. My advice was, "This election year rhetoric, just don't pay any attention to it." The CIA covered the West Indies from an office in Miami. There were no CIA operatives in the embassy, but they had the people out of Miami travel a lot. As they usually operate, they identified people on the islands who became paid informants. I knew who a lot of them were. I got to know the guys in Miami fairly well because they would come down about every three months and they were the only ones who really wanted to talk to me about what was going on. The ambassador was concerned with being aloof and with her role as an ambassador. The DCM, Peter Lord, was a nice guy but he was really concerned with his social life in Barbados. We almost never talked about what was going on on other islands. The CIA would come down and want to know about this or that leader, cabinet changes in St. Lucia or St. Vincent. They were really interested. When they came to town, they also paid a courtesy call on the attorney general or the head policeman in Barbados. They maintained a formal intelligence link in case there was any information that needed to be passed. The ambassador chose to believe that that relationship was being put in question. I said, "No, It's not really. Let's just leave them alone." Well, she insisted. She sent a couple of first person cables back saying she was going to get a clarification on this. She asked for an appointment to see the prime minister and he refused to see her. That kind of puffed out of context. It took about six months for it to finally blow over. This kind of silly stuff? Sometime after that, the CIA traveling guy came down and said, "There are things we're interested in above and beyond what the embassy is interested in. You're the only guy who really travels these islands. We'd like to bring you up to Miami and talk about what we do and maybe encourage you to do some additional reporting since nobody else seems to really do reporting." There was no real indication that the Caribbean desk ever read what I did. I did mostly airgrams in those days and a few telegrams, but they never asked me for clarifications or more information. The desk officer, the one time he came down on an orientation trip, could not remember who any of the leaders were or the capitals of the islands. It was all very depressing, but the CIA was really very interested. They asked me if I would come to Miami and they wanted to talk about additional reporting. Eileen Donovan got very upset with that and said I may not go. But she said, "Thank you very much. I'll go." So, she went up there and came back and basically said, "I don't want to have too much to do with those guys." At the same time, AIFLD (American Institute of Free Labor Development) was trying to expand their operation in the area and had an AIFLD guy placed in Trinidad. He was kind of a bozo but he was a nice guy, a black guy from New York with a strong labor background. She really didn't want him coming to Barbados because of AIFLD's past connection with events in Guyana with Cheddie Jagan and stuff like that. So, at the time I left, that was still kind of a point of contention. I always felt we could have worked together a little bit better.

Q: Did you feel that you were the odd man out there?

MACKLIN: Yes, I did. The economic officer was a young lady who had some personal problems. She basically never did any reporting. She did economic trade reporting six or eight months late and just never did any reporting. She never traveled. The head of the Consular Section never traveled. I was the only one who covered those islands, doing consular work and planned to do some economic reporting and political reporting. It was kind of fun, but nobody was interested in what I was doing.

Q: Grenada was part of your beat?

MACKLIN: Yes. I knew Eric Geary quite well and I knew all the opposition people down there. Hubert Blaise, who later became the prime minister after Geary was overthrown and after the Cuban invasion, after we invaded Grenada to get the Cubans out? I knew Blaise really well and a lot of the others. I could never get close to the Black Power guys.

Q: Bishop was it?

MACKLIN: Yes, Maurice Bishop and the rest of them. There were little Black Power groups on almost all the islands. Grenada, St. Vincent, and Antigua were the best organized. George Moose, who followed me, had absolutely no problem dealing with them. Bill Moore, who followed George Moose, both black officers, got along with them very well. They just didn't want to meet with somebody who was white.

Q: You mentioned some Americans getting in trouble in the usual thing down there. Was that much of a problem?

MACKLIN: No because most of the island governments didn't want to have an American in jail. It was an embarrassment to them. There was one guy in St. Kitts who was a black American who was really a bum. He had been picked up for drunkenness or something and thrown in jail. He stayed in jail for about three months in St. Kitts before he told them he was an American. When they found out he was an American, he was destitute, they really wanted to get rid of him. I traveled up there and talked with the government and they agreed to release him. I gave him some money of my own and got him on a plane to St. Thomas and then he was okay. He never came back. Then there were Americans who would sometimes get in trouble, but basically the islands didn't want any trouble because of tourism, so they sent them back to the States.

Q: Was there at that time a yachting group, people in their powerboats would sail from one place to another?

MACKLIN: There was a lot of yachting and it was kind of an international group. A lot of Brits were there. There was a big yachting harbor in Antigua, Nelson's Dockyard. Part of it has been restored. It's really quite pretty. At one time, when Admiral Nelson was in charge of the Caribbean fleet during the Napoleonic wars, he was headquartered there. Up on the bluffs overlooking Nelson's Dockyard are the ruins of the old barracks and a very interesting graveyard of people who died there from various tropical diseases. It was considered a very difficult, unpleasant assignment because they weren't used to the heat. But there was a lot of yachting that goes in and out of that dockyard and it's been developed a lot since then. Then from Grenada up to the Grenadines to St. Lucia, there was a lot of yachting. But that was big money.

Q: They didn't cause any problems?

MACKLIN: No. In St. Kitts one time, Bradshaw was the prime minister and he had been the treasurer of the Federation of the West Indies and was very well respected and very correct and basically not corrupt. He was the flamboyant guy who had a yellow Rolls Royce, but on budgetary issues he didn't steal and he ran a tight ship. He had an attorney general named Lee Moore who was a rabble-rouser, a very bright lawyer who was pushing Black Power issues and trying to stir people up. He used to criticize the Americans a lot. One time, I went up there and there was a small hotel in St. Kitts named the Golden Lemon. It was run by homosexuals for homosexuals. So, Lee Moore had criticized them at public meetings and had threatened to burn the hotel down. So, the guys were scared and I went up there and talked to them once. It was a gorgeous little hotel. They only had about 12 rooms. I had lunch there and talked to them for a while. Those guys had such good taste in decoration. Lovely little hotel. So, I went back and talked to Lee Moore and said, "If there is not a problem, quit threatening those people." So, he did. There was occasionally stuff like that.

In Antigua, the Walters government? The Bird government had been around for a long time and was replaced by the Walters government. They were labor based. They were always threatening hoteliers. They were absolutely thoroughly corrupt. They were voted out of office the very next election. I had talks with hoteliers from time to time.

Q: These would be American hoteliers?

MACKLIN: Yes.

Q: Were they trying to extract more money from them?

MACKLIN: They wanted payoffs. They would go in with a baseball bat and bang on tables and tell the staff there, "You don't have to mind these people. You work for us. You don't work for them." You can imagine how that would upset a hotel owner. Nothing ever really came to it.

Q: You left that?

MACKLIN: I left there in July of 1972.

Q: Where did you go?

MACKLIN: I came back to Washington. I had never been assigned to Washington up to that point. So, I went to work for a year as staff assistant to Ron Spiers, who was the director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. His deputy was Tom Pickering. They had a lot of good people in the bureau then. Ray Garthoff did a lot of the strategic missile issues with the Soviet Union. They had a fairly large office covering non-proliferation issues and arms control issues. Tom Simons was working there then. Leon Fuerth. There were a lot of good officers.

Q: What were you doing?

MACKLIN: I was staff assistant. I only did it one year. They had a big paper flow problem. I basically straightened out the paper flow problem, kind of reorganized the way the memos came in and out. At that time, there was an awful lot of written material. Pickering was there. He worked a lot on arms sales and problems in the Middle East and he traveled a lot. But on arms sales issues in the Middle East and arms control issues with the former Soviet Union, we tended to send three to five major action memos up every day. In those days, the Secretariat was more powerful, so there were all these format problems and stuff like that. So, getting the paper flow working correctly was difficult.

Q: Did you feel that the Political-Military Bureau was a powerful one? You had men who were stars then and stars later on.

MACKLIN: It was a very strong bureau. They had a lot of influence in the building. They had a good relationship with DOD. I think they carried a lot of weight on the 7th floor.

Q: Did you have any feel about? Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State, wasn't he?

MACKLIN: Well, at the time I went in, it was Bill Rogers and then Rogers left and Kissinger came in about the time I left that job.

Q: Did you have the feeling that Rogers was somewhat out of the power flow?

MACKLIN: Yes. Everybody assumed Rogers was a very nice guy. Basically, Kissinger ran circles around him. One of the big jokes was, when Nixon went to China, Rogers and Kissinger went with him and it was saiand later proved to be truthat when they went in to see Mao, Kissinger and Nixon turned to Rogers and said, "Okay, Bill, thanks. We'll meet you back here in an hour." He didn't have much influence. There was a lot of hand wringing over the influence of State versus the NSC staff, where Kissinger was.

Q: I would imagine being a staff assistant could be a little bit difficult because these are operators. These are people who want to get things done immediately. Did you find yourself hustling to try to see that things got done?

MACKLIN: Yes. It took me a while to figure out what Spiers wanted. Spiers was a wonderful guy but he's kind of shy and quiet and it took a while to figure out what he really wanted. But eventually, it was fine. Pickering had his own issues he was pushing. I tried to make sure things he was interested in were expedited, but we didn't have much of a relationship beyond that.

Q: After a year, in 1973, where did you go?

MACKLIN: I went to the Caribbean desk and became desk officer for Trinidad, Barbados, and the West Indies Associated States.

Q: You were doing that from '73 to when?

MACKLIN: '75. I did that for two years.

Q: Looking at it from the other end? What was your impression of the Caribbean interest within the State Department?

MACKLIN: The views I developed when I worked in Barbados and in the West Indies were only reinformed when I worked in the Department. I felt that these were very small islands. They were little microcosms of democracy. They had serious economic problems. We ought to go in there with a bilateral aid program and try to help them develop the relationship with the U.S. and help them with the transition to a better economic life. We had a lot more in common than we did with Venezuela or Colombia, the bigger nations in Latin America. These were English speaking, Anglo-Saxon countries with the same rule of law that we had. I thought we should do more. I beat on that drum during my entire two years in the Department and it was only after I left that we really started to develop a bilateral aid program. We put money into the Caribbean but it was through multilateral organizations like the Caribbean Development Bank. We didn't put much money in. it was pretty bad news.

Q: I would have thought that given our Cold War concerns with Cuba that we would be interested in precluding the Cubans from fishing in these troubled waters.

MACKLIN: One would have thought, but it didn't really have much impact until Eric Geary was overthrown in Grenada and a relationship was developed with the Cubans. Then we got a pretty good aid program going. I had left long before that. Until then, there hadn't really been any interest in a major aid program.

Q: I would have thought also that, being the West Indies and a beautiful place to go to, you would have a lot of people within the government (Congress, State Department) putting this way up in their priorities and really having to go there, particularly during the winter months.

MACKLIN: You'd think, but when I was in Barbados, only once did we have a congressman come down. Once we had a STAFFDEL. Two times during two and a half years, we had somebody from Capitol Hill come to Barbados. It was interesting that they didn't seem to have any interest in this area.

Q: Did the immigration flow from that area cause any problems for you? I'm thinking of people who settled in New York.

MACKLIN: It didn't cause any problems for the Consular Section. There was concern over bone fides and problems with people coming up and staying. When I was working in Barbados, we did a lot of H visas (for temporary training) in Grenada for people to become dental technicians. Finally one day, I said something to the head of the Consular Section about, "You know, we're probably training an awful lot of people to be dental technicians. There are only two dentists in Grenada." He looked up and over the past three years we had trained something like 80 dental technicians for Grenada. So, there was a lot of that sort of stuff. But I wasn't plagued with it either on the desk or when I was down there. Only once was I ever called on the desk for help with getting a visa for someone.

Q: How about their embassies? Were they at all effective here in Washington? You would be their point of contact.

MACKLIN: The Trinidadians had a pretty good embassy staff. They were very active in UN circles. Eric Williams was prime minister of Trinidad. He was kind of a prickly pear. He was a difficult guy, very egotistical. He went through a period of being anti-American. He desperately wanted to get Trinidad in OPEC and the Arabs kept blackballing him because they didn't produce enough oil. He was a historian by background. At one time, we had an ambassador in Trinidad, Tony Marshall, who had worked for the Agency. He was desperate to develop a relationship with Eric Williams. For some reason, Eric Williams decided he didn't like him, so he refused to talk to him. The ambassador went for a year without ever being able to talk with the prime minister, which he found personally extremely embarrassing. But their diplomatic missions in Washington were pretty good.

The Barbadians usually had a good ambassador. They had a couple of staff members who were dumb as doornails and caused problems. But the Trinidadians had a couple who were really smart. They were easy to work with.

Q: After leaving this hotbed of inertia, where did you go in '75?

MACKLIN: I should maybe say two things about the Caribbean desk before we leave it. Probably the worst assignment I had in the Foreign Service because of the country director, who was very difficult to work for, a guy named John Burke. He is dead now. He was smart. He had a nasty streak. He basically firewalled us off from the rest of ARA. We were never allowed to go to ARA staff meetings. He never came back from ARA staff meetings and said, "The Assistant Secretary wants this or that." He would often ask you to write up something but give you vague instructions and then when you'd turn it in, he'd say, "Well, I wanted the following. Why didn't you give that to me?" I'd say, "Well, it wasn't clear to me what you wanted." Very difficult guy to work for. The one episode that I remember as the worst was thus: Eric Williams had asked for an appointment with Henry Kissinger. Eric Williams had been a historian and written lots of books on the West Indies and had great respect of Henry Kissinger. By then, Henry had become Secretary of State. He got on Kissinger's appointment calendar. So, I had to do the memos for Kissinger, which I did. There was a small university in Puerto Rico that was associated with the West Indies. This was at a time when there were serious oil problems following the '73 war. Everybody was primarily concerned with petroleum. I asked the embassy if he was going to come talk about this university problem. It was kind of a worldwide university system headquartered in Puerto Rico. They said, "No, absolutely, he won't talk about that." I did the talking points. Eric Williams was very proud. It seems to me it was the morning of the appointment or the afternoon before, but the staff assistant in ARA called down and said, "Apparently, Williams has been taken off of Kissinger's schedule." So, I went upstairs to see Jerry Bremer [later viceroy in Iraq], who was a special assistant to Henry Kissinger. I said, "Look, is it true?" He said, "Yes, Kissinger's really got a lot of work to do and he needs the time to do something else." I knew Jerry and I begged him, "This will ruin our relationship with Trinidad for the next 10 years. This guy is extremely proud and very thin skinned. He is a historian. Kissinger is a historian. He thinks they're kindred spirits. If you cancel this appointment, we're going to be in a stew down there for a long time to come. He's nasty and vindictive." He said, "Okay, let me see what I can do." So, he got Williams back on the schedule. The meeting went off. They got along fine. Eric Williams came out of it, couldn't have been happier. The one problem was, the thing Eric Williams wanted to talk about was this little university that was headquartered in Puerto Rico and the talking points had touched on that but hadn't included a lot about it. So, my boss came back on me like a ton of bricks. I said, "Well, if it wouldn't have been for me, there wouldn't have been any goddamned appointment." He said, "I don't care." It was very unpleasant. I was very happy to leave that job.

Q: Where did you go?

MACKLIN: I went to Personnel and became a career development officer [CDO] for junior political officers and then the second year became CDO for economic officers as well.

Q: So, '75 to '77.

MACKLIN: Yes.

Q: Let's talk a bit about the Personnel system. The system keeps changing, but what were you doing?

MACKLIN: At the time, FSOs came in as a 7 or an 8 and they were tenured when they were promoted across threshold. There was a threshold system established. When you were promoted to FSO-5, you were tenured. If you came in as an 8 you had 7 ï¿½ years to get promoted to 5 and if you came in as a 7, then you had 5 years to get promoted to a 5. So, my job was to take brand new officers through that first untenured period. I would assign them when they came in the Service and I was the one who would go to the assignment officers in Personnel and tell them who we wanted in positions for onward assignments. These people come in and they don't have a corridor reputation. Nobody knows anything about them. Nobody knows who is good or who is bad. So, I had a lot of authority since I was the only one who really knew them. I could go to NEA or EUR and say, "So and so is really good" and get them assigned. I could basically decide on assignments myself. I developed a good relationship with all assignment officers and made sure that before I assigned anybody, I'd find out what the needs were at post, what the personalities were, and a desk or whatever. I thought I did a good job.

Q: How would you get to know these officers?

MACKLIN: If they had just come into the Service, you met them during the A-100 course and then you'd talk to them a lot. I'd meet with them four or five times. I developed some sort of file on them. I'd find out where they went to school, what they had studied, what they knew. I just spent a lot of time with them. After they had been in the Service, I had a file with all their efficiency reports and all of the letters they had written us. Before I'd assign anybody, I'd call their former bosses or people who worked with them at a post and say, "How did old Schmutz do" or try to find out what kind of person they were.

Q: I've been in Personnel, too. We all know there's no problem with really good officers. But there are also officers who maybe won't develop and other ones that really haven't done very well but there is potential there and some people are slow starters. How did you deal with the ones that in your heart you knew were difficult to deal with?

MACKLIN: You try to give them a little time to develop and put them into less demanding jobs. One of the biggest problems I had during that assignment was that there were very few junior political jobs. There were fewer junior political jobs than there were junior political officers, a lot fewer. There wasn't yet a rotational program. Gil Blanford, who I succeeded, had started the rotational, started to put it together, but it wasn't really in place. I worked with it and over two years got it set up in basically 12 model posts where we got it going. But the problem we had with political officers was that it wasn't uncommon for somebody to come in the Service as a political officer, for their not to be a political job available, you'd send them off to do consular work for a tour, which is good experience anyways, then they're up for reassignment, there still isn't a political job for them, and they would sometimes face threshold review without having worked in their cone yet. So, it was a big fight. What I did a lot was try to steal jobs from the mid-grade office. That meant sending people out to Africa and the Middle East because there were 05 jobs. A lot of the African embassies had FSO-5 jobs that were maybe called "consular officer" or "economic officer" or "economic/commercial officer" or something like that, but they did political, consular, economic work, a little bit of everything. Those were really good jobs and they were almost always at the 05 level so I'd steal those whenever I could and put these junior political officers into them.

Q: In your glimpse of it how well did the Personnel system work?

MACKLIN: I thought it worked very well then. The place where it doesn't work is where you get a lot of vested interests that are not adjudicated well. I thought at that time we had really good assignment officers, and the officers responsible for assigning people were really very bright. There was an understanding within the assignment panel that people would take turns sharing the less competitive officers and it was done systematically. "No, you had to take so and so last time. This time, NEA has to do it." So, I thought up through the mid grades it worked really well, that an effort was made to give the best officers the best jobs, to really get to know people, to place people in jobs where they had the right training, to find out what it was you were putting them into. I thought it worked very well. When you have less competent people in Personnel, the bureaus kind of take over. It seems to me that is Personnel policy at its worst.

Q: Did you see officers who became known maybe to an ambassador or assistant secretary who would take them under their wing and try to bypass the system so that their boy or girl got ahead?

MACKLIN: Yes, that would happen from time to time. It was usually a fight. One example was when Sandy Vershbow came into the Service. He had a lot of background in arms control and at the university level had been working with the Brookings Institution as somebody on negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Political Military (PM) Bureau really wanted to get him to work in that area. There was at the same time an effort to send him off to do consular work. So, that became a great tug and pull. I must admit, I had sympathy for both sides. You come into the Foreign Service, you're available for worldwide assignment, and you should know something about what the rest of the building does. But in this case, PM won. He went up there and I doubt if he ever did consular work. But that didn't happen so much at least in my area.

Q: I would think in your area it would be less likely than when you're mid-career. Did you have any problems at that time that would be defined today as sex discriminatioyou can't send a girl to that post or something like that?

MACKLIN: Not so much. I remember there was one assignment I was involved in involving a female officer who wanted to be assigned to Tromso in Norway. I managed to get her assigned over the dead body of the assignment officer. Tromso is north of the Arctic Circle. In those days, it was a one officer post. It was kind of a USIS listening post, an official presence post. Tromso was a nice little town, but it was a little town. So, you'd go through periods of about two to three months in the winter where you don't have any sun. Then conversely in the summer, you don't have any night. So, it takes somebody who is resourceful. In the past, they would always assign somebody there with a family. She didn't. but she was determined to have that job.

Q: Did she have any background that would put her there?

MACKLIN: She didn't, just determination. I think she got the job primarily because there was a general feeling that, well, we've got to prove that we're not sexist on the panel. So, she got the job. It was okay. She managed to get through the two years without a nervous breakdown. But I gather it was close. She didn't do a particularly spectacular job. In general, we could have assigned somebody else there. We could have found a better officer for the job. At the time, she was the only one who wanted it, but it was a post we always managed to fill.

I don't remember a lot of problems with sexism or racism. Charles Martinson was the assignment officer for NEA. I worked with him a lot. I was really interested in the Middle East. He had worked very hard to bring some female officer into the Arabic training program, including April Glaspie, amongst others. So, it seems to me there were opportunities.

Q: When you left there in '77, whither?

MACKLIN: The Director General and also the head of Personnel was Carol Laise.

Q: How did that work?

MACKLIN: We had some problems with Carol Laise, who I felt was opinionated and had very little feeling for things operational. Somewhere along the line the DG's office had hired on contract a psychiatrist to look at the transition process for various groups of officers. He was an extremely articulate guy, had a lot of charm. There were three factors working on this. He was one factor. (end of tape)

There was a junior officer class that had come in that included a lot of very ambitious, egotistical young officers who were concerned because they weren't given the kinds of assignments they thought they were entitled to. He went to talk to that A-100 class. There was something that clicked between him and a bunch of officers in that class. They had all thought they were going to go off to Paris to be the ambassador's special assistant or deputy head of the Political Section or something grand. They weren't prepared to take the Tegucigalpas of the world. They felt the Service wasn't sensitized to their potential. So, he had meetings with them which resulted in a paper, a paper saying that if you want to keep good people, you've got to treat them right. At the same time, the Executive Director of Personnel was a guy named Larry Russell. Larry Russell was an old line admin officer who loved to scheme and wheel and deal. Larry didn't like the way Personnel worked. He didn't like the assignment process because there was too much negotiating going on. The admin people in those days tended to slam dunk people. You got somebody... Basically, they would let the executive directors of the five geographic bureaus make the assignments. You need a GSO in Ouagadougou, you find a guy at the right grade; if you like him, you put him there. There was none of this negotiating, "Would you rather go to Namibia" crap. He felt that there was too much negotiating that went on in the process of staffing econ. Jobs overseas and political jobs and the rest of that. So, at the same time, he wanted to increase the importance of his office, the Executive Directorship of Personnel. He said, "There are really too many people in counseling in assignments. We ought to abolish several of those jobs. Then there will be less negotiating. I'll create management jobs in my area and we can run this program better and more economically." He had Carol Laise's ear and the psychiatrist had Carol Laise's ear. One of the things the psychiatrist said to Carol Laise was, "How can you have counselors down there? They're not trained in counseling. They don't have a background in psychology. You can't have people down there saying they're counselors." There were a whole bunch of meetings that took place and the result was that counselors were then called career development officers. That was really the only thing that changed, but it complicated our work immensely. Larry Russell and Carol Laise tried to get involved in specific assignments of younger officers. Two or three people were discredited along the way. The head of counseling in assignments was really unwilling to stand up to her or Larry Russell, so the whole thing was kind of one of those stupid bureaucratic things that sucks up a lot of time and everybody is worse off after it's over.

Q: What was your impression of the officers who were coming in?

MACKLIN: I thought they were good. I thought there were some really good people. Every now and then, there was a clinker. The clinking was usually because they had interpersonal problems, didn't understand, couldn't relate to other people, were extremely egotistical, or something like that. But in terms of raw intelligence, we were getting very good people. Indeed, a lot of the people that I helped with their early assignments have gone on to great thingambassadorial assignments and assistant secretaryships and so forth.

Q: What would you do if a bright person whose ego was such that they felt they really should essentially be Secretary of State but they might have to put in a year or two getting ready for that job. How would you get them assigned somewhere?

MACKLIN: What I would always do in talking to them is just explain what my options were and explain that the sort of role chance has in the whole assignment process. If you're available for an assignment when there are certain jobs coming open, your chances may be better than somebody who comes available next year when they're not. So, there is a lot of luck involved in all of this. I'd sit down and explain what the options were. These were the jobs that were open. We'd talk about them and I'd explain that there were other people competing for them and that people who had been in the Service, had one tour already, often had a leg up. They had, after all? I found as a rule, when you told people, "Look, you've got to be available for worldwide assignment, everybody in the Foreign Service has done a hardship post or two, and why not get it out of the way while you're young and more flexible and you don't have kids in school," for the most part, that worked okay.

Q: Did you find that if you had a personality problem, someone who was not a team player? When I was a career management officer, as we called them in those days, back in the '60s, we found that we tended to send them off to London or Paris because we thought, "These places are big and can absorb them." But after a while, we were getting screams from London and Paris saying, "Lay off this. We're getting nothing but problem people, particularly in the consular and administrative sections."

MACKLIN: If you have somebody who has a little too much ego and you're able to put them in an institutional situation where they're going to have to compromise with other people in a political section where the guys they're working with may be even more ambitious than they are, then it's maybe a?

Q: Let the chips fall where they may then.

MACKLIN: Right.

Q: In '77, whither?

MACKLIN: I took the 26 week econ course, which was painful. I knew at the time that there wasn't a future for me in the political cone. All of my economic cone colleagues were being promoted much faster than we were. It wasn't unusual for people to stay in the mid grades eight or nine years. In fact, working on the desk in ARA, if I had stayed, it probably would have worked out, but I saw a lot of guys who as then FSO-5s would go off to Colombia to be political officer and then come back and work on the Colombia desk and then go off to Peru as political officer and then come back and be the desk officer for some ARA thing and then go off to be political officer. It was linear. There was no upward movement. You remember what it was like back in the mid-'70s. There were just no political promotions. So, I thought I had to do something. I really liked Personnel work and I thought I should switch into either econ or admin or something. I had my eye on a job in Algeria as principal officer. I took the economic course as a filler and did that for 26 weeks and somehow managed to pass. Then the second six months, I took French in preparation for going to Algeria. While I was in French, I came down with hepatitis. It turned out to be recurrent hepatitis.

Q: Do you think you had picked it up somewhere else?

MACKLIN: I think I picked it up in the Caribbean over Christmas. After the economic course, we had gone down to the Caribbean on a vacation. I think I picked it up there. It turned out to be recurrent hepatitis. I'd take French and have to drop out and then I'd be back in it and then have to drop out. It was a holy mess. At the same time, I was scheduled to get married and we were going off to Oran together. They had always assigned couples there. I still had hepatitis when we went out. It was bad judgment on my part. I shouldn't have done it. I could have said, "Look, I'm not well yet. You've got to either give me more time or reassign me." The guy who was there I really liked and they were about to go nuts at the place, desperate to get out. I was really interested in going there. I had read up on Algeria and was interested in the Middle East. So, we went and I got sick again and eventually got medevaced out.

Q: For how long were you in Algeria?

MACKLIN: Two weeks. I was sick before I got there. We flew to Paris for a couple of days to get over jet lag and flew down to Nice for two days because I wanted my new wife to see a Mediterranean city that was not Arab and see what it was like. I remember I was too tired to walk. We rented a little VW and drove up to one of the hill towns. I couldn't get out of the car. I just sat in the car and she got out and walked around and came back.

Q: Can you tell me a little bit about how you met your wife and her background?

MACKLIN: She was one of my counselees. She came in the Foreign Service as a political officer when I was in Personnel. So, we met because I was her CDO. Talking about sexism, she had been a Foreign Service brat. She said, "Look, I'm willing to go anywhere. I'll take any assignment you want to give me." There was a consular job in Curacao. I sort of had her in mind for that. It was a small post where you could do a lot of different things. So, I had her in mind for that. There was an officer from her class, a guy named Joe Limprecht, who is now ambassador to Albania. I wanted to assign him to the staff assistant job in Political-Military Affairs, my old job a few years later. Limprecht had a good background for Pol-Mil staffer, was a good officer. So, I thought he'd be an ideal assignment.

Well, the special assistant in PM at the time was Joe McBride. The staff assistant was a woman named Lorraine Takahashi. Joe was kind of on a roll in those days. He decided he wanted a female staff assistant to replace Lorraine and he didn't want a male. He liked the idea of having a girl around so that he could kind of find it easier for him to dominate. Joe is a nice guy, but in those days, he was a bit much. We were old friends and he came to me and said, "I won't take Limprecht. It's up to me. The assistant secretary (George Vest) gets to decide who he wants for a staff assistant. He'll take whomever I tell him to take. I won't take Limprecht. I want a female officer. If you don't have a female officer in the political cone, I know for a fact there are three female officers in the econ cone in this entering class, so I'll take one of them." At the time, I was just doing political officers and wasn't assigning econ officers. The only political officer I had in that entire class was Adrian. So, rather than send her to Curacao, which I was going to do, I assigned her to PM as staff assistant. I got Limprecht a job in EUR. So, it worked out for him and she went to work in Political-Military Affairs. But it was entirely because Joe wanted a female and not a male as his staff assistant.

Q: You were yanked out with this medical thing. What happened?

MACKLIN: We went to Oran and then I was medevaced back. We talked about it a bit. I wasn't well. They just broke the assignment. So, I went in to see Mary Ryan and said, "I think I'd like to switch to admin." I wound up working in AF/EX as the personnel officer and staff assistant. I worked there for two years, the first year as a staff assistant/personnel officer for the Africa Bureau, and the second year as a post management officer.

Q: What happened to your wife?

MACKLIN: She came back with me. She took a job in OES.

Q: From '77-'79, you were?

MACKLIN: It was '78-'80 that I was in AF/EX.

Q: How did that work? You were doing personnel. This could be a pretty critical position. You're the person more or less to see that there is a good ebb and flow within Personnel to the Africa Bureau.

MACKLIN: Yes. I knew everybody in Personnel and so it worked out pretty well. Dick Moose was the assistant secretary in AF and he did a good job in AF. He was a disaster later in M but he was okay in AF. I knew a lot of the people in AF. So, it worked out okay. There was a sort of dominant clique around Moose. I got along fine with Dick Moose, but there was a dominant clique around him. Lannon Walker, Bob Houdek, there were a bunch of them that were old AF hands. Lannon Walker is an asshole. I had a lot of problems with him.

Q: He was big in AFSA.

MACKLIN: At one time, yes. He was a real schmuck. At the same time, the admin people didn't really accept me as an admin officer. I had never done GSO work overseas. Most of them had come up and had been communicators and then had mustanged over. So, in a way, I wasn't really accepted by the admin people. By now, the country directors, who were mostly political officers, were treating me like one of those admin nerds. But it was okay. It wasn't too bad.

Q: How well did the Africa Bureau compete for officers?

MACKLIN: AF had three things going for it. There were a lot of good people as office directors. Even though I wasn't part of that clique, Houdek is very good. Kurt Cameron was one of the office directors. Tom Smith before he died... There were some really good people in AF. Young officers who went out there got jobs above their grade level. There were a lot of people who went out there as junior officers to take mid-career jobs or were mid-career officers taking senior jobs. There was a real opportunity. Thirdly, there were certain people who were really interested in Africa. So, the three of those things kind of were responsible for the bureau's success.

Q: Did you find yourself in battles with the other bureaus?

MACKLIN: I was out of my element. If I was going to switch to admin, I really should have done administrative work overseas. There were a lot of the nuts and bolts and the basic budgetary factors that I didn't understand. There are allotment categories that you can use in GSO and there are allotment categories that you can't. I never worked with that in the field. Dick Salazar was the executive director of AF. There was at State an admin. Old boys club that made a lot of the decisions. John Thomas was the head of the A Bureau at the time. Sheldon Krys was running NEA. These five executive directors had enormous amounts of authority and they would get together and make a lot of the decisions for the building in the admin area. One of the things that was coming along at the time was the classification of Foreign Service national positions overseas. The Department had been trying to classify all of the FSN positions overseas. This was causing a lot of problems in a lot of posts because it was resulting in the downgrading of very senior FSNs who had been around for a long time and had a lot of authority. The people running the classification function within Personnel were very categorical in their approach. I dealt with them later on and they were very dogmatic about certain things. Dick Salazar would refuse to let any of them come to any AF post to do a classification survey. So, he was kind of the odd man out. I was often asked to go to meetings to represent Salazar with these other executive directors and they would say, "Why don't you do this? Why don't you do that?" All I could say was, "Well, I've been asked to work with you guys, but we're not going to cooperate on this or that." So, it was all very strange. Salazar was later on found guilty of filing a double voucher and using the money to cover expenses at an admin officers conference in Nairobi or something and had to leave the Service. But he was kind of a wheeler dealer kind of guy that liked to keep his cards close to his chest. He was kind of resented by some of the other bureaus. The executive director of EUR? So, there was a lot of friction there in working with the other bureaus. I felt that we were having a lot of trouble getting people assigned to Africa and I felt that we should use the approach that the private sector doeif people don't want to do it, pay them more. Eventually, you'll pay them enough so that they'll go there. So, I worked up a proposal for super hardship posts to basically triple the hardship differential for places like Zaire and maybe Pakistan, but it never got anywhere. It was kind of frustrating. Salazar didn't understand it and wasn't interested. The other executive directors thought, "There's nothing in it for me." NEA was faintly interested but decided it couldn't be done.

Q: Of course, the European Bureau wouldn't have any hardship posts that would fit that category.

MACKLIN: Yes. East Asia.

I made four trips to Africa. The first three trips I took the malarial suppressants we used to take in Vietnam and in every case, my hepatitis came back. On my last trip to Africa, I didn't take any malarial suppressants and I didn't get sick. So, when my two years in AF was up, I knew I couldn't take an assignment to AF. This upset the admin club a great deal. They wanted me to go to Freetown, Sierra Leone. There was a tandem assignment there. Adrian could do consular work and I could replace Don Hayes as admin counselor. I said, "I can't go someplace where I have to take these malarial suppressants. I'll get sick." Well, they didn't believe me. So, that added to the problem.

Q: In 1980, where did you go?

MACKLIN: I went to Tel Aviv. It was a forced placed assignment. I was interested in going back to the Middle East. I looked around for jobs. There was a tandem assignment in Beirut, consular officer for my wife and admin. counselor for my wife. Beirut was a very small mission. There was also a GSO position there. I bid on both the GSO job and the admin. job and she bid on the consular job. But I talked to a couple of people there and thought, "The GSO job is really not a very good job. The admin. job would be fine." They wanted to assign us to it. I withdrew my bid on the GSO job. I said, "I'll be happy to go there as admin., but I don't want to go there as GSO." So, they got pissed off at me and forced placed me into Tel Aviv as personnel officer replacing an FSO-6. So, I didn't know if I was going to go or fight it. At the same time, Adrian as an FSO-6 was offered an FSO-3 job in Paris as deputy science counselor. By then, Tom Pickering was the head of OES and he controlled all the science jobs overseas. She had been working in OES and they liked her and said, "Do you want to go to Paris as deputy science officer?" So, she took it and went off to Paris and I went off to Tel Aviv.

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Q: Today is November 17, 2000. Tom, you were in Tel Aviv from 1980 to when?

MACKLIN: 1982.

Q: Your position was as personnel officer. Could you describe Israel in 1980 when you got there, the state of things?

MACKLIN: It seems to me that Camp David was sometime [before my arrival]. So, everybody thought Camp David solved a lot of the problems. In fact, the Begin government continued to establish settlements in the West Bank. During that period, the West Bank and Gaza were surprisingly quiet. Security was extremely good. There were no bombings. The only danger was being shot at by Israelis, which happened from time to time to embassy people. If you were driving around the West Bank they were pretty free with their bullets. But Palestinians were surprisingly docile at that time. There was a little friction but not a lot of friction between the consulate in Jerusalem, which really represented the Arab constituency, and the embassy in Tel Aviv. The Begin government was really dominated by the Shamir/Sharon group, very right wing. They felt that the Palestinians had a state. There was a Palestinian state. It was called Jordan. Indeed, there were a lot of people in the embassy that felt, "Look, we're in sort of a transitional period, but what really has to happen is, all the Palestinians need to be pushed into Jordan. Let's just get it over with because this all belongs to Israel." I was in Israel at the time the Israelis withdrew from the Sinai. There was one settlement that was down very close to Gaza but inside Sinai. I remember the agony that they went through in finally evacuating that. There were a lot of people in Israel that felt that any Jewish settlement was holy. There was no historic association with that site. But it was a pretty intransigent thing. The Taba issue was a major thing in the Gulf of Aqaba. Taba was a little sliver of land about 12 miles long and about two miles wide. It went up in the armpit of the Gulf of Aqaba. It was part of a land that was supposed to be given back to Egypt and in fact ultimately was given back to Egypt. But the Israelis hung on to it and the Egyptians had to take them to an international court to get it back, but the Israelis, who were better at legal maneuvering, managed to fight the thing off for years. It was one of the big issues at the time.

It was a pleasant time to be there. I remember talking with Palestinian cab drivers. I went to Jordan a couple of times and went up to Jerusalem a lot. I can remember in particular one of the cab drivers said to me, "I can't fight the Israelis. I can't fight Begin. We don't have any guns. But the one thing I can do is go home and have more kids. I'going to have the biggest family I can. That's how we're going to get the Israelis." Considering the population of the Palestinians? The PLO operated out of Lebanon in those days. Our ambassador was Sam Lewis. We had very competent staff. Sam Lewis was ultimately there eight or nine years. He was a very good ambassador. I had a lot of respect for him. He was superb at explaining to congressman how to walk the tightrope of visits to Israel and not saying things that commit us to one thing or another. The Israelis had a habit in negotiations of saying, "Yes, but back in 1953, you said blah blah blah." So, Sam Lewis, having been there through a long transition period, was very effective at countering that kind of stuff, those debating tactics. Sam Lewis' deputy was a guy named Bill Brown, who was later ambassador. The political counselor was Charlie Hill and then later Paul Hare. Rich Kauzlarich was the economic counselor. Dennis Jett wathe science guy. They all became ambassadors. Jett was a good guy.

Q: You were a guy thrown in there without any particular commitment to the Arab or Israeli world. Was there an atmosphere on the political issue in Tel Aviv with our embassy that was hostile to the Begin group or pro-Begin?

MACKLIN: Sam Lewis had gone off as ambassador at about the same time that Begin had been elected over Rabin. There was a scandal involving Rabin's wife and the Labor government for the first time in the history of Israel was out of office. Begin, who had been a rock throwing terrorist, became prime minister. Sam Lewis got off the plane and said, "This is the best thing that could happen to Israel. Begin is a great man and that's the kind of leadership they need." So, they started off on the right foot. By 1980, by the time I got there, the relationship was a little bit frayed. Begin was extremely arrogant, didn't give a damn for anybody who wasn't Jewish. One of the big issues while I was there was when the Israelis would invade Lebanon to "clean out" the Palestinian problem. There were Palestinians in the Bekaa Valley and all over southern Lebanon in force. That is where Arafat spent a lot of his time. There were occasionally rockets lobbed in, not nearly as much hostility as there is now, but at the time, the Israelis felt that what they needed to do was go up there, clean that out, turn the country back to the Lebanese, and everybody would thank them. Of course, we all know how that turned out. But during the massacre of the two refugee camps, Sabra and Shatila, I remember afterwards, it was semi-orchestrated by Sharon, who cleared a path for a Lebanese group to go in and do their dirty work. They were very much involved in the process. But the Begin government was astounded that anybody blamed the Israelis for this. Begin's statement to the press was, "Goyim kill Goyim and they come and blame the Jews." So, Sam Lewis' effort in my last year in Israel, '81-'82, was trying to talk Begin out of invading Lebanon. There were several times when they had a timetable and they were ready to roll and Sam Lewis and Charlie Hill managed to talk them out of it. But eventually, they decided to go ahead and do it. There were also various provocations along the way. I remember one episode where the Israelis had done something that was really embarrassing to us and Sam Lewis talked to Begin about it and Begin threw a temper tantrum and said, "We're not a banana republic. You can't push us around." So, it was a difficult, but positive, creative relationship.

Q: How did you feel about being there? There has been this idea that the Arabists are all anti-Semitic which I think is more a creation of the Israeli Information Service than anything. Was there a feeling of frustration about a small country which essentially could dictate to the U.S.?

MACKLIN: There wasn't within the embassy. There were an incredible number of American Jews at the embassy who were very pro-Israel, no question of loyaltieFSOs. They all did their job well and some of them spoke Hebrew fluently and had good access and were good officers. They didn't do anything they shouldn't. They didn't spy for Israel. They didn't leak information. They were very good officers. Sam Lewis was nobody to cross, but their loyalties were very clear. They were very pro-Israel. These were some of the guys who would say to me, "This is a transition time. The sooner we get all these Palestinians out of Israel and into Jordan, the better off we're going to be."

Q: When you say "Israel," you mean basically the West Bank.

MACKLIN: Yes. I went to Israel as a disciplinary assignment. I had switched from political to admin because my wife was a political cone officer and I thought I had to. I was never accepted very well by the admin people. It was a very cliquish outfit and they really very much wanted me to go off to Africa. I couldn't go to Africa because of my hepatitis. So, there were bad feelings. I went there replacing an FSO-6 who had done just a wretched job. I was not terribly pleased about the assignment, although I liked the Middle East. I had some friends there. I knew the admin counselor, who was a gunamed Pete Mollat. He was a nice guy who was very tightly strung, kind of a piano wire kind of guy. But he was a decent guy as long as you didn't mind having him shout at you three times a day; he was okay to work for. After you were ripped, he'd come back later and apologize. Then he left after the first year and Tom Lindville took his place. He was the very opposite. He was so laid back you didn't know he was awake. He was a great delegator and delegated. I did the Personnel job for two years. It had a lot to do with classification, salary and wage surveys. But I tried to dabble in other stuff. The second year I was there, Sam Lewis became the dean of the diplomatic corps. There had been an Austrian who was dean of the diplomatic corps. He left. Sam was the senior ambassador, so he became dean of the corps and like everything, he wanted to be an activist. So, he wanted to organize monthly luncheons and all kinds of stuff and work with certain embassies on certain issues. He didn't like his special assistant, so he brought me in to handle all of his diplomatic relationship issues and help him be dean of the corps. It was fun. I got to go up to Jerusalem a lot and deal with the foreign office and other embassies. It was a good time. I enjoyed that.

Q: How did you find the diplomatic corps? Did they have some of the same political pressures that we had?

MACKLIN: Not that I ever saw.

Q: I'm really talking about the Jewish and maybe Christian fundamentalists support of Israel, which meant that diplomatically our hands were really pretty well tied.

MACKLIN: No, I didn't see that. I didn't know very many Brits. But I knew a lot of Australians. Their ambassador was a tough little guy and he seemed to have a completely free hand. No problems at all doing what he thought was right. The Europeans generally had just a handful of people there. But they took a very EU approach to all this, that we needed to be more evenhanded. For the most part, they had no influence. They just had a mission there to report on things.

Q: How about Jerusalem? Did you get involved with our consulate general there at all?

MACKLIN: We went up there a lot. At the time, there were a lot of peace talks going on. We had a lot of SecState visits. Every time there was a visit, we would wind up setting up CODEL offices or SecState offices at the King David. So, I went up there a lot. It's a wonderful city. The number two in the Consular Section in Tel Aviv, Susan Jacobs, her husband, Barry Jacobs, was the branch PAO in Jerusalem. The number two was Jock Covey, whom I had known from Washington. I knew the admin. guy pretty well, Steve Noland. There was a guy named Tom Wookish, who was there as political officer. Wookish is one of these strange kind of 19th century archeologist types who is a walking encyclopedia. He was wonderful to talk to and I went on a couple of CODEL trips with him. He could find old roman aqueducts and biblical locations that I never dreamed existed. He was a very bright guy, very pro-Arab. There was not so much friction between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Sam Lewis was pretty firm on that. But there were differences of opinion.

Q: As a personnel officer, how were the local personnel? How did we view the Israelis who we hired?

MACKLIN: There was a senior FSN in Personnel who was really kind of a nitwit who had been there for a long time. I kind of worked around her. I hired in some new people. My experience in Israel was that it was the best FSN labor pool I've ever seen in my life. There were a lot of people there from Britain, from British colonies. I had three secretaries, all of them bilingual, trilingual. They could all take dictation. So, I could dictate to one and then they'd bring me a draft, I'd rewrite it. I turned out more correspondence in two years in Israel than I did in the rest of my career. In GSO, in Budget, almost everywhere we went, we had really skilled FSNs, a very good labor pool. I thought they were very impressive. There were two guys in GSO who were extremely good at visits, who were kind of famous in the whole Middle Eastern community. One of them later died of throat cancer. After he died, it turned out that he had been involved in a small ring in GSO raking off money from various contracts, which was most sad because he had been a captain in the RAF in World War II and was really a good guy. The Israeli FSN salary scale was a greater secret than any we had in the Political Section. We did not report the salary scale to the government of Israel. We paid the FSNs in cash every other week. They would line up and receive cash. So, they could report whatever they wanted to the government and of course, they underreported. So, there was a lot of sensitivity there. When I'd go and out and do wage surveys, I took the head of the Budget Section with me, who was a kind of spokesman for all the FSNs. He was an Iraqi-Israeli and was very good.

Q: When I was in Naples just about this time, we were under great pressure to report to the Italian government how much we were paying our people. This was an extremely sensitive issue because many of our people had not paid any taxes. Finally, a couple of years after I left, we agreed to tell the Italians how much we were paying. A considerable number of our staff retired very quickly so that it wouldn't be reported. What you were doing was probably illegal, wasn't it? According to Israeli law, an employer is supposed to tell the government how much they're paying somebody.

MACKLIN: Because we were a foreign government, we didn't fall under Israeli law. So, what we did we did as diplomats who were immune from prosecution. What Israeli employees did with their own government was their concern, although frankly they had their own fraternal order of FSNs and they worked out a mock salary schedule that would make their reporting internally consistent.

Q: 70% of the Israeli population is Sephardic.

MACKLIN: It wasn't then. There were a lot of them. In the election of '81, that was a really important election in terms of the Middle East. People were upset with Begin. He was seen as too hard-line. Peres was the leader of the Labor Party and he was favored by something like 20 points. Begin outmaneuvered him. Had Peres come in, he had said, "I will curtail settlements. I'll try to work out a peace deal." What Begin did was, he worked an agreement where he said, "Fine, we'll have elections," but because of all the things that are going on, they provided for more campaigning time than they normally do. They wound up giving the Begin government something like four months, an unusual amount of time. In that time, he adopted a lot of measures that were generally popular and kind of eroded away Peres' lead. Then a couple of weeks before the elections, there was an Israeli comic who had a big public meeting in Tel Aviv. He made a crack about the Sephardic. There is a racial name that Israelis call a Sephardic Israeli who is too dark skinned. So, this comic who wasn't particularly bigoted, made this comment at this big meeting on TV about, "Well, all the really great people are here, none of that riffraff." Well, Begin picked up on the riffraff and used that as a banner. They had posters out within a day or two about "The leader of the people." So, he got the Sephardic vote and won the election by not much of a margin, but enough to stay in power. That was a really pivotal thing. Sam Lewis knows all the details on that election.

Q: I was thinking more as a personnel officer, were you under any constraints? Were you having Arab (we're not talking about Sephardic or Ashkenazi)-Israelis, many of them coming in as regular FSNs?

MACKLIN: I don't remember if we had any. I don't think we had any in Tel Aviv. The staff in Jerusalem was mostly Arab.

Q: I interviewed Mike Metrinko, who around '91 was consul general in Tel Aviv and was saying that he found when he needed to go up to Jerusalem to see Palestinian-Americans who were arrested, there was nobody that he could call in the Consular Section who spoke Arabic and that there had been a policy of not hiring Arab-Israelis. I think the inspectors came out about that time and said, "Cut it out." This sounded like a system where you don't hire blacks or something like that.

MACKLIN: I had no guidance on hiring. I was allowed to hire? I didn't make decisions on my own. When there was a vacancy, we'd go through certain procedures, but then you'd go to the section chief and interview people together and say to the head of GSO and the head of budget or the Political Section or whomever, "Who do you think is best and why?" But I can't remember ever having an Arab-Israeli apply for a job. In Jerusalem, we had several very sharp FSNs at the consulate. If they needed an Arab speaker, there were tons of them up there. But Mike's a smart cookie. That was not a problem I ever saw.

Q: How did you work it out with your wife? She's in Paris and you're in Tel Aviv.

MACKLIN: We just had great vacations. We wouldn't take them together as a rule. She would come to Tel Aviv and I would kind of keep working for the most part. We didn't have a lot of annual leave. So, we'd maximize it. Then I'd go to Paris for a couple of weeks. So, we'd try to get together about every three months. It was a bit tedious, but great vacations.

Q: In '82, how did you fit in? You weren't a Middle Eastern hand. You weren't administrative. You weren't political.

MACKLIN: I was fed up with having a separate assignment. I also had developed a real interest in going to Russia. Traditionally, Moscow has been a good place for tandems. I was really kind of interested in going to Russia. Also, I liked the Middle East. Sheldon Krys was the executive director of NEA at the time. He came out and visited. The guy who was GSO in Tel Aviv left in the summer of '82. I left in the summer of '82. So did Dennis Jett. All three of us. So, NEA suggested to me that maybe if I wanted to move over and be GSO, Adrian could get Dennis' job and we'd still have a tandem. I said, "No." In retrospect, I probably shouldn't have. Lewis really liked me and it was an interesting place. But I said, "No." We took an assignment to Moscow. But by then, Sheldon had figured out that maybe I was okay. They were prepared to reassign me to post or something. But I really wanted to go to Moscow and I told him that. So, I did.

Q: Did you both take Russian for a year?

MACKLIN: Yes, we took a year of Russian, '82-'83. Then we went to Moscow for two years.

Q: So from '83 to '85?

MACKLIN: Yes.

Q: How did your Russian come along?

MACKLIN: It was difficult. I'm not really good at languages involving intricate grammar changes. Russian, with all of the cases and then the two track verbs and all of that, was difficult. I managed to muddle through with a 2+. But it was a very divisive year. We had a linguist, an Irene Thompson. She was writing a book and had sold the FSI hierarchy on the idea that the way she managed things, she could bring people with no Russian up to a four in the one year, 44-week period. Then she turned to us and said, "Look, we're all trying to do the best we can. The idea is to speak as much Russian as you can. If you're in a class and somebody else is having problems answering something, don't hesitate. Jump right in and answer for them. We want everybody to answer on this. I'm going to reward people who are the most verbal." So, several of the people took the hint and nobody took their turn. You can imagine what that does to the language class in the FSI hierarchy. It was a very nasty year. Then Andy Goodman and a few other people complained about her system and so she gave them really snotty training reports. It was a divisive year.

Q: What jobs did both of you have?

MACKLIN: She spent a year in the Consular Section, which was typical, and then a year as deputy science officer. I went on as GSO. Initially, I was going to go out as admin officer, as number two. Both that and the GSO job were open. Joe Hewins, who went out as the admin counselor, called me up from Belgrade and said, "Look, we had you in mind for admin officer, but Rusty Hughes also wants to go to Moscow and his wife is now an FSO and she's been assigned as an assistant GSO. I was going to make you admin and Rusty GSO, but I can't do that because of his wife. Would you be willing to switch?" Rusty and I were the same grade. I said, "Well?" He said, "You'll report directly to me. You won't report through the admin officer. You'll report directly to the admin counselor. I'll make sure you're taken care of." You can't very well say, "Well, fuck you, I don't care." So, I said, "Okay, fine." So, I went out as GSO, which in retrospect I think is probably a better job.

Q: Moscow 1983.

MACKLIN: In 1983, we had a brand new baby, so that complicated things a little bit, but I remember we went out there, got there in August, and then about a month later, the system was that they tried to get you out as often as they could because Moscow tended to get to people. Actually, I always liked it. I was very much at home there. One of the things they would do to get people out was, when your car, which you had shipped in, arrives in Helsinki, it was actually cheaper for the government to send you down on the train, let you spend the night or two in Helsinki, and then drive the car back to Moscow, overnighting in Leningrad along the way. That was cheaper than having the car shipped in. So, they would send people down there to drive their car back. So, we were at the Intercontinental Hotel in Helsinki and the TV was full of something about some plane crash. We could never quite figure out what it was because the Finnish is so convoluted. It was when the Russians shot down the Korean flight. The relationship turned so sour after that. Gromyko and Shultz wouldn't even talk to each other. They just spit at each other. For at least a year until Andropov died, it was a frozen relationship. It was also at a time when the medium range missiles were being put into Western Europe-

Q: This was the SS-20 and we responded with a Pershing and Cruise missiles.

MACKLIN: Yes. So, there was a lot of acid in the system in those days. So, for the first year that we were there, we didn't have any CODELs, we didn't have a SecState visit, we didn't have anything. We could just do our jobs. The Russians were very cold. There was an organization set up to deal with all the diplomats, UPDK. They were actually quite friendly to us, but very correct on anything they gave us. We needed additional housing and OFM was just getting on the ground in those days. So, we couldn't really be reciprocal on everything. It was only partial reciprocity. But we had a major problem trying to get additional housing and trying to get them to do things. So, the relationship was really kind of tense. They never hassled us. But they hassled a lot of people at post, the KGB. Art Hartman was the ambassador. He was very good. He actually had awfully good access considering the constraints. It was a good embassy. The DCM was Warren Zimmerman. The political counselor was Curt Cameron. His deputy was Mark Paris. It was a very small embassy but very good.

Q: How did you find the embassy building?

MACKLIN: The embassy building was old and creaky. The offices were inadequate. But in those days, there was a pretty good balance between space and people, much better than there was in '89-'91 when we went back. Then we had real problems. But because we had a small staff, it was a pretty good balance. GSO was in the courtyard behind the embassy. The embassy building itself on the ring road was built sometime just after the war, about '47, and was a strong building and it had to be to withstand all those fires. There were four or five apartments in the building. There was a good snack bar in the courtyard, which turned into a nightclub at night, which was a really popular place. There were very few places to go in Moscow then and so Uncle Sam's, as the nightclub was called, was pretty popular. It was concessioned out, usually to a SEABEE who would buy the liquor and run the bar and make the profit. The concessions were re-bid every year. There were a lot of people who came to Uncle Sam's and it was the nearest thing there was to an international gathering spot.

Q: Did you show movies there, too?

MACKLIN: We had movies, but not at Uncle Sam's, which was too small. But people would do it in their apartments.

Q: Were other diplomats going to Uncle Sam's?

MACKLIN: Yes. It was mostly a young crowd, but a lot of diplomats from other missions, and the Marines? There were a couple of communicators who hated it. They hated the Russians. They hated Moscow. I found the culture fascinating because it was kind of a forbidden civilization. You couldn't just go there. I found it really fascinating, but there were people who didn't, who were xenophobic. Two of the communicators made a bet as to who could stay on the compound the longest. They lived in an apartment on the compound because you always had to have a communicator on call. They ate in the snack bar, bought food from the commissary in the basement of the building, and so they went for three or four months without ever leaving the embassy compound. When one of them finally lost, it was because Joe Hulings invited him to dinner and he couldn't get out of it. So, he lost his bet. But there was that spirit among some of the people at the mission.

Q: I can't remember? There had been a major fire there. Was that before or after you?

MACKLIN: That was before. There had been two fires before us and then a major fire? The worst fire was the second tour. We were there for that.

Q: I'm interviewing a Mr. Skoug, who was there during a big fire that took the roof off the embassy.

MACKLIN: What did he do?

Q: Was there a concern about security? You had the Sergeant Lonetree case. Did that happen while you were there?

MACKLIN: Yes. I hired the femme fatale, so I know the case quite well. One of our biggest problems in the administrative area was lack of personnel. We had a terrible lack of personnel. When I arrived, there was only one guy who cleared shipments for us. We had shipments that came into the airport. We had a biweekly train run from Helsinki, a big department store in Helsinki called Stockmans would come in with milk and perishables which we could buy at exorbitant costs and then there were land shipments that would come into the big customs house outside. There was only one guy, Anatoli, who cleared all of these shipments. There was no controlling Anatoli. He was very devious. He was extremely smart. He was always one jump ahead. He always had a valid reason for clearing the shipment that he wanted to clear. No matter how bad you wanted him to be outside of the customs house outside of town, he had a better reason for being at the airport. There was no controlling Anatoli. There was the same kind of problem with a couple of other areas in GSO. I said, "Anatoli, the problem is, we need three Anatolis so we could send one to the airport and one to the train station and one out to customs. Then everything would be covered." He said, "What we really need is a woman back here as a clerk and then an assistant for me and maybe it would be more manageable. But forget about it, because there is no office space. We tried this before. UPDK won't let us have it because there is no office space." We also needed a couple of other thingsomebody to do the clerical work on customs shipments. There were two FSNs there who were known to be intelligence operatives. One was Galia, who worked for me in GSO, who had a sort of Lotte Lenya personality, very well organized, very connected, very decisive, and didn't work any bullshit with somebody she didn't like. Then Riya, who worked in Personnel, who was a tall, blond woman about 6'4". Everybody called her "Ilsa Shewolf of the SS." She was very tough. Everybody knew that they were intelligence operatives. Galia controlled the keyboard, amongst other things, and there was really no better way to do it. You had to have keys for all parts of the embassy. So, somebody would come in and say, "I need a key to the upper room in the upper annex" and she'd kind of file away who it was that asked for the key for that part of the building. Those thoughts were shared with her colleagues across the river, but I don't think?

Q: The KGB.

MACKLIN: Well, she would share it with the KGB, but I mentioned it to our Langley friends and to the NSA guy a couple of times, but they didn't seem to be bothered by it. But in any event, there were those concerns. So, it went to Hulings and said, "Look, if the problem is office space, we've got two huge containers sitting next to the GSO office that are just taking up space. They're filled with some stuff from an Austrian contractor that we used to redo kitchens and bathrooms, a guy named Golofer, and let's take those containers and get them the hell out of here and have the FSNs build their own office building. If we build a small room, you can house about four people in there and then I could hire two assistants for Anatoli and a couple of other people." I worked all of this out. He liked the idea. We went to the UPDK. They agreed to it. I had the FSNs remove? It was a project. "This is your office building. You guys build it." It was beautiful. They removed the containers. They designed the buildings, the carpenters, plumbers, they all came in. Beautiful pine floors and gingerbread outside. Lovely place. Then I was able to hire additional people and we could begin to control Anatoli. But we still needed a couple more people. I talked to Riya and Riya said, "Well, the problem now is, even though we have space, there aren't people available through the UPDK." Well, there was this one very pretty Russian girl that they had brought onboard at Spaso House. She was very cute. She worked three for about three months and we had a clerical job we had to fill. One of the clerks had quit because of something. I talked to Riya and said, "Look, we really need a clerk. We need somebody to fill that clerical vacuum. I would like to get it done before I leave." She said, "Well, I've got somebody good for you, this woman over at Spaso House. They just wanted her there for a short time and she speaks English and would be perfect." I said, "Well, let me check her out." I talked to Mrs. Hartman and she said, "Oh, she's dumb as a goddamn wall. Don't touch her with ten foot pole." So, I went back to Riya and said, "No, I don't want her. She's no good." So, Riya said, "Well, I'll go talk to the UPDK." She came back and said, "They said there's nobody." So, it stayed that way for a couple of months. Just before I was leaving, I said to Riya, "Look, I really want to fill that job. We've got a window of opportunity." She said, "Why don't we do this? Why don't you just bring her on for three months. That establishes the position with UPDK. They recognize they've got to fill it. Then during this probationary period, we'll fire her and then we'll fill in behind." So, I talked to the personnel officer and a couple of other people. They said, "Okay," so I told Riya, "Okay." Then I was replaced by Jane Becker, who was an old friend. Jane and I agreed to meet in Frankfurt on the way out. She couldn't arrive before I left, but I met her en route. We spent a day together kind of going through everything. I told her about this babe and said, "First thing you've got to do is fire her because she is dumb as dishwater and all we wanted to do was get the position established and watch out for Riya." That was enough time. She had already made her contact with Lonetree.

Q: He was a sergeant in the Marines.

MACKLIN: Yes. The gunny sergeant's wife worked for me in GSO. I employed a lot of spouses. When I arrived, it had been a Gunny Sandabol who was a mean, nasty piece of business who was mean to everybody. To the best of my knowledge, he beat his wife, probably beat the shit out of his kids. He had a cute little kid who must have been around seven or eight and his favorite expression was, "I'll rip your lips off." All the Marines hated Gunny Sandabol because he was so hard on them. But they didn't dare step out of line because he was kind of unpredictable. He was really mean. He was replaced by a guy who was a far better manager, whose wife also worked for me in GSO. He eased up on the Marines a bit. We had the second year there a British nanny who was going with one of the Marines. Then the Marine was transferred out to Barbados. So, she started dating one of the other Marines and would occasionally spend the night at the Marine house. She said, "I wasn't the only one spending the night at the Marine house (which was located in the chancery). There are a lot of girls, Yugoslavs and other nationalities, who shack up with the Marines there." I think that's also part of the atmosphere of what happened.

Lonetree was stupid. They picked somebody who considered himself a loner. But in a way the gunny sergeant was unfairly victimized, but I don't think it would have happened under Sandabol. He'd have killed the guy. But all of that was going on at the time.

Q: Ambassador Hartman was sort of like the captain of the ship who is held responsible for this. Talking about the Marine Corps situation and having overnighters staying there, that gets, particularly in an embassy, a little bit out of line, quite a bit out of line, isn't it?

MACKLIN: I think it is in the Soviet Union. The RSO was at that time a guy named Rich. He was very easygoing, not anything like the guys that we had in later tours there. If you had a British girl spend the night with one of the Marines, frankly, we knew the British girl, there was no risk there. I don't know if you get into Eastern Europeans like Yugoslavs? I think basically, it was a laxer atmosphere than was probably healthy considering the angst back here over the Soviet threat.

Hartman was a good ambassador. He took the long view. He was very bright. Matlock, who followed him, whom I also worked for, was also very good, but they were as different as salt and pepper. Matlock felt there was no detail too irrelevant to report and Hartman said, "We're out here to provide our judgment over big issues and not to try to scoop CNN. I want quality reporting. I'm not so concerned with the volume. I want to be right." And he was. I think he turned out a good product. There were good people there.

Q: Were you able to partake in the cultural life of Moscow?

MACKLIN: It was impossible to get to know Russians. They were just scared stiff of us. We had a baby and Russians love babies more than anybody I've ever met. So, you're in a park and you're all bundled up because it's cold nine months of the year and you're pushing this little kid who's all bundled up so you just see a nose, eyes, and a bit of a mouth. But that is still enough for Russians to [notice]. So, you run across other couples with babies. When they'd get a little bit older, a year and a half, or when David was almost two, take him to a little playground which was a place full of topsoil, full of glass? incredible. They used this filled dirt from God knows where. Glass all over the ground. They put up a couple of swings and that's a playground. David would play there and other kids would play there. As happens the world over, you strike up a conversation with the parents. Well, the minute they hear you talk, they know you're a westerner and close up like a clam and scoot back. They're just terrified. It was very tense.

The militia men everywhere. The police. I remember one of the communicators' wives who worked for me, they had a car and she had done something that pissed off somebody and so they took her car. She came out one day and couldn't find her car. She got on really well with the militia men who guarded that particular compound. So, she went up and said, "Look, do you have any idea where my car is?" He said, "Yes, go up about four blocks and over on the street and it's just around the corner." So, she did and it was. The single people, sometimes the KGB would come in their apartments when they weren't there and do things like leave a cigar someplace so you'd know they'd been there. If they didn't like you, when you took an R&R out of the country, they'd unplug your freezer. Pour Coca-cola into the open vents on a hi-fi system. Not a lot of it, but some.

Andropov died. Chernenko became Party Secretary. Chernenko died. Gorbachev became Party Secretary. That kind of breathed a bit of fresh air into the place. When they started having funerals, we started having people come out. George Bush came two or three times, was very amiable, spoke with the mission, was very decent. So was Shultz.

Food was uniformly terrible. You'd go to a restaurant to hear the music, so if they liked you they'd put you at a table up close to the band so you can't talk. The food takes forever to be presented. After a while, we figured out that if you really want to go out to eat, you go there ahead of time and give them some cigarettes or something and get a table way away from the band and maybe you'd get some food that was moderately edible. There were beginning to be some more liberal restaurants just as we left in '85. Nothing to write home about.

We traveled a bit. We went to Volgograd. I can tell you anecdotes about the trips, but I don't know if that's really-

Q: Just give a little flavor.

MACKLIN: Ostrahan had not been reached by the German army. They were stopped about 75 miles north. We flew up. Marty McLain and Ed McWilliams and I flew into Stalingrad, Volgograd. We saw the usual stuff. Very impressive. Then we flew down to Ostrahan, which is on the inlet on the Caspian. It's where a lot of the ships start the tour of the Volga. It's a lovely old city. The Russians used to do a lot of movies there because they had a lot of these old wooden houses like "Dr. Zhivago." It was really fascinating. We flew in there in a small jet. Off to the left of the airfield was this huge field of biplanes. There must have been 200 biplanes, the kind we might use for crop dusting, just sitting there like they hadn't moved since 1914. It was a beautiful old city with old trolley tracks wandering around. They hadn't had any diplomat visit there in ages, so they didn't even have an Intourist hotel. They had a hotel. They put us up. But there was no food in it. In fact, there was not much food in the town at the time. It was late spring. They did have some chicken and some jarred pickles and stuff from Bulgaria. That was about all they could serve in the hotel. But there was a yarmaka, a fair, going on in the town. These yarmakas are places where people who have their own individual gardens come in and sell stuff. So, it was kind of fun. Marty and I bundled up. I took a lot of pictures. Somebody got the idea that I was from- (end of tape)

Somebody got the idea that I was from Russian _____, whereas normally Russians don't want to be photographed, especially by a foreign diplomat, they were all teeth (or broken teeth as the case may be). So, I got some great pictures of these people down there. It was wonderful. They had their own Kremlin down there and there was a parade going on. We went to this yarmaka and they had all kinds of nice bread, so we bought four or five little loafs and that's what we lived on for two or three days. It was really funny. It was a little bit cold. We wandered down by this Kremlin. Against the wall, there was this little Russian kid who must have been about eight years old who had a ratty soccer ball and he was kicking it against the wall just for practice. There was this very tired looking dad standing there while the kid played. I talked to him for a minute. Down there, they weren't as afraid of us. It was kind of poignant. It was really interesting. There is something universal about a dad standing there while his kid bangs the soccer ball against the wall.

So, Marty and I stayed there two or three days and had a good time and took a lot of pictures. Then the day out, we went to the airport and they lined us up. This very broad shouldered, fat old gal, about 55, when it was time to board the flight, said, "Okay, everybody on board the flight to Moscow, come with me." She had a flag and started marching across the tarmac. It's a tarmac littered with about 25 planes. When we got about half way over, the crew sees us coming and they come running down the walkway and said, "No, you can't take this plane. This plane is no good." So, the woman said, "Yes, they're assigned this plane. They've got to fly on the plane whether you like it or not." So, they get in an argument there. He said, "No, no, no, take that plane over there" about seven planes across the tarmac. So, she said, "Okay." Off we go, this line of people getting more trepidatious by the step. The same thing happens. The pilot and the stewardess see us coming and come running out, "No, no, no, this plane won't fly." So, they have an argument. So, the woman says, "Okay, follow me." So, we do an about march and she goes back to the tower, which is about two stories up. There she is with her flag shaking her fist at this tower saying, "We've got to get these people on a plane. I don't care which plane you put them on, but you've got to fly these people to Moscow." They were saying, "Well, I don't know about this plane and I don't know about that plane." So, they took us back into the waiting room and about two hours later they took us out and we went to the second plane just as if nothing had ever happened. We boarded the plane not feeling great about this. We took off and it was a wonderful, uneventful flight. Everything was fine.

Q: It sounds like the crews didn't want to fly.

MACKLIN: Yes. But whatever it was, I didn't feel great about taking that flight. This was very typical of travel in the Soviet Union.

Q: In '85, where did you and your wife go?

MACKLIN: We came back to Washington. We wanted to stay overseas, wanted another tandem assignment. As it turned out, the whole crew who had been in Moscow before us almost to the person were assigned to embassies in Western Europe. But they went there for four year assignments. So, there was no admin job, no science job, no nothing. It was really pretty dismal. So, they offered me a bunch of things. Finally I agreed to be the executive director of the Medical Division, which was a big mistake. Adrian was offered a job in OES and went to OES and did okay. We left in '85, came back to Washington. I was actually offered Nicosia, which in retrospect, I should have taken, but I didn't. There was no job for her. But it was probably a mistake on my side, but not on her side.

Q: From '85 to when were you with Med?

MACKLIN: About a year and a half or a year and a quarter. It was a very bad assignment. I went off to Rome in November of '87.

Q: What was your impression of the medical part? Was it a bureau?

MACKLIN: Yes, Bureau of Medical Affairs. I thought the doctors were very good. Medically, I had great confidence in them. They had really good people. On a management level, it was just hopeless. It was a big mistake to get involved in that office. Doctors basically, whether they work in a hospital or what, have a mentality that says, "I'm running my own practice." If you're a doctor, you're running a family practice. You decide what to pay yourself, where to put your office. You make all the decisions yourself. You don't have to talk to anybody about anything. That was the mentality. So, these guys come to work for an institution. They don't understand how positions are classified. They don't understand why State does some of the stupid things they do. So, what happens? You get alienated. So, they trust each other but they don't trust the Department of State. I was a newcomer. They didn't want my advice. So, there was nothing to do. I was bored out of my mind. The typical experience in Med was, after I had been there about four months, there were one of these directives that came from the Director General that said, "We've got too many senior positions. OMB or someone is going to be after us to reduce the number of senior positions, so let's do it ourselves first and they'll see that we've got a lot of self-discipline and it will be easier to defend what we've got. So, everybody has got to take their cut. We're going to make this across the board," so they told all the bureaus, "You've got to downgrade a certain number of positions." They decided they were theoretically going to downgrade a certain number of doctors. So, I went around to the people in the DG's office and said, "You know, I know the government is a bureaucracy and you've got to relate everything to a classification scale, to a GS scale or an Foreign Service scale, but really we're dealing with medical professionals whom we acquire on the open market at market prices. Not only that, we don't send these guys to Paris for the most part. We send them to places like Pakistan. So, if we don't approximate market scale for their salaries, we're not going to keep the good ones." That resonated. So, although we had gotten a piece of paper that said, "You've got to do the following. Tell us which positions you'll downgrade," I talked to the doctors. First of all, there were some of them there who didn't like me. They said, "How dare you presume to judge our value within this organization?" I said, "I'm just here to help. I can deal with the DG's office, but?" I didn't make much headway. Finally, I got the head of the Medical Division to say, "Go talk to him and see what you can do." This was about Thanksgiving. So, I went around to Alex De la Garza, who was in charge of classification, who was a pretty good guy, pretty smart. I went through this with him. He said, "You've got to make some cuts." I said, "Okay, let's make a few but just a few because there is an elastic demand for medical services in the Foreign Service. When you need it, you've got to have it and you've got to have the right quality." He agreed. So, we would only cut a few positions.

Well, at the same time, the medical director, Dr. Destin, had decided he wanted to write a letter to the Director General because the Director General really didn't understand doctors. So, I said, "Okay, go ahead and write the letter, but don't send it until I look at it." Remember what Lincoln used to do. He used to do this all the time. He would write letters to people and get it out of his system and then he'd file the letter away and never send it around to anyone. "So, please let me have a look at it because they've offered us this deal and it's a pretty good arrangement. We're only going to have to downgrade about 20% of what they told us we're going to have to do." He said, "Well, let me write my letter." Then I went back to California for Thanksgiving, came back and he had sent the goddamned letter criticizing the DG, criticizing the people who classified, talking about the "So-called classifiers who don't understand what doctors do, etc." So, I went back to Personnel and they said, "We don't have a deal. What do you mean? We were talking about that, but we're going to have to stick to our guns and you're going to have to?" So, I started looking of a job then. EUR, it turned out something happened to the GSO in Rome and so by the following spring, they said, "Well, if you want to go to Rome, you can go." I said I'd take it. So I went to Rome. I even got about eight weeks of Italian and got out of Med after one year.

Q: So, your wife stayed in Washington?

MACKLIN: No, she stayed in OES until about a month after I left. I went ahead and then she followed me. So, she curtailed by about four months and went on to LWOP [leave without pay] and had our second child in Rome.

Q: You were in Rome from '86 to when?

MACKLIN: To the summer of '89. I guess I went out there in the fall of '86. It was two and a half years. Then I left there to go back to Moscow on a direct transfer.

Q: Talk about the embassy in Rome.

MACKLIN: The embassy is located in an old palace the palace of the former Queen Mother, Palazzo Margherita. It's a lovely old building. There are catacombs below everything in Rome, but there are a lot of antiquities there. There is that famous statue that we discovered there a few years ago that was just sitting around in one of the hallways. People didn't realize it was worth a small fortune. It's a lovely building right on the Via Veneto, nicely located. There are two or three annexed buildings. It's got a large parking lot with fountains and stuff. The ambassador has a beautiful residence in downtown Rome, Villa Taverna, which is a villa dating back to the 16th or 17th century which has miles of catacombs underneath it and huge grounds. The embassy itself is really a composite embassy, kind of like the microcosm of Washington, DC. If you took every agency that's represented in Washington, DC, and shrunk them down to the size of a pea and then moved them all to Rome, that's kind of what the embassy is. The State Department represented probably 25-30% of the whole mission. Lots of cops, DEA, Secret Service, FBI, naval security, NSA, the spooks? FAA. All these government organizationAgriculture, Defense. They all tended to be kind of self-sufficient, sort of insular. There wasn't a lot of social interaction between these groups. There was some within the former cops (DEA, Secret Service, etc.), but it wasn't a terribly happy embassy. It was a political ambassador who was really just interested in himself, Max Rabb. He wanted to do a good job and if somebody wound him up and pointed him in the right direction, he would speak his lines, but basically all he wanted to do was travel around the country having fun. He did that. He was there eight or nine years and had to be dragged out with a team of horses. When Bush became President, he thought he was close to Bush. They just worshiped Ronnie and Nancy. He was a nice enough guy, an ineffectual ambassador. We had a wonderful DCM, a guy named John Holmes, who did an absolutely superb job and got no reward for it at all.

I really liked the city after a while. It took a while to kind of cotton up to, but I really liked it. It was fun. Good locals. A lot of intrigue. There were no great political issues. There were some pol-mil issues: participation in NATO, IMF, the base in Aviano, terms of reference for that, a lot of pol-mil stuff. We have so many military there between Aviano and down in Naples. There was a lot of turbulence in the Italian government at the time, but it never affected the bilateral relationship.

Q: When I was consul general in Naples '79-'81, I was not an Italian hand. I would watch all these reports coming out of our role in the change of governments. In those days, nothing happened. It was just the same old faces reshuffled. We seemed to spend an inordinate amount of time getting into practically county politics, but at the Rome level.

MACKLIN: Yes. It was true. All of these interrelationships. It was fun and intriguing, the way the Italians in the north looked at the Italians in the south, and everybody's cousin who can do something for them. We knew a guy who was a dentist quite well. He and his wife had a daughter and our oldest son and she played together. So, we used to do things. They had an apartment in a very small apartment building. Like most Italian apartment buildings, the water came from a small reservoir on the roof. The water had to be piped up there into the reservoir. The size of the pipes and the size of the reservoir had a lot to do with your access to water. He had to remodel the apartment and he really needed to expand the reservoir. So, he didn't contact the water department. He spent four or five days calling everybody he knew across the board until he finally found somebody who was a friend who had a relative who worked with the water department. Then and only then working through the friend with the relative did he get his reservoir fixed. Got the permits, got it upgraded, got it done very quickly, but he had to do it that way. He couldn't go directly to them and get the paperwork done. There is a certain amount of that.

Q: I remember people would say, "I want to make a long distance call to the United States. I know somebody in PTT." That's the way you do it. Could you get things done?

MACKLIN: Yes. I had some very good locals, one guy in particular who was more Russian than Italian. He was kind of the head local informally. At least all the locals in GSO were kind of afraid of him. He was very good. He had been there a long time. We actually became good friends. It took a while, but we became good friends. He was very good. We made a lot of changes together and he was very open to ideas. We changed the way we did contracting and stuff. I found that we could get things done. The usual admin problems within a mission were there. "I don't like my housing" kinds of stuff. But in terms of repairs and upgrades and facilities and utilities, the usual operational stuff, there was no particular problem.

Q: Often as GSO at particularly a large embassy with a political ambassador, you find yourself dancing the tendons on the ambassador's wife.

MACKLIN: It was very important for me to get along with Mrs. Rabb. Actually, I liked her a lot. She was eight times tougher than her husband. She was New York Jew, "What's in it for me?" I really liked her. She had awfully good taste. She did a lot of work refinishing the residence, put a lot of her own money into it. She could be really tough. They were very well connected in the entertainment industry. At one time, they had Michael Jackson come stay with them at Villa Taverna-

Q: He was a popular music star.

MACKLIN: He was an idol at that time. He put on a performance for the Rabbs. Well, two of the Marines snuck into Villa Taverna to see Michael Jackson and she caught them and had those guys pilloried. Not a forgiving lady. But we got along very well. I liked her. She had good ideas for Villa Taverna. I have a lot of respect for Mrs. Rabb.

Q: You had by that time taken care of the arsenic in the ceiling of the ambassador's bedroom. Clare Boothe Luce when she was there with her family, the paint kept flicking out and she was actually suffering from arsenic poisoning.

MACKLIN: That's right. We were more careful than they were in those days. Incredible.

I had one big problem in Rome, which sullied the tour. I would have happily stayed for four years, but for three things. I wanted to go back to Moscow because it was changing. I didn't think I'd get promoted in Rome. I had a terrible problem with the RSO. The second year, I almost developed ulcers. It was really awful. We had an admin counselor named Harry Geisel. Harry can be tough, but he delegates. So, he kind of left it up to me and as long as I never made a mistake, he would leave me alone. That was good. Well, Harry was tapped to go up to Bonn to be admin counselor. It was one of these admin daisy chain flip flops. So, Harry went up there and was replaced by a guy named Don Shay, who was an old line admin officer with a good reputation. I found him awfully lazy and not very imaginative. But in any event, Shay came in at about the same time we had a change in the RSO. The old RSO had been a pretty good guy, pretty laid back, but he had a staff that was kind of restive because they really didn't have much to do. He had two or three FSOs, assistant RSOs, working for him. There was no real threat there. There was not a lot to do. When I arrived, there was a guy I inherited that worked on contract, a guy we called "Captain Bob." He was just an example of how all of this started. He was a fireman from New Jersey who loved Italy. Bob was about 28 or 29. He had a lot of firefighting experience, although he had been a reserve or volunteer fireman in New Jersey and had been involved in what was a very famous hotel fire in New Jersey. He knew a lot about safety. He was an Italian-American. Because he was still an American, he couldn't really work, but he wanted to live in Italy and to stay there until he was there long enough (I think it took five years before he could get a work permit). So, Bob did a lot of freelance stuff. We had had a couple of years before an apartment fire that resulted in somebody's death. So, Captain Bob offered to do things like train the Marines in fire safety. He had good relations with the Italians, so he'd take them out to the Italian firemen firefighting camp and show the Marines how to do things. He came to me and said "For something like three dollars an apartment, I'll go around and do fire safety reports on every apartment the embassy has and I'll provide my own transportation. I'll give you a written report." Sounds good to me. He had a contractor's badge so he could get on the compound. He went around and with a lot of the places they didn't have enough smoke detectors. So, he sold some smoke detectors on the side. But basically, he was free labor the way I looked at it. He wasn't a bad guy, went to all the Marine parties and stuff. Everybody liked him. One of the assistant RSOs decided there had to be something wrong here. This guy was actually a volunteer fireman, not a real fireman. So, he did a background check through DS in Washington to ask why, which turned up that he had been a volunteer, not a "real" fireman. He said, "Well, this guy wear's a fireman's uniform and goes around talking about being part of the American embassy." I said, "Look, he wears a fireman's coat because it makes him feel good, but he's free labor as far as I'm concerned and as long as he does nothing venal, I don't see the problem." This went on and on. This guy kept trying to get some goods on him. Finally, he built up a circumstantial case against Captain Bob. He went through his boss to the admin counselor. So, the admin counselor without asking me, sent me down a memo that said, "Captain Bob is no longer welcome in the compound. Don't use him anymore." So, I went back to the admin counselor and he said, "Look, my view on this is that gringos have to get along. I don't want to really get involved in this. Why can't you and the RSO just get along with each other?" I said, "Well, I'm happy to get along with him, but I didn't know he was investigating this guy who is free labor." Eventually, Captain Bob was reinstated. It took about six months.

At the same time, the other assistant RSO had decided to investigate GSO. The chief FSN for the RSO's office had a long time blood feud with one of the head locals in GSO. These two guys had had kind of a fight at one time. The GSO senior local was kind of a bully and had picked this guy up and threatened him physically. The other guy said, "I'll get you for this." So, he convinced this junior RSO that there was misconduct going on. The senior FSN, not the most senior, also the Tavak [a little smoke shop]. So, he was convinced that he was working, that the Tavak was getting paid by us. He started to investigate. That went on for about two months before I found out about it. During this time, he would build up circumstantial evidence, none of which was valid, and then send it in to Diplomatic Security (DS) as the truth. So, he had built up quite a body of evidence that there was something rotten in GSO before I got a whiff of it. That was when the admin counselor said, "Well, number three cable, why don't you show this to Macklin before it goes out?" I said, "This is full of factual errors. He makes statements that are not actually correct. He says that this guy is the one who decides on hiring people. When we hire, he doesn't even interview. He's not consulted. He's not part of the process." "Well, that's not what I hear." I said, "Well, I don't know what you hear, but I'm the one who signs the paper. Why would this guy interview for an FSN working in another division in GSO?" We went through a lot of this and some of it was a bit acrimonious. So, at about that time, we were being inspected. So, the admin counselor said, "I don't know. Let's just get to the bottom of this. Let's ask DS to send an investigator out here and see if there is anything going on." So, they sent a team of investigators out there. They stayed there for about six months.

Q: Well, it's Rome.

MACKLIN: It's Rome. They had a wonderful time. They finally found with the senior FSN that they had been fighting with, they decided none of them liked him, but they couldn't pin anything on him. In fact, the admin counselor said to me, "He hasn't done anything that I haven't done myself a million times." But they wanted to get rid of him. So, finally the RSO looked through the RSO regulations and went back to the admin counselor, not to me. He said, "The RSO has the authority to withdraw someone's FSN security clearance if in the judgment of the RSO there is a basis for doing so. Why don't I on my own judgment withdraw this guy's security clearance and then we can fire him and we don't have to prove anything?" So, I went to the admin counselor and said, "Do you really want to do this if the guy hasn't done anything?" "Well, it will kind of clear the air." I couldn't talk him out of it. I said, "Okay, well, I went back and talked to my senior FSN and my senior FSN says to please let him resign because if you're fired from a diplomatic mission for security reasons, under Italian law, that means you've been involved in terrorism and it will affect the guy's future employability." So, I went back to Shay and said, "Here's the deal. Please offer the guy a chance to resign. Otherwise,?" Well, he just didn't get around to it. So, they fired the guy.

At the same time, the investigators was going great guns and they started using a technique? They'd take the senior FSN in the FSO's office and he'd go off to one of the clerks in GSO and say, "Paolo, we haven't talked in a long time. Let's go have a talk." So, they'd go off and have a cup of coffee and he'd ask them a bunch of questions. Then he'd write up a report in Italian and submit it to State without having anybody clear it. He would write his own report of what he said she said, but wouldn't let her or me look at it to determine whether or not there was any truth in it. Then he would submit it to Washington saying, "There is all this stuff going on." So, I got really pissed. I wrote a letter to Sherman Funk, the inspector general. I was told not to do it. I did it anyways. I went through with this letter and I outlined every specific I could think of in terms of every specific incorrect procedure. Sherman Funk never replied. I was never penalized because of it. I transferred out of there about three months later. I got a good efficiency report, helped me to get me promoted. I left with no acrimony between me and Shay, although I had a lot that I felt. The investigation went on for another two months, but they stopped interviewing people like that and they finally found one of the assistant assistant assistants, about an FSN-6 level, guys in maintenance had kept about $12, so they fired him. That was the only other action they ever took. But the IG was able to keep its staff in Rome, two or three people, for at least six months. I was really pissed off at the admin counselor for not trying to shut the thing down.

One last anecdote, an example of another thing he had done. In Rome, at a big embassy in a big city, we had had the same warehouse for 30- years. Right after the war, we had acquired a basement on the other side of Rome about an hour and a half away. It was a basement with a ceiling about six feet tall. We couldn't even use a forklift in there. That was our warehouse. We had been looking for another warehouse for years, never could find one. We found one in the fall of '88 just before I left. A guy, an Italian who had always liked America because we drove the Germans out of his country, had a freestanding warehouse on the embassy side of town that was near no buildings. It was a regular two story tin warehouse, perfect inside and outside, surrounded by a big parking lot, it was just ideal, in pristine condition. He said, "I've always loved America. If I can rent this to you." I started running the contract through. Everybody thought this was wonderful. The post management officer said, "Oh, by the way, get the RSO to sign off on this that it doesn't pose a security problem." So, I ran it by him and he wouldn't sign it. He said, "I want one of my guys to look at it." He went out there and said, "Well, we have security requirements for embassy buildings that require set back and certain kinds of walls and certain kinds of cameras." I said, "Yes, but that's for a chancery where there are people working. There won't be any Americans working at this facility. It's just going to hold paper and supplies." "Well, I don't make the regulations. The regulations don't make a distinction. I don't make a distinction, so I can't approve it," he said. So, it wound up at Christmastime, I had to get a waiver. The RSO's office stepped back and said, "Well, if you can work it, I guess it's okay with us, but we won't help." In Washington (I had a deadline of the second of January), nobody's there at Christmas. I had to walk the thing through about five offices, getting it approved, and I finally got it approved and we got the warehouse. But it was all of that hassle.

Q: Sometimes at large embassies, you get people who have almost too much time not to be intrusive.

MACKLIN: Yes.

Q: Let's stop in '89 when you're off to Moscow again.

MACKLIN: Yes.

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Q: Today is November 27, 2000. You're off to Moscow. You were there from '89 to when?

MACKLIN: '91.

Q: Let's compare and contrast Moscow to when you were there previously, which was '83-'85. What was the situation from your perspective?

MACKLIN: From '83-'85, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was at one of its low points. When I arrived in '83, it was Andropov as Secretary General of the Party and the Korean airliner incident had happened and there was the business with the missiles in Europe. When Andropov died and Chernenko came in, it was no better. Soviets were afraid to talk to you, really afraid. There were a handful of dissidents who would talk to the embassy people, but it was generally thought that half of them were there for the KGB. The government was not cooperative. There was no access to the public at large. The political section spent a lot of their time wading through these long polemic editorials hoping to find some nuance phrase that they could use to report a change in Soviet policy. So, it was pretty basic Cold War stuff with dirty tricks occasionally and a lot of snooping.

In '89 when we went back, Gorbachev had been in power for several years. He had been promoting his policy of glasnost [openness or candor]. What he wanted was to correct the problems with communism. They had a centralized economy, a government that made all the decisions, and the government because of corruption and because the system had basically broken down, didn't get the kind of information he needed. The government from the provinces, people reported what they thought the next hire rung of the bureaucracy wanted to hear. There was an emphasis on production quotas without regard to other factors such as pollution or ecology or the per unit price. So, the system had basically stopped functioning somewhere under Brezhnev. So, what Gorbachev wanted to do was he wanted candor within the Soviet system. He wanted production managers to talk about their real problems. He didn't want people hamstrung with production quotas which were unrealistic or which were self-defeating in the long run. He wanted to make qualitative improvements in the way people lived. He recognized that the Soviet Union basically hadn't been able to provide the means for people to enjoy life. The health system was no good. There were just problems in every base of life. So, he opened it up, allowed and encouraged criticism, but the problem was that the whole system had gotten so corrupt and so inefficient and people were so cynical that once the complaints started to come in, it was difficult to channel them. There were so many complaints, the government couldn't deal with them. They really couldn't deal with open economic problems with other countries and with the West. So, on one hand, the government couldn't deal with the magnitude of the problem and as the people saw that the government wasn't really responding to anything, they became more cynical. So, it got worse rather than better. At the same time, the hard line wing of the Party felt very strongly that what was needed was more discipline, to reign people in. The West and the U.S. were offering strong incentives to open up the economy to outsiders and to open up the media to outside sources. So, whereas in the early '80s, there was nothing in the papers that wasn't controlled, there was a newspaper called Orgin Yolk, which was a youth journal which occasionally let people write letters to the editor that were kind of honest. But that was it and it was very controlled.

When I got there in '89, people were writing letters into "Literaturnaya Gazeta" asking things like, "How can I establish a Swiss bank account?" The newspaper would answer them. So, as people began to find out what it was really like on the outside, they became more interested in change. So, there were two main themes during that second tour. One is, the government and the people in the Soviet Union wanted to change. On the other hand, the U.S. embassy was still smarting from the whole business with Lonetree and was over concerned over security. So, you had on one hand a government which is finally opening up and you can meet people and security- (end of tape)

We couldn't meet with Russians. You couldn't talk to a Russian alone.

Q: That's crazy!

MACKLIN: Well, it was. For once, they were anxious to spill their guts. Matlock, who had replaced Art Hartman, who was kind of a big picture guy who was very smooth socially and oozed charm, was an expert on the Soviet Union. He knew some of the dialects. He spoke good Russian. He had been working for 30 years on the Soviet Union. No factoid was too small for him to want to file away. He insisted on volumes of reporting far and beyond what the community was interested in back here. I think the intelligence community jumped on everything they sent in. Over at Spaso House, the ambassador's residence, they were able to bring in large numbers of very important Russians. We got along with the Matlocks and got invited to a lot of functions over there. I liked Jack Matlock. He was an interesting guy. But he was full of contradictions. Whereas the first tour in Moscow, there was really no one who ever came to a social event at Spaso House other than the dissidents?

Q: Which is really not a real picture at all. This would be true if you only invited extreme left-wing communists to the White House.

MACKLIN: Yes. There were Soviet policemen out in front of Spaso House in the old days who would check the invitations and then still not let some people in. Well, this time, he could ask anybody he wanted and there was no particular problem getting in as a rule. There were some wonderful conversations at Spaso House. It was fascinating. I remember one night I - the economist from Novosibirsk, Abengayneyen, who was one of the first people to puncture holes in some of the Soviet economy policies and was part of a group of economists from Novosibirsk who were kind of on the Russian cutting edge of understanding economics. He came to a lot of those functions. We got people from the foreign minister and the UPDK. It was really a renaissance. The security policy at the embassy was, you can not speak to a Russian unless you have a substantive reason to do so. If you work in political or economic, you have a reason to go out and talk to Russians. But you can't do it alone. You have to have somebody with you. If you speak to a Russian by mistake, you have to file a report. There was a form on an index card so that they could cross-check anybody you may have talked to.

Q: The Lonetree thing was obviously way down the line as far as? Who was calling the shots on this sort of thing?

MACKLIN: Well, there was concern from the White House. They didn't want any more embarrassment. Then the Under Secretary for Management was Ivan Selin, who himself desperately wanted to be ambassador to Moscow and tried very hard to get that job and quit when he didn't get it. But he had told people when they went out to post, "I don't want to see another security embarrassment." There was Lonetree. There was the Howard affair. The CIA guy who? But this was before they knew about Ames.

Q: Ames being a CIA officer well placed who turned out to be a Soviet spy. He was fingering all the agents.

MACKLIN: Yes. When we were there the first time, they couldn't figure out how the Russians kept such an accurate tab on who was and who wasn't with the Agency. So, there was still a lot of this paranoia and there was an awful lot of right-wing resentment of Soviet spying on us as if we didn't spy on them. So, the regional security officer, Mark Sanaa, was sent out there having been told, "Keep a tight reign on things. We don't want any problems out there." So, he did. There were problems with the rest of the embassy. It was this strange juxtaposition. There were people in the embassy who ignored it. A couple of people in the political section were kind of free spirits and really were working for the State Department just because they liked Russia and wanted to work in U.S.-Soviet affairs. They developed a wide range of friends and entertained a lot and basically said, "Screw you" to the RSO. Some of them got in a little bit of trouble and some didn't. There was also the question of the local employees. There was a perception amongst certain elements in the U.S. government that we had been extraordinarily stupid in the old days to employ Soviets at the embassy. Matlock had been on the NSC staff at the time and said, "We don't need them. I can get graduate students from universities in the U.S. and go out there and do the same thing." Well, if you want somebody to work in the political section to do political analysis and to translate, that's by and large true. But if you want a phone operator or a carpenter or an electrician or a plumber who knows how to work the pipes in those old buildings over there, it's kind of nice to have somebody who knows how they do things in Russia. We tried hard to get the front office to agree to hiring Russians. We were able to finally do that, but it was a long fight. The State Department had a contract with Pacific Architects and Engineers [PAE]. They would hire a lot of people to go out there and work in the consular section, in GSO, etc. We had about 180 of them working out there at one time. All of them we had to house and provide special allowances for and pay a king's ransom. Some of them were pretty good and some of them weren't. We certainly needed Americans to run an air conditioning system and some of the highly technical elements of the compound. But there were two ways we were able to run a chink in this. One was, the embassy had two dachas that we maintained. They were both quite nice. Frankly, when you work like a demon for 12-14 hours a day for long periods of time, every now and then you could reserve the dacha and go outside of Moscow and it was beautiful out there. The air was clean, it was a birch forest, it was really gorgeous. It was a wonderful getaway. What was called the "old dacha" was out in Terasaco, a small suburb town. It had been abandoned because we had put an A&E couple out there and they had gone stir crazy and they got so nutty they had to pull them out. They couldn't get anybody to live up there because they were so isolated. So, they left it vacant. The minute it was left vacant, in came all the neighbors and started taking off doors and windows and pulling out wiring and stuff like that. So, we went over about a three month period to the front office, to the DCM, and then later to Matlock and sold them on the idea of hiring Soviets to watch the dacha. We'd have to go through UPDK, which had also changed. We'd have to go to them and we'd have to find Soviets who could go out there and maintain it. What they did was, they lived there. There was a small, little bitty dacha up near the gate and they lived there at all times. So, they were also a night watchman, made sure nobody broke in and stole anything. Not only were we able to do that, but we were able to hire back two of our old dacha caretakers who loved the old building and knew all of the problems with the grounds and stuff. Then with GSO and not with the Russians, we went back in and replaced the wiring and all of that stuff. It was always understood that the place was bugged. Nobody cared. You never discussed anything out there that was sensitive, but basically, we restored the old dacha and it became popular again. We used it for community picnics and stuff like that. But it was a long fight and the only way we were able to make it functional was by hiring Soviets to serve as night watchmen out there.

The other area where we had a big problem was drivers. We had a political section of 30-40 people and a front office that was demanding and in bad weather, you don't necessarily want to be walking across town. We didn't have enough drivers. So, we sold the embassy and the Department of State on the idea of signing a contract with a Russian organization to supply drivers. The drivers would not be able to enter the compound. They would have to stay outside the compound. But you could order a car and say, "I need to go to the airport" and you'd go to the gate and driver number seven would be there. They provided the vehicle. They'd drive you out to the airport, wait for you while you picked up whoever it was, and come back to town. In those days, as things broke down, there became less discipline and people became less afraid of the cops and cab drivers at the airport would rip people off and say, "Well, it will cost you $70." From time to time, people would arrive at the airport, put their bags in the taxi, and the taxi driver would drive off into the woods, take away their money, bags, and passports, leave them out there in the cold, and drive off. So, it was important to have drivers. So, that was one of the big issues that affected the admin section concerning security.

Q: How about the char force and that sort of thing?

MACKLIN: The chars were Americans. After I left, we were able to get them to let Russian chars on the compound to do some of the basic stuff.

Q: My experience with hiring Americans to do essentially menial work is that you get a pretty low quality and these people in a way are much more susceptible. They're not as sophisticated and are more susceptible to getting involved in black market deals or romance. In other words, you're not really getting rid of the problem. In fact, you have a false sense of security when actually you're bringing people in who are more susceptible.

MACKLIN: That's true. There were problems with some of them and some of them had to be sent home. It is a problem. Also, there is a big cost factor. If you don't let people in the secure areas of the embassy, it was generally thought that they're not a threat. We all felt that our apartments, even on compound, were bugged and therefore you couldn't discuss anything sensitive in the apartments, including who worked where. So, what difference did it make if there was a Russian who came by and shoveled the snow off the stairwell rather than you, who didn't have enough time, or some PA&Eer who was pissed off about it. That was a very difficult issue in those days.

Q: I worked in Yugoslavia in the '60s and we had local employees. We were quite sure that there were some who were probably more willing than others, but they all had to report to the UDBA, the equivalent to the KGB. But at the same time, you could have conversations with them. You were picking up quite a bit from them. They're people and you're a person and you just sort of talk. Particularly translations and things like this. You were getting people who were intellectually engaged and they would start pointing out things.

MACKLIN: I can remember the first tour in the early '80s, we had some of the locals, Soviets who worked in the consular section who had been with us a long time and really liked the U.S. They were on a short leash from the Soviets, but they were good at working the system. There were a lot of cases where you had Americans who had come there as tourists who were injured way out in some far flown province where the phone system didn't work very well and these locals could talk through? You couldn't just dial an area code and get Tashkent. You had to go through different telephone exchanges. Sometimes you got there and they didn't want to talk to you or they would only speak a certain dialect. We had FSNs who were wonderful at getting through to the right people, who knew which hospitals they might be at, who saved lives. We lost that the second time around. They were missed. The same with the phone operators, who were admittedly Soviets and did they pay attention? You bet. But since all calls were strained before they came to the embassy anyways, what the hell difference did it make? They were strained first by the KGB and then they went to the switchboard. But the second time, we had Americans who spoke Russian but not so well who if you called them up and said, "I need to speak to somebody at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or over at the Kremlin," it was very difficult for them to operate. So, we lost a lot in effectiveness by being overly paranoiac.

Q: Did you feel that Matlock was facing that problem or was this just a price he paid to do his thing?

MACKLIN: He did not face it. He did not agree with it. He said the old system was best. He said he wouldn't want to meet with a Soviet alone, that you were better off to have somebody with you, it was just good professional practice. But he had been one of the people whit had been hard for him to get that job. That was his dream job and he was there at a dream time.

One of the other themes that went on at that time was the intellectual fight between the political and economic sections. Matlock believed very strongly that the most important element was political, that everything in the Soviet Union was controlled by the Party, the Party was political, the political developments were the dog that wagged the tail, that economics was important only as an adjunct to that. The political counselor, Ray Smith, who is very bright, kind of felt the same way. Ray Smith had 30-40 people working in the political section, divided between external and internal. They had an enormous group. John Blaney was the econ counselor. He had a staff of three. He used to say, "This nation is collapsing economically. It's in freefall. They can't provide the goods and services for the people. It's falling apart economically and that's going to have a bearing on the politics." Well, they'd get into these arguments at staff meetings over what was more important. Matlock and Ray Smith on one side and Blaney on the other. It was tough on old Blaney. When it came time to fight about resources in any way, Blaney always lost out. Economics just wasn't that important. Well, as history unfolded, Blaney was right and they were wrong. But that was another opinion.

Q: It's interesting to see it coming at that point. We had this huge operation focused on the Soviet Union. We were doing everything you could think of to find out about this country and yet when it fell apart, we didn't get it.

MACKLIN: There is a tendency to want to deal with the government in power and to not offend the government in power by developing a close relationship with the opposition. So, what happened there was that the embassy said, "Gorbachev is our man. He is changing this country. He is the first guy since Peter the Great who's really changing things. He will keep changing. He has agreed to all of these disarmament discussions and he's prepared to cut nuclear weapons. This is a guy we should talk to and we should help him stay in power." Then along the way, people started saying, "You know, Gorbachev is losing his grip. We should pay more attention to Yeltsin." There was great pressure from the front office not to get too close to Yeltsin. So, this was another strain that was going on. Later on, when Yeltsin was in power and it was falling apart, there were those who said we were too close to Yeltsin. But back then it was Gorbachev and the Bush administration in particular was behind Gorbachev when the Baltic countries split away. We were very slow to recognize and we kept trying to hold this union together, to help Gorbachev hold it together, even though the Baltic countries and some of the others wanted our support to break away.

Q: Was this a theme that you could feel in the embassy?

MACKLIN: Yes.

Q: You've got a political section with 30-40 people. What the heck were they doing?

MACKLIN: Well, they did a lot of reporting. They were by and large good officers. They got out. You could talk to people and people would talk to you. So, there was a lot of information to report.

Q: Did you see any change in the support people that you were dealing with in the Soviet Union?

MACKLIN: I went back as admin counselor, but I was in fact number two and in fact for most of the time I was number three. It was a strange thing. I very much wanted to go back. In EUR/EX, I got along very well with Clark Rogers, the deputy executive director. I didn't get along at all with Ken Peltier, who didn't like me. I really wanted to go back and I had expressed an interest in going back as admin counselor and Ken Peltier wouldn't hear of it. They assigned somebody else and even picked somebody for number two. But then the person who was supposed to go as number two developed a family medical problem. So, there was nobody in the wings. So, Clark Rogers called me up and said, "Would you like to go to Moscow?" I said, "I'd love to." So, it was all set up and I went. But I went as number two. Ward Latrelle was the admin minister counselor. Then I was his number two, the admin counselor. I said to Ward, "What I'd like to do is run this the way Embassy Bonn runs. The minister counselor for administration deals with the other agencies at post and with the ambassador, sort of up on this interagency level. The admin counselor runs the mission. I supervise GSO and the budget people, etc." Ward agreed, "You run the thing and I'll deal with interagency problems." Then we were there about eight months and Ivan Selin, who was Under Secretary for Management, still didn't think we were doing things right, we as an embassy in general. At the same time, there was all this concern over the bugging of the new embassy building. This was an issue that had gone through that whole period and was part of the outrage of the right winhow could we let this happen? So, Selin wanted his man in Moscow. He said, "I am sending Joe Hulings out there. He is going to be kind of the second DCM. Joe Hulings is going to be minister counselor for management. He will supervise the admin and consular sections. Max Robinson, the CG, will report to Joe Hulings. Ward Latrelle, the admin minister counselor, would report to Joe Hulings." When that happened, Ward Latrelle said, "Screw you. I want out of here." He left the next summer. I said, "I'd very much like to take Ward's place." They said, "Okay," and I said, "Can I get a TDYer out to take my place just because it will all work here?" They said, "Okay" and I went out and recruited somebody. Then one day out of the blue I was informed that Bob Austin was coming to take Ward's place. I was very upset but I stayed on through the year. I got promoted out of the job. Bob Austin got tossed out of the Service more or less. But Joe was there the whole time. So, I had to deal with both Joe? There was about a three month gap before Bob arrived, so I ran things. Then he came to post, was there three months, and went on home leave for two months. So, about half of that year, I was in charge. So, it wasn't so bad.

Q: How about morale in the embassy?

MACKLIN: Have you talked to Mike Joyce?

Q: No, I haven't.

MACKLIN: Mike Joyce lives in Virginia. He was DCM for about three years under Matlock. He is a wonderful guy. He did a good job. Matlock is very difficult to work for. Frankly, most of the time I was out there, Mike Joyce looked like he wouldn't live through the week. He was grey, had pallor, shook constantly. Look at him now and you'd think he is a picture of health. But Matlock just worked him nuts.

Q: You were saying that Matlock had his idiosyncrasies. How did Matlock manage?

MACKLIN: Matlock couldn't manage. He was a political officer. He was your basic political officer, promoted up to be the chief political officer at the chief post in the world. That is what he ran. If you talked to him and said, "We've got to pay attention to this," and you convinced him, he would do it, but he didn't believe it. We went to him? I liked the political stuff and I like to know what's going on. I told him or maybe Mike, "If you could give us a monthly briefing, you really know this stuff. You know what's going on. Most of the people are here because they're interested in the Soviet Union. They're interested in Russia. If you could give us monthly briefings, people would better understand what's going on and it would help them relate their jobs to the overall mission." I had actually done the same thing in Tel Aviv with some success. So, Matlock started these monthly sessions. They were great. He would take a lot of time and pay a lot of attention to that. He was not the kind of guy? There are some FSOs who like to stick the stiletto in somebodpeople like Lannon Walker, who delight in putting the stiletto in somebody and watching them squirm. Matlock was not like that. He didn't like to hurt people. But at the same time, we didn't have FSNs and they were entertaining at Spaso House every goddamned night. They needed written invitations to go out. He would have FSOs in the political section sitting down, filling out invitations by hand. He would review them himself to make sure that they were all done right and he would send back batches of them because they got the case wrong or some grammatical element. These were people who were working themselves sick like Mike Joyce. He did it without thinking. He'd send them back and say, "Do it over." So, he just didn't understand. It wasn't part of his nature to understanhow to manage things. He kind of thought, "Everybody is excited as I am to be there." He has an active mind. I doubt if he slept five hours a night and didn't think anybody else did either. I liked him, but he was very difficult to work for.

Q: Back to morale.

MACKLIN: The biggest problem with morale was the security thing. Most of the people were there because they wanted to be in the Soviet Union, they wanted to be in Moscow, they were interested in the history and the culture. On the other hand, you had Security saying, "Don't leave the compound." When I had been there the first time in the early '80s, there were a lot of people who were very happy not to leave the compound, but this time people couldn't wait to get out there and see things and talk to people. Security drove them nuts. Mark Sanaa, my friend, a good guy, really went around the bend. They started keeping files on all of the Americans at post without telling anybody. They would have internal ciphers and then not tell somebody. There was a cipher at post where you entered the secure area and there was a Marine booth. Inside the door to get out, there was a cipher, but they wouldn't tell people what the cipher was, so you had trouble getting out. We had a fire marshal at post on contract, so we would unleash the fire marshal to get internal ciphers changed.

One of the biggest problems at post was in secure communications. There was pressure from the front office to do reams of reporting, but since it was all classified for the most part, classified cables had to be typed up on computers which were kept in vault boxes. There were only three of them at post and they would only hold two or three people at the same time. They were double locked things. We had a lot of admin problems with the building. There was a construction problem. We had the new embassy building which was full of intelligence agencies who were tearing it apart to make sure they found all the bugs, who lived there 24 hours a day around the year, tearing bricks apart. Then in the building itself we had a $20 million project redoing major parts of the building. So, there was always construction going on and we'd have electrical outages all the time. So, sometimes, people working late at night would go into the vault, open the first door, which is an electronically operated sealed lock, go in, then open the second one, and you'd go inside. Then you'd close the first one and the second one and sit down to work and the electricity would go off. You're stuck in there and think, "God, is there another fire. Am I trapped in here? How do I get out of here?" They can't see anything. People would get the wits scared out of them. You'd go in there and there were only two or three machines and somebody was using them. You've got to get this cable out before you can go home tonight and your kid's having a birthday party, so you need to get it done and get home. You try to hurry up somebody and they say, "Goddammit, don't bug me. I'm writing." It's not just typing something you're written. They wrote while they type. One of the things that Security did? People were hurrying. You'd finish up and they'd say, "You're done." You know these people. You're trying to cooperate with them. So, "Okay, it's your machine." Off you go. One of the security officers used to go into those vaults at three in the morning, and find out if anybody had by mistake left a document on the hard drive. Well, if they had, it was treated as leaving an unattended classified document, so you got a security violation. If you get two or three, you're going to be put on LWOP, it goes on your record. We know the problem people are having now with security violations. Nobody wanted a security violation. But it's all because somebody forgot to clear the hard drive when they left or they were pushed off the machine by somebody who pulled rank. Who is to know? So, there was a lot of bitterness. So, someone from the embassy used to go into those vaults late at night and type up bogus classified messages in the name of the security officer who was going around tracking people down. But he wouldn't give himself a security violation for this. But the Security people got so angry that they put out an admin notice that described what was happening and threatened the people. It said, "We think we know who you are and we're going to get you." They never got them. But there was stuff like that that went on.

Let me give you two more quick examples. After we had been there about a year, a group of Soviet ex-pats from New York came in. These were guys who had immigrated to New York about 20 years ago and had had a thriving business with a video store and they wanted to get in the hotels in Russia which were opening up. They thought there was a gold mine but "We want our foot in the door in Moscow." So, they came to the embassy and said, "We'll set up the video shop for you basically free. We'll charge you the cost per video about what it costs to maintain this operation. We'll give you a library of 4,000 videos." Wow. Everybody loved that. Long, dark winters. You can watch a video movie. You don't have to worry about somebody from the States sending you the stuff. They'd bring out all the new movies and a lot of kids movies. They'd say, "The way we work it at home, we do this on a computer and the computer tells us every month which videos are moving and which aren't. If there are videos that aren't moving, you send them back and we'll replace them." Well, in admin., we agreed that we could go ahead and draw up a contract and the Security Office wouldn't clear it. They said, "Well, is this computer a Tempis hard drive computer?" "Well, no. It's an unclassified area in the compound." They said, well, then the Soviets can pick up the emanations from this unclassified computer." "Yes, I guess they could." "Well, then they can figure out what movies we checked out and from seeing what movies you check out, they can do a personality profile and they can find out your weaknesses." We said, "Shit, most people leave their blinds open anyway. If they want to see what movies they're watching, the KGB is in the building next door." "No, we can't do it." So, we argued and they finally said, "Well, if you code everybody's name and you code every movie, we'll agree to it." So, everybody had to have a name serial code, like a bar code, and every movie had a bar code. So, you'd go in there and barcode yourself in and you'd barcode the movie out. It was things like that that just really?

To keep the Marines on kind of a sense of mission, they would have monthly hostage simulations. They were never announced. Just sometime during the month, you could tell when they were coming? We lived right next door to the RSO. You'd see him going out ihis flack jacket with a helmet and they'd ring an alarm bell and have a hostage scenario develop. Usually somewhere in the embassy someone, an outsider, had entered and had taken a hostage and was somewhere in the embassy. So, the Marines had to tumble out of the rack, get in full battle gear, run up to the chancery, which was a quarter of a mile away, go inside fully armed, going down the hallways safely, to try to find out where the hostage situation was. They'd run those things at least once a month. People in the political, economic section, etc., would be working late at night and they'd stumble into these armed Marines. Nobody was ever shot, but it was just? There was a lot of tension.

Q: With the Marines, one of the things that is sort of unwritten history is, how does one take care of the Marines that are young men with normal sex drives. How was this taken care of in Moscow?

MACKLIN: The second tour there, there were lots of Americans on compound. Of the 180-some PA&Eers, at least 40% were female. All of them were young, interested in a good time. There were a lot of businesses that came to Moscow in those days and they often hired young Americans. So, suddenly, whereas the first tour in the '80s there really wasn't much available in the way of a social life for the Marines, the second time, there were just loads of girls.

Q: I suppose this was the graduate students' year abroad.

MACKLIN: Yes. Or even people who hadn't finished. There were a lot of them.

There were other incidents that I don't remember right now, but it seemed like every week there was some sort of hassle. While we were trying to get drivers on contract, the Security Office fought it constantly. Trying to get people for the dacha and we had to overcome their resistance. We had a lot of problems? UPDK the first time I was there was barely polite. The second time around, we needed a major expansion in our housing. OFM had come along. So, if we didn't get good housing, the Russians over here didn't get good housing. It worked. It worked so well that people back here kind of loved to stick their finger in the eye of the Soviet mission. One of the first housing problems we had? I went over there with Ray Smith and we got harangued at by the head of UPDK, whom I had never seen the first time, and somebody from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about some housing block they had been putting Soviets in here that they really hated because they were identified there and were being bothered by dissidents over here. I became convinced that the Soviets probably had a pretty good case. Maybe if we were helpful there, they'd ease up in Moscow. So, it took a couple of months of trying to persuade the Department of State, mostly EUR/SOV, that we should cooperate with them on this one particular housing development. I think it knocked the socks off of everybody on the Russian side. They couldn't believe that we were suddenly beinnice. Things kind of opened up. We got permission to go private. At the same time, UPDK was told, "You've got to be self-sufficient. You're no longer going to be funded by the KGB."

One of the things Gorbachev did was say to various ministries and various divisions of the government, "You're not going to get funding from the central government anymore. You've got to come up with your own funding and develop a budget accordingly." So, UPDK that dealt with apartments and rentals, etc., were told, "You've got to be self-sufficient. You've go to make enough money off rents and other services to pay for your personnel requirements." So, they became a little bit nicer. At the same time, we were given permission to go out on the private sector. At that time the Russians had invited in people from the private sector to build apartment buildings. There was one Swedish guy who made a lot of money inside the Soviet Union that he couldn't export. So, he said, "Well, I'll build an apartment building and then rent out the apartments and then maybe I can get paid offshore." There was stuff like that going on. So, we were able to start renting apartments from organizations other than UPDK. That made UPDK a little more anxious to be user friendly. So, there was a change in the general attitude of government. The head of UPDK was an Armenian named Karis Dechiance. I had a really good relationship with him; he was very helpful to us. He looked a lot like Gene Hackman and he had a deep guttural voice.

Q: A famous actor.

MACKLIN: At one juncture, I said, "Do you have access to a video machine and is it multi-system?" He said, "Yes." I said, "I'll get you a couple of Gene Hackman movies," so I did. He was really proud that he looked like this American actor.

What else was interesting? There were some strange people at post, but there is no advantage in talking about that.

Q: Maybe you can call them "Mr. X" and "Ms. X."

MACKLIN: There were a few of the types who really did like the Russians and were kind of naive about it but there were only a couple of them and everybody knew who they were. One of the big events there was the fire. It changed personalities a lot. In March of the second year, 1991, they were still working on the chancery. The chancery on the ring road contained the entire embassy except some elements of admin. It had several apartments in it. It had the political, economic, science, consular sections, parts of various other organizations that you find in embassies. All of it was there. The front office, security office, etc. at the same time, they were working on the building, redoing floors. They'd vacate a floor and then redo it. They were doing a good job, the contractor who was in there. One of the things they were doing was putting a big freight elevator on the back of the building. The embassy had two crummy Soviet elevators. One was a glass elevator that would only work about half the time. I remember one time in the first tour, it was stuck somewhere around the seventh floor with Art Hartman. Then there was an inside elevator that went up to the ninth floor that was very small. It was jerky. So, they were putting on this big, enormous freight elevator on the back of the building, which it desperately needed. That was about the end of the whole project. Well, there was a material that was being used on the inside of that elevator that had been provided by a certain organization back here and cleared because it would somehow shield the embassy. You could send out certain kinds of electronic signals through this sheeting. It was procured by this other organization. It was guaranteed non-flammable. Well, there was a welder up on the eighth or ninth floor who was welding away that day early in the morning. A piece of slag from the thing he was welding fell down inside to about the second floor and it got wedged up against some of that sheeting, which turned out to be highly flammable. Within about five minutes, the whole elevator was a roving candle. Of course, it opened up onto every floor of the embassy and so we had to do an evacuation of the embassy. It went all the way up to the roof. The fire lasted all that day, started up again on its own the next day. We had to call in the Soviet fire department. We had our own fire people. The Marines got in on it. Part of GSO, the security guys. It took forever to put that fire out. Basically, it obliterated the mission. Even the consular section down on the ground floor couldn't function because of the smoke damage. There was reallno floor on that embassy where you could work again. It was either burned out or the smoke damage had charred everything. They went into my office. The Russian fireman stole some stuff out of there in the process. There was great danger over secure safes and stuff like that. But it was a really bad fire. It looked at one time like the whole building was going to come down. Why it didn't, I don't know.

When it started, I ran down to the new embassy office building on the compound and saw the construction engineer, Carl. I said, "Why don't I get my video camera?" I lived on compound. He said, "Do it." I came back about a minute later with my camera. We went to the top and spent the day up there videotaping the fire. Most of the best fire footage I provided. The Security Office back here, FBO, etc., and the CIA and some others, did a reexamination of the fire to see if it could have been started by some other means. I just turned over my footage to them lock, stock, and barrel. But it was a massive fire.

Q: I've heard people say that the first firefighters in were very professional and doing stuff, but then another crew came in and seemed to be KGB types.

MACKLIN: There was a second crew that came along that was well-briefed on what to look for. Who knows what they got away with. There was one woman in the political section, Tatiana Deford, who had a brooch. She was of European extraction and her French mother or grandmother had given her a brooch that was about 200 years old. It was very valuable to her and kind of valuable because it had jewels in it. It was in a safe that was not a secure triple locked safe and it was stolen. I told her afterwards, "You've got to know the firemen took it. My suggestion is, you see our fire marshal and get an introduction to the fire chief of the city of Moscow and say, 'I don't care who took it. I don't care what the circumstances are. But here is $500 green. I want it back.' I'll bet you you'll get it back." Well, the fire marshal said, "I resent the allegation that a fireman would steal." She wouldn't push it, so it never went anywhere. A couple of times, people said they stopped Russian firemen from trying to break into safes and take things out of the building. But it caused a lot of excitement and a lot of stress. Then when the fire was over, there was no place to go to work. So, here I was, I was the admin. section. As I remember, Bob Austin wasn't there. So, I had to get together with Joel Hulings and we went down onto the compound and we had to find places for people to work. We went to the Soviets. The consular section of the new building had never been affected because it was on the ground floor. So, they gave us permission to use that even though we didn't allow them their building here. Then there was a big meeting room auditorium. We divided that up. We took the bowling alley and put down a false floor and put DOD in there. We threw people out of townhouses. The army attache was a wonderful guy and was very cooperative and was due to leave post in three months. We said, "WE'RE sorry. We've got to move you into a small apartment." He didn't bellyache. We put the whole admin office in that townhouse. Then in this auditorium was the political section, the econ section, the science people, and agriculture and certain other organizations. We got makeshift tables in there, flat picnic tables and stuff. Nobody had enough table space for all their offices. So, if a table was allotted to the econ. Section, but they went out to lunch, they'd come back and find political officers sitting there working at their table. We set up one vault in the basement, in the motor pool area, of the building with two terminals. People would line up outside those terminals waiting to get in to use them to type their cables. There were often 5-10 people in line.

Matlock, the day after the fire, I expected him to say, "We've had it. Let's reduce to about half of our staff, send about half the people home, and let's prioritize what we're going to do." Well, he made a promise to the White House the day or so after the fire that this was a full performance embassy, that everything would continue at the same level it did before, and that was it. That's what he expected from everybody. So, everybody was trying to do the same job-

Q: Spaso House, was it used?

MACKLIN: It was not because they didn't want them over there. Mrs. Matlock was rather more difficult to get along with than he was. We had a maitre d'. There were two problems with Spaso House that I got involved in. One was, because they entertained so much, it was very difficult to come up with enough food to have food for all these dinners. You couldn't do it through official channels. So, the head cook, Pietro, who was an Italian who had married a Soviet and who spoke Russian with an Italian accent, was a master at knowing the black market. He would go off in the morning armed with vodka and cigarettes and come back with fresh veal and vegetables that you hadn't seen for weeks. He was wonderful at that. Well, some of the security guys said, "Well, he's trading on the black market and I don't really like that." The deputy budget officer was on his first overseas tour. His only job in the U.S. government before had been as an IRS inspector. So, this was all the kind of impropriety hat gnawed at him. I said, "Look, damn it, it's a false economy here anyways. We've got to provide food for those people at Spaso House. He does it." Well, they put it in writing. I said, "We've got to deal with it." Lo and behold, Sherman Funk came out about three weeks later. I reminded him that I had written him a letter from Rome outlining some of the problems with an investigation at that point that had been counter to accepted legal procedure in the U.S. I said, "Gosh, I was hoping I'd get a response" and he said, "Didn't I ever respond to you? That was a wonderful letter. On this thing at Spaso House, do what you're doing. Don't worry about a thing. I'll send you a letter in a couple of weeks reaffirming this, but I want you to go ahead and let that guy keep dealing on the black market." Of course, he never sent the letter, but the guy kept dealing on the black market.

Q: How about the consular section? Did that cause any problems?

MACKLIN: No, he didn't cause me any problems. The guy who was the consul general, Max Robinson, was very bright and very competent. He was a good guy. Max and I got along. We had no problems at all. The first year I was there, my GSO was a guy named Jim McKeezer, who was on his last tour in the Foreign Service. He was a strict constructionist. You don't do anything you don't have to do. Just stick your neck out and you get into trouble. Well, in the old days, the Soviets didn't give people exit visas. Now they did. So, we suddenly got a large volume of visa applicants. It was unheard of in the old days. They didn't have enough space. So, Max Robinson came and said, "Maybe we could issue visas outside, but it's hard. Maybe if we took the side of the building and built kind of a lean-to and created windows out there." I said, "Makes sense to me." Well, the GSO really didn't like it. He just rubbed his heels and we finally had to order him to do it. He said, "Damn it, you let Max do this and the next thing you know he'll want walls. Then once he puts up walls, he's going to want it heated." I said, "Well, I would presume he will, so let's plan for it." "Well, then they're going to want bathrooms." Damn it, these people have to go to the bathroom, too. In any event, that was a constant battle to try and provide enough service for the consular section. They really needed it. They had their hands full. There were more Americans coming over, more Americans getting into trouble. Max Robinson did a good job. He was a good officer.

Q: You said the security people wanted to keep you all on the compound. What about life off the compound?

MACKLIN: Life was much better. I don't remember anybody being victimized the way they had been in the old days. There were incidents. I didn't notice that the second time. In fact, life off compound was nice. They had allowed free enterprise restaurants to spring up, so you could find new restaurants around town. If you paid them a little on the side, you could get good food. There were nightclubs that kind of sprang up, nothing special, but kind of interesting. The two circuses improved a lot. Then you had other firms come to towMcDonalds was a huge hit. At McDonalds, they started out providing hamburgers - at Russian prices. So, that meant a Russian could afford to get a hamburger at McDonalds. For us, it meant you could get a hamburger for about three cents. The Russians, you would see them lined up for blocks around McDonalds, waiting to go in. It was good food and it was cheap. Pizza Hut came in after the first year. Ice Cream, Baskin Robbins. Pizza Hut provided pretty good pizza. So, there were things like this. They restored some of the hotels. The Metropole was restored beautifully. So, there were social attractions outside in the city. The flea market sprang up. When I had been there before, Russians couldn't sell anything. The only way to sell anything was through what we called the government commission. You'd go there. It's kind of like a pawn shop. You could buy things and most of the stuff was crap. But at the flea market, it was really free enterprise. You could get some good stuff. Individual Russians had a shot at getting some hard currency. So, it was fun on the weekends, if you didn't have to work, to go off and buy things.

Q: Did you get out at all? By this time, we had some consul generals around, didn't we?

MACKLIN: Actually, we only had Leningrad while I was there. I got three or four times. That was a lot of fun. It was a fascinating city. They had a lot of problems down there that we tried to help them with. Yekaterinburg didn't open until later on when I was on the desk and the same with Vladivostok.

Q: Kiev?

MACKLIN: We tried to open Kiev. Finally, it did. The last year I was there, John Gunderson went down there with two other people and opened it up. But the problem was, the Department wouldn't give us any money. We owned four apartments in Kiev, but they had fallen apart and they needed to be redone. We didn't have an office building. John Gunderson was assigned down there as consul general. He's a good guy who did a good job. He was a tad arrogant and kept coming up to see us and saying, "Why can't you guys give me what I need?" We couldn't even support the Moscow mission on the budget we had. So, there was a lot of friction developed. We tried to get money from Washington from FBO and just came up empty handed.

There was one other problem I can mention in the admin side. When I arrived there, the budget section basically didn't work. The budget officer never knew how much money he had. Our accounting staff was maintained offsite in Bonn. There were five dedicated FSNs who handled the books for Embassy Moscow. But there was no computer link between the two. He wasn't a great manager and wasn't particularly liked. What he would do was, about every two or three months, he'd take his books and fly out to Bonn and spend a week going over the books and find out how much money he had. So, it was a terrible way to run things. He was too conservative when you needed to buy things. Then we'd find out later on that we could have made purchases that we desperately needed. So, I basically sacked the person who was doing our computers, who was incompetent. We got with a lot of nagging and persuading somebody who was very good at computers who was able to work up an e-mail line between Embassy Moscow and Embassy Bonn. So, it was a permanent line and the budget section was then able to get information daily. It worked really well. It allowed us to straighten out the budget section. The head of the budget operations was going through a lot of personal problems. His number two was this guy whose only job had been working for the IRS and he felt his main job wasn't really to help with the budget, but to try and identify people who might be cheating somehow. So, it took a long time, but we finally got that e-mail link and were able to straighten out the budget operation.

Then we had problems with the old guard from the Office of communications. This was at a time when the Department combined all of the computer people in the Foreign Service with the Office of Communications. The people from the Office of Communications, there was an old guard there who were very good at old technology but didn't understand new technology. They felt this woman we had who was doing the computer work was an upstart. They needed to rein her in. She was doing what we wanted her to do. So, OC sent out a representative, one of their regional guys, who felt he didn't need to talk to me and would go straight to the DCM. Well, the DCM said, "You've got to go deal with Matlock." We had a battle. They tried to knife this woman. They tried to spread rumors that she was incompetent and so forth. We were able to help her through it, but it was a stupid bureaucratic fight that we didn't need.

Q: You left before there was no longer a Soviet Union.

MACKLIN: We left a month before the coup. I always regretted it.

Q: What was your wife doing there?

MACKLIN: She went out to work in the political section. She was assigned to political internal. Did some traveling but really wanted to work in science, so she was able to do a switch with a guy named Ed Salazar and both were better off. She worked in science two years and liked it.

Q: In '91, whither?

MACKLIN: In '91, I went to the National War College at Fort McNair.

Q: How was that year?

MACKLIN: It was a good year. I had fun. I unwound from Moscow. I had wished I had stayed in Moscow. My wife didn't. She was sorry we went back. But I wish we had stayed on. Because we were in the War College when the Soviet Union broke up and they set up embassies all over what used to be the former Soviet Union, they tapped people who had just been there. But from the War College, you could not be pulled out. So, Dick Schumacher, who had been the head of political internal, and I were trapped at the War College for a year, which was extremely frustrating. But it was a good year. I got to know a lot of the military guys and had a good time.

Q: You were there from '91-'92?

MACKLIN: Correct.

Q: A lot of people had been through Desert Storm. The military must have been feeling pretty good about itself.

MACKLIN: Everybody had been through Desert Storm. They were pretty happy with themselves. I would not say they were cocksure. There were some guys in our class who were obviously affected. When you're at the War College, you take a two week trip at the end of the year. There were a couple of Air Force guys who had been flying "wild weasels," electronic countermeasure. They would go out and kind of bait the anti-aircraft missile crews and then send in a counterpunch. But it's kind of risky chicken that they play. These guys said it was very clear to them from the way this technology was managed that these stations were being run by Russians. They said it was really touchy business. There was this one guy who I think was probably ruined by this. He got drunk almost every night. He was extremely funny but had become very iconoclastic and just kind of babbled constantly and had lots of stories about how unnerving it had been. Most of the ground guys took it in stride. They had handled it pretty well.

Q: The War College always sort of sets you up for something else. What happened with you?

MACKLIN: What I wanted to do was, I didn't see anything on the desk in SOV. We didn't want to go overseas right then. I was really interested in being deputy executive director of NEA and I thought I could have done a good job. I lobbied very hard for that job. He picked somebody else at the last minute, kind of a lesser mortal. In fact, normally, what happens is that you come in as deputy executive director and when the director leaves, you kind of move up. This guy when his time came was not moved up. I don't know. I talked to one of my pals in Personnel who said, "Well, the problem with you going into the EX in NEA is, you have the same strengths and weaknesses as the executive director and he wanted somebody?" I had a lot of personnel experience and so did that guy. So, I didn't get the job.

I was offered a job as basically executive director for AID's establishment in the former Soviet Union. They were going out to the former Soviet Union. They were going to set up offices in Moscow and all of the republics. They needed to find housing and office space and to get their administrative stuff in gear. They offered me that job. I turned it down. There was an AID guy in my class at the War College who said it would be a mistake to work for the woman who was head of that division in AID. She was Ken Adelman's wife. Adelman had been the head of ACDA at one time. They were Republicans. She was known to be extremely difficult. She was a close friend of Marilyn Quayle's. He said, "She tends to suck people dry and then _____. People just don't want to work for her." So, I thought about it for a long time and turned the job down.

I cast about for a while. My wife kept saying, "They need a deputy office director in the Office of Global Warming in OES. It's a big issue and the guy who is the office director is really a good guy. Everybody is very happy there. The person in the job, Stephanie Kinney, is well thought of and she likes it. It's probably a pretty good job." I stewed about it for a long time and took it and it was an absolute disaster.

Q: Today is December 7, 2000. You were in OES from '92-'93. What happened? You might explain what OES does.

MACKLIN: OES started out as the Bureau of Science and then later on they expanded it to include international problems concerning oceans, science, and the environment. There were an awful lot of international treaties affecting fishing rights, environmental issues like endangered species or coral reefs, biodiversity, and science. There were bilateral science agreements with Eastern Europe. Back in the days before the fall of the Soviet Union, there was bilateral science agreements, though not so much now. The office that I went into in OES dealt with global warming and the ozone question. It was the deputy job. I took it because I was told the office director was really a good guy. It was a fun office and an interesting issue and was pretty laid back work. Well, I got in there and it took me about four days to figure out that I was wrong; it was everything but that. That's the way the office had been described to me and it wasn't.

Q: Obviously, you go around and talk to people in the corridor. Who was misinforming you?

MACKLIN: My wife. She normally has awfully good judgment, so I didn't really go very far. She told me these wonderful things about the office, so I didn't pursue it and it was my mistake. It turned out she admitted she was totally wrong. So, I went to the P [principal deputy assistant secretary] desk, a guy named Vick Smith, who had been kind of a career OES officer and said, "This assignment is a mistake. We should cut bait now." He said, "No, I'd be grateful if you'd try it out. Please stay at least a year." It was a two year assignment. So, I stayed a year and then walked back in to see Vick Smith and said, "Vick, I gave you a year. Now I quit." I went off and had to find another assignment.

The problems with the office were global warming is a very big issue. The office director is a good guy. We got along personally. But we disagreed on substance and management of the office. On the substance side, he felt that it didn't matter if global warming was going to happen or not, it didn't matter if we should be pushing the country towards some sort of policy to control global warming or to slow the process down. The substance of the office was to control the process. As long as we controlled the process within the interagency process, that was all we really needed to worry about. There were a lot of UN organizations involved in this issue. There were two UN bodies who followed global warming and made recommendationthe International Committee on Climate Change and one other. They were all big multilateral organizations composed of people from the UN, other countries, and a lot of NGOs. Many of the NGOs, actually the most active NGO came from Global Climate Coalition, which was a group of very smooth, effective lobbyists paid for by the coal and oil industries. They played to the office director's strengths, saying, "Let's control the process. Let's make sure we have people involved on the committees who make these determinations." One of the big issues was targets. They didn't want the IPCC [International Panel on Climate Change] to recommend any targets. In other words, a three percent reduction by such and such. Their view was that we still don't know enough about this process, that we're the ones causing it, that man is causing it, that even though we are causing an increase in carbon dioxide, a leakage is apparent. Well, the scientific community has pretty welnow accepted that the increase in carbon dioxide is having that effect. So, the campaign began to shift even when I was in the office from "We don't know enough about this" to "Why should we make sacrifices when China, India, and Russia are potentially dirtier than we are and they're not bound by any agreement we make?"

Q: Just to put it into picture, the coal and oil group were the people who were producing the pollutant. Their users would have to pay for this. So, it was based on money to begin with.

MACKLIN: Yes. Well, the lobbyists were very smooth. They said, "Look, what we've got to adhere to is due process. Everything has to be transparent. Nothing can be resolved behind closed doors. At every step of the way, we want to ensure that we're represented." All of those goals were achieved. The management side of it is the office director, a guy named Dan Ritesnider, a nice guy. He is unable to delegate. At the time I went into the office, his mode of operation was to come in late, spend a lot of the day on the phone just kind of social stuff with other people involved in the issue, sort of networking. Then about 5:30, he would like to kind of sit down and start brainstorming abut what we needed to do that day. He would routinely work until about 8:00 pm. He'd routinely come in on holidays. Once, he dragged his kids in on Thanksgiving Day so he could work for about five hours. He liked to work with the whole office in his office. He liked to get everybody in his office. He had huge stacks of papers everyplace. He liked to get everybody in and then "barnstorm." That was his favorite means of developing ideas. He went through about two packs of cigarettes a day. He wouldn't leave the building. He would quietly smoke in his office. So, we were subject to all that second hand smoke. I said to him after a couple of days when he said, "What do you think of my office," "It all goes through you. Why don't you kind of parcel some of this out so everybody can be working at the same time? You can still control things." He said, "No, it doesn't all go through me." He just never understood. Later in the year, they gave me ozone to work with. They added that to the office portfolio and gave it to me and let me do it on my own. It was fun. It was kind of interesting. I ran up against EPA. The head of the ozone unit at EPA was a woman named Eileen Claussen, who later became Assistant Secretary of OES. She was very hard and tough and had a nasty side but I liked her. She was very competent.

Q: Could you explain what ozone meant?

MACKLIN: There is an ozone shield in the atmosphere around the earth. That filters out ultraviolet light from the sun that causes skin cancer. Because we, man, is using something called carbofluorocarbons, CFCs [we used to use it in refrigeration and stuff like that], it destroys ozone. So, as this stuff rises up in the atmosphere, it's beginning to cause a thinning of the ozone layer. The ozone layer protects us from the sun. So, there was a Montreal convention signed. It's been generally supported by the rest of the world. Industry climbed on board, unlike with global warming. Industry became convinced that this was a valid problem and they developed an alternative to CFCs. So, all air conditioning and refrigeration units manufactured in the U.S. are free of CFCs. That's not true of China and some of the developing world, but that's part of the bigger fight. They say, given time, probably a lot of time, 50-100 years, the ozone layer will build back up again. But it's something that has to be monitored closely. So, there is an international secretariat in Montreal. EPA was kind of a lead organization on this. I got to know the guys there pretty well. Besides Eileen, they had 200-300 people working on ozone. The State Department had me doing it part-time. So, they were there a long time. There were some legal backgrounds. They knew the secretariat, the people at the secretariat, the other delegations, the issues. Nonetheless, they played hardball. I went to meetings in Montreal and I learned later on that the EPA delegation would arrive a day or two before we were supposed to and then they'd have an American delegation meeting without ever telling me that it was taking place. They'd approach other national delegations and say, "Let's get together our two delegations and discuss issues" and never inform me. As I found out about these things and made it clear to them that approach was not acceptable.

It was a fight, but the fact, is that I liked the guys at EPA personally and I liked Eileen. They knew what they were doing and there was no substantive difference between State and EPA. So, I figured it was important for State to continue to play a role, but as long as they weren't undermining our policy, I wasn't as concerned. I only did it for about five months before I quit. With global warming, I went for a couple of international conferences. Frankly, I didn't like the way they did business. I felt it was really bad. Reed Schneider wanted to do it all himself. He would often have meetings in his office. He wouldn't say, "Let's have a meeting at 2:00 pm to discuss a paper we need to do for this and such." He would just grab? There was a Civil Service guy there who had a scientific background, Jonathan Pershing, who was very bright. He'd grab Jonathan and say, "Come on in and let's figure out what we're going to do" and not tell other people in the office. You could go along for a couple of days after that without having been informed that they decided we needed to write a paper or something like that. On every element of the office's work, that kind of stuff went on. It wasn't that he was making an effort to cut me out. It just never occurred to him to get everybody together in the office

Then when the new administration came in, the Clinton administration, in January '93, and Gore and all that stuff, there was an amazing amount of toadying up to the White House and trying to prevail over who would be the lead agency on these issues and elements of these issues. Actually, most of it didn't work, but in the process, Dan would volunteer to write papers that didn't need to be written. It was sort of a scattershot approach to things. One night, he kept everybody in the office working all night long to do a paper that nobody had asked for but he thought might ingratiate us to one of the staffers at the White House. He also wanted to spread the rumor that those at State worked all night long. He kind of took a lot of pride in that sort of thing. So, it was a bad match. At the end of the year, I told him, "I'm quitting" and then I went to Dick Smith and said, "I quit."

There was also a problem in OES at the time. They had an executive director who really didn't understand the way you recruit for the Foreign Service. So, what had been under Tom Pickering and John Negroponte basically a bureau about 85% FSOs, by the time I left, it was only about 10% FSOs. There was a bad feeling between the Civil Service personnel and the Foreign Service side of the building. It had some real problems. So, I quit.

I was offered a couple of jobs in Personnel. I turned them down. Then I was offered a job working for Tom Symons in SE/SC under Strobe Talbott, who had been a friend of Bill's. They had been Rhodes scholars together. So, when Clinton became President and Madeleine became Secretary of State, Strobe was made special representative to the former Soviet Union. Strobe Talbott was a good guy who kind of liked to run his office like an Oxford don. Every day at the end of the day, they would schedule vespers. He'd go there about 7:00 and sit around and talk for an hour to an hour and a half whither the Soviet Union. They were very good discussions. I only got to a couple of them. They were fascinating. But that's what he liked doing. He really enjoyed that kind of thing. He spoke good Russian and knew the Soviet Union. If you wanted a fresh approach to the former Soviet Union, he should have been a good guy to do it. At the same time, there was a decision under the Bush administration to develop an assistance program to the former Soviet Union. The Clinton people carried that on. The money had been voted and it was sort of a bipartisan approach to trying thelp the Soviet Union in its transition to a free economy and a pluralistic political society. So, when Strobe Talbott had been a journalist for Time Magazine, Tom Symons had been the principal deputy assistant secretary in EUR and had been responsible for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. So, Strobe used to come in and see Tom all the time and get little tidbits of information and discuss things. They had known each other from that time. Tom Symons was at that time U.S. ambassador to Poland. So, Richard Armitage had been running that office. It had been newly set up and Armitage under the Republicans had been the director, but he had only been there for about six months when Clinton came in. So, Symons took over and pulled together an office mostly using the people? Tom Symons didn't drive a very good bargain and Strobe Talbott really wasn't good at and didn't like management decisions. Tom Symons said, "If I'm going to do that, I'd like a staff to do it." He was basically told, "Well, you can have two people." He said, "No, I need more than that" They argued and they finally said, "Okay, you can have four people and that's it. You can have Armitage's own staff and you can have four people and don't talk to us again about people." That was a bad deal. Some of the people that Armitage had were pretty good and some weren't. But this wasn't really a team that Tom Symons had brought together. It was a patchwork quilt.

I was invited in to kind of do the admin side and to help out on certain specific issues. I think what had been intended was really to be part of a larger S/NIS, Newly Independent States. They took what had been EUR/SOV, which had been a very large office, and they cut it off and made it part of the Secretary's division of the State Department [S/NIS]. That was kind of a mini-bureau unto itself. In fact, over the following years, there was a lot of thought being given to whether or not it should become a separate bureau. There was a lot of thought given to all that stuff. In any event, I think what was intended was for us to be part of NIS and just the assistance part. But it didn't work that way. Tom Symons came in and said, "No, I don't want anybody else going to vespers. I'll go to vespers." So, we were cut off from those evening meetings with Strobe.

Then the next thing that happened was that Strobe sort of weeded out all of the old Soviet hands from the Foreign ServicKurt Cameron, Warren Zimmerman, Bill Brown, Mark Paris, a whole bunch of them. He even got down as far as John Fernell, who had been a junior officer during the early '80s. So, there was a lot of expertise that was sort of sent off or consigned to other areas of the world. In any event, something happened with Tom Symons and Strobe Talbott. Something didn't click. I think it was egos. I think Tom thought he should have had the job and he probably shouland that he was smarter than Strobe. One time Tom Symons came back from one of Strobe's staff meetings and was talking about, "Boy, there is no organization. Sitting through one of Strobe's staff meetings is like trying to keep a squirrel in your lap. It just goes every which way." I remember another time when Strobe had a meeting with everybody from S/NIS and they invited us. It was about the only time we were invited to one of those things. He kind of talked about the importance of the new organization and a lot about whether or not we should be a separate bureau. Somewhere during the conversation, Strobe said something about smoking or something, something like, "What have you been smoking," and Tom said, "Yes, but did you inhale?"

Q: President Clinton was faced with the question of "Have you ever smoked marijuana" and he said, "Yes, but I didn't inhale." So, Strobe Talbott being a roommate of Clinton, this was?

MACKLIN: Yes. So, Tom said, "Well, did you inhale" and Strobe got a really sour look on his face and said, "Well, Tom, you still inhale." Then he went on with the meeting. It was less than a week later that we heard a rumor that Tom had been fired. In fact, there were a couple of people on Strobe's staff who got very nasty towards us. I was an OC by then. In particular, there was one lady who was odd and she just refused to see me about certain issues. It became a little bit nasty. She was the first one to tell me, "Well, for one thing, your boss has been canned, so why do we owe you guys anything?" What do you say? A couple of days later, Tom Symons called a? Obviously, Strobe leaked the information, but they didn't have anybody to take Tom's place. About two days later, Tom Symons had a staff meeting and said, "I had a long talk with Strobe and we have agreed that it's probably best for me to move along. When I do, he will take over the office and I will do something else." Then it took them two years to find somebody. They kept asking people and nobody took the job.

Q: What was the reason?

MACKLIN: It was a combination of things. I don't know for sure. Frankly, one of the things is, they were asking the wrong people. They didn't do a good job of head hunting. The guy they eventually got in there was not nearly as effective as Tom and knew nothing of the area. They were desperate to have somebody in that job because it had become a major embarrassment. People knew Tom hadn't had Strobe's confidence, but you would have thought this would have been a big operation. You would have thought that somebody would have jumped at it. Maybe people saw what happened to Tom and thought, "I'm not going to get myself in that situation where I don't have the support of my boss." So, in the meantime, S/NIS, what used to be EUR/SOV, had a parallel operation for our operation. I think they had four people who worked on assistance questions. Although Tom Symons controlled expenditure of funds, SOV or S/NIS had a parallel operation. They were kind of snippy towards us. The people in AID knew very well that Tom didn't have Strobe's backing, so they also? I later took on responsibility for something called the Russian Officers Housing Program, which was a program to get the Russian officer corps out of the Baltic countries. There were thousands and thousands of Russian officers who were in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and they had a good life there. They were part of the Red Army. They were well paid and they had a nice house to live in and food was more available there than it was back in Moscow. When these people were transferred back to Russia, there was no housing for them. They had families and would have to stick them in hotels or move in with relatives or live in tents on a base. It was a very unpleasant situation. So, we developed a program, which we shouldn't have called the Russian Officers Housing Program, but we should have called it the Baltics or the Russian Program, but because we were providing housing for Russians, the press had a field day along the way. But in any event, AID, especially the AID people in Moscow, had some very well developed ideas on how they wanted to do that program. I would tell them, "We control the money, so we should have had the final say in it." I had several confrontations with them and said, "No, we want to do the following" and they'd do it anyways. "Let's take a trip over there and take a look at what's going on." Then I'd find out the next week they had gone off on their own without us. I talked to the head of the AID program for Russia, whom I had known from Vietnam. "Let's go out there and take a look at this thing." He agreed. He said, "I'll let you know when." Then he made arrangementgot tickets, visas, everything. About two days before he was due to leave, he said, "Oh, yes, did we tell you we're all leaving the day after tomorrow." It takes a week to get the damn visa. At the time, the Russian embassy was being nasty about visas. They'd pull trips like that. It didn't do any good to talk to Tom Symons about it because he lost his clout.

Q: Was Symons still there?

MACKLIN: He was there. He stayed on in the job.

Q: I would have thought this would be very uncomfortable.

MACKLIN: It was very uncomfortable. The one thing he did was develop a good relationship with two of the ladies working in the office and decided what we reallneeded to do was support and fund the free market people in the former Soviet Union and in the Ukraine and establish enterprise funds and things like that. It was actually a mistake. There was a certain amount of blind enthusiasm. We found some people in the Soviet Union or in Russia who seemed to say all the right things, so we kind of galloped off on this thing. Tom Symons also was able to redirect the policy a little bit and everybody at the time thought, "Well, this really is the way to go." It also had the merit of putting money in enterprise funds. Then you don't have to deal with all these assholes in AID who wanted to do it their way. They wanted control and if you give the money to an enterprise fund, then we don't have to deal with AID as much.

So, Tom did a lot of that. In the end when he finally left, Strobe got up and made speeches about what a wonderful job he had done and how despite what had happened, Tom had redirected policy and he was the one responsible for the success. Tom Symons was still pissed off about it. He got up and made a speech saying, "It was wrong to fire me and it was a stupid, ignorant thing to do." He said it in much more eloquent terms, but it still kind of pissed off Strobe. Tom went off to be ambassador to Pakistan. I am told he did a wonderful job. Then he retired and went off to the Hoover Institute at Stanford.

Q: While you were doing this, was there anything hovering over your organization? Before, it was sort of the engine on which the whole world was driving. Then all of a sudden, except for trying to keep these people from popping off missiles, it was gone and we had other priorities. Was the State Department getting the word on this or was it going along the same course?

MACKLIN: I think it was understood as an opportunity. The Soviet Union had broken up. Bush had felt, "Let's support Gorbachev because here is a guy who really understands that we need to disarm and that his country needs to change. Let's support him within the framework of his country." So, even things like supporting the Baltic states' desire for independence, we were a little bit late and a penny short. But after the coup attempt and the business with Yeltsin in the White House and the Bush election, it was understood that this was an opportunity, that the Soviet Union was kind of in a vacuum. It's not in freefall, although the economy was in freefall. It was in a vacuum. All the old dogma and doctrine were gone. They have got to understand how economies work in the West. There was desperation on their side to understand how to rebuilt their own country so they can enjoy the kind of prosperity that the West enjoys. At the same time, there was a level of greed that we had been used to for 100 years. So, it was a bit of a mess. I think State saw all of this as a great opportunity to influence the direction of a country that used to be our enemy but was now a friend and there was no reason why there needed to be any enmity between us as long as we could help them reform into something that was pluralistic and was based on free market.

Q: What you were doing was looking at the economy and trying to make things work within it. Were you seeing what eventually happened, the state resources into the hands of a bunch of cronies?

MACKLIN: I never saw that and I never dealt with the energy sector. Tom Symons and some of the people we had on contract and in Civil Service temporary appointments may have had an inkling that there was a lot of profit being taken by Chairman Merdink and other people, but it never came to my attention.

Q: You alluded to it before, but just looking at bureaucratic behavior, did you find that when it was obvious that there was dysfunction between Symons and Strobe Talbott, there was a beginning to group around and take sides?

MACKLIN: Oh, yes, everybody was on Strobe's side. There were only a couple of FSOs in our office. There was me and for a while Terry Taminol and Joe Thessel, but they left very quickly when they saw the way things were going. Darren Johnson came in later on, worked for a year until Dick Morningstar replaced Tom Symons. But we were kind of civil servants and contract people. Strobe had a small group of younger officers, mostly notably Victoria Newlin, who became his special assistant for about three years. She was unusually bright and competent and quick. According to one of the people who worked with her in Moscow in the political section, she had a psychopathic desire for power. I always found her to be polite, witty, and decent, but Strobe liked her in every wholesome sense of the word. She had a lot of influence on Strobe and a lot of control over who saw Strobe and who didn't. I think she was disinclined to share Strobe with anybody else. There were other people like that who considered that there was sort of a loose inner circle and that they were influencing policy. It was a younger group, except for Jim Collins, who is well-liked. I never had much respect for him. I didn't think he was much of an independent thinker. I thought he was basically there to carry out everything Strobe wanted.

Q: You were there from when to when?

MACKLIN: I was there from the summer of '93 until about October of '95. Tom Symons finally left in June or July. He was replaced by a guy named Dick Morningstar. He had been the deputy over at OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation]. He is a smart guy from the private sector who was brought in to work at OPIC. He owned a Minor League baseball team. I felt he was a really bad appointment. I felt that the NSC people were desperate to find somebody to replace Tom Symons. I know for a fact that the under secretary for Management had offered Tom Symons a couple of jobs and he turned them down saying, "No, I'm not going to leave here and take up a job as a bus driver someplace." When he did go to be ambassador to Pakistan, that was considered acceptable. But they were really desperate to find somebody else. They liked Dick Morningstar. They felt that they would get somebody who was smart, brash, brought a private sector no-nonsense approach to these problems and understands economic problems. The thing Dick Morningstar didn't understand was government. He felt alienated by it. He really didn't understand how things worked. One of the problems we had at the time was, we were supported by SS/EX [the executive directorate for the Secretary of State]. In fact, the whole time I was there, one of the things I had to do was work with SS/EX. They serve as personnel, budget, and GSO office and executive director for the whole seventh floor. So, their first priority is the Secretary, understandably. The executive director up there was Lynn Diff, who was off on the Secretary's trips, organizes travel, etc. Big job. So, they're up there to support the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. We were packed on. After we were dropped from favor, it was very clear that people shouldn't waste any resources on us.

At the same time, since we hired people by contract, we had an unusual contracting authority that pissed off the rest of the building. We had had a couple of problem secretaries dropped on us. Before I arrived, promises had been made to a couple of the Schedule C, Schedule B political people. SS/EX refused to carry out these promises. So, I had to do the paperwork and talk to them. They were rude to me. They refused to see me. It was really unpleasant. There was one lady in particular who was very bright but kind of a prima donna who had been promised a GS-14 and she was an 11 or a 12. Tom Symons really liked her work and Strobe liked her and SS/EX refused to consider changing her grade level. So, Symons was pissed off at me because I couldn't get things done and they wouldn't give me the time of day. Finally, we got her promoted because I teamed up with one of the guys in the office and we went to see Torrie. Torrie had sent an e-mail to the personnel officer in SS/EX saying, "Strobe really likes this gal. Help her." Suddenly, we got the promotion. But there was a lot of unpleasantness.

Morningstar came in, so with all of this unpleasantness behind us, he came in and made a bunch of further demands. He wanted some people out of DOD, so I had to fight those fights. I won most of them, but he didn't like being told, "No, you can't do that." In the end, we parted amicably, but when he first came into the office, the deputy was Darryl Johnson, who has been ambassador twice and is now Deputy Assistant Secretary for EAP covering Chinese affairs. He is a very competent guy. He was the deputy and Dick Morningstar came in and Morningstar didn't want to talk to Darryl. He said, "Oh, he's too hard nosed. I don't want to talk to him." So, there was a guy in the office named Bill Taylor, who was a pal of Bill Bradley's and was a good guy. He runs the office now. But he managed to be Dick Morningstar's batman. He was the guy who delivered when Morningstar wanted something. There were two political appointees in AID, a guy named Tom Dine, who was then head of AIPAC but had done something embarrassing and had been fired, so he was given a job in AID, head of the program for assistance to the former Soviet Union. Tom Dine and Dick Morningstar and there was another political staffer up there from the Hill and Bill Taylor and they would go off on their own. "Let's have lunch together. Let's have dinner together. Let's talk about how we're going to do this." They left Darryl and me and everybody else out of it. It was really unpleasant. All Dick Morningstar did during that first year was, he took two defunct enterprise funds in Russia and combined them into one. They had recreated enterprise funds and they hadn't loaned any money out. So, he combined them into one and energized them. But it was a recommendation that had been around for a while. I think there are other things we could have done. Two of the things I worked on in my declining months there, I had responsibility for health issues. There are a lot of things in the health field we could have done for Russia. We put no funding into it. The woman with AID who was responsible for health had about 13 people. There had been some money put into health the first year. She was just an unmitigated bitch. She was an FS-2. I was an OC. There were times when she refused to see me. It was just bullshit. So, I had to wind up making alliances with people from NIH and CDC and other organizations to get things done in spite of her. It was difficult.

The other thing I took on was the rule of law stuff. We had some small programs in the Soviet Union with NGOs here in Washington teaching them how to do jury trials, rule of law, how to organize politically at the local level, things like that. It was really legal assistance to former policemen, lawyers, and these were good programs. I always felt that was something we should have put a lot more money into. Well, we didn't, but I felt the money there was well spent. In any event, I think one of these days historians are going to have a field day with that program because there were a lot of problems there.

Q: You left there in '95. Did you feel that much had been accomplished?

MACKLIN: No. I didn't think what we had done had had much impact in Russia. Russia had changed and I felt the embassy had had some impact. When Pickering was out there as ambassador, I felt he had a lot of impact. But I didn't think the aid program had much impact. The housing program worked in that it got about 18,000 army officers out of the Baltics. So, that was okay. But if you look back and see the changes that took place in Russia in the economic and political sense, the positive changes, we will have a difficult time proving that what we did contributed very much to those positive changes.

Q: I got a little taste of this in this period when I went to Kyrgyzstan for three weeks with USIA. The idea was to give them ideas for setting up a consular service. I talked to people and we had all sorts of people coming with bright ideas. It seemed to be mainly the money that was allocated was spent paying travel and salaries to people who were doing wonderful proposals in the U.S. It was a great boon to the academic world.

MACKLIN: Yes. That's certainly one of the things that AID does best. They bring experts from the U.S. to go over and they write papers and leave behind papers full of good advice. At the same time, in fairness, there were an awful lot of Russians that were brought over here. A lot of these Russians came over here and hit the Bloomingdales of the world, but they learned a lot and they were exposed to what happens in another country and it was easy enough for them to see that we enjoyed a much higher standard of living and we weren't doing it by exploiting anybody. It was just a system that was working better. You could find problems here, but nothing like the problems over there. So, I thought the money spent bringing Russians over here to look around and get a feeling for what we do was money really well spent.

Q: I assume in '95, you were getting ready to get the hell out.

MACKLIN: By then, I was looking for an onward assignment and we had the same problem with my wife, trying to get a joint assignment overseas. The best we were able to do, I was offered the admin counselor job in manila and she was offered the science officer job in Jakarta. We turned it down. I was approached about the job, but I called out there and talked to them. If there had been a job in Manila for Adrian, I would have taken it, but there wasn't. There was an admin counselor job coming open in Jakarta that summer. A friend of mine, Ward Gromick, was going into the job. Morrie's wife had just joined as a secretary and it wasn't clear there would be a job for her in Jakarta as a secretary, but the EAP/EX people told me there probably would be a job for her in Manila as a secretary. So, I found Morrie and said, "Would you do a switch? You can have Manila, where your wife is more likely to work and I'll take Jakarta." This was all between us. I had been put up to it in part by the personnel officer in EAP. Morrie said, "Let me get back to you." Then he tried to switch his job for Hong Kong. They found out about it and said, "No, they have enough trouble making this assignment in Jakarta. Nobody's changing anything." So, we said, "No." We didn't have jobs. Adrian was in B/EX at the time, so she extended for a year. I took a job as deputy director of EUR/EEA, which was responsible for the assistance program to Eastern Europe. It's the same thing I had been doing in the Soviet Union but it was in Eastern Europe. I was deputy to a guy named Jim Holmes, who was ambassador to Latvia. I liked that a lot. That was a good job. I would have liked to have done it for two years. I took it on for one year because Adrian and I really needed to get overseas. But Jim Holmes didn't have to worry about Strobe's support. He was extremely well organized and very competent. We had a good relationship with AID. They didn't give us much crap. We had FSOs in the office, not schedule Bs and Cs. We had some really good people in the office. The programs worked well and they were better identified programs with the banking sector and so on in Hungary and the Czech Republic, etc. It was a good job. I liked it a lot. Midway through the year, the whole Dayton thing came about.

Q: This was Yugoslavia.

MACKLIN: Yes. The peace treaty for Bosnia. So, we had to put together the assistance program for Bosnia. We worked with INL, with the Narcotics and Legal Affairs Division at State, with AID, and with a lot of other agencies. We had quite a lot of money. I felt it went very well. It was a good year.

Q: That gets you up to '96.

MACKLIN: Yes. I had just gotten? It takes a while. I started in October. So, by the spring, I was really catching on. But we tired for overseas assignments and there just wasn't anything together. The executive director of EUR approached me and said, "How would you like to go to Vienna as admin counselor?" I said, "Sure, is there anything there for my wife?" He said, "I don't know." I went off and looked. Indeed, there was. There was political-economic counselor at the U.S. mission to the UN agency in Vienna. It was a good job, an FSO-1 job, a supervisory job, management stuff. I thought, "Wow, I'd love to go to Vienna." He said, "Well, the ambassador is a little bit tricky. She has her own ideas about who she wants. Normally, the executive director of the bureau picks the admin counselor. But she has got a lot of political power and she'll decide who she wants. So, you go interview with her." Well, I interviewed and made a mistake. I interviewed one day when I had a headache and had been through a whole bunch of meetings, unusual fighting with AID, and I went in there kind of emotionally exhausted and ill-prepared. I should have learned a little bit more about the ambassador. I just bombed. It was a terrible meeting. She obviously wanted somebody who was terribly polished who would spend all of their time assuaging her ego. She was a lady with real problems.

Q: What was her background?

MACKLIN: Hunt Ketchup. The Hunt brothers in Texas who tried to corner the silver market. She had lots of money and had given generously and wanted to go to Vienna. Her husband was a conductor of sorts, so it was perfect for his love of music. She spent a lot of her time trying to flirt around Europe and spent a lot of time running down to Bosnia trying to be our ambassador to Bosnia at the same time.

Anyway, my interview just fell flat. So, that was the end of my candidacy. But about a month later, the DCM at the UNVIE mission called up my wife and said, "Would you like to come out and be my political-economic counselor?" So, we stewed about it for a while and I said, "Well, shit. I'm not going to get anything. Why don't you take it and I'll go on LWOP?" So, she did and I did. In the process, it doesn't take a math wizard to sit down and figure out, if I stayed on LWOP for two years in Vienna, I would not get paid a pension. I was eligible to retire. So, that's three years of pension that I would not collect and would really never collect. So, I went ahead and retired. I stayed on LWOP about six months.

Q: It's been fun. Thank you.

End of interview